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Payments for Environmental Services
Payments for environmental services - short, PES - are defined as “1) a voluntary transac-
tion in which (2) a well-defined environmental service (or a land use likely to secure that
service) (3) is ‘bought’ by a (minimum of one) buyer (4) from a (minimum of one) provider
(5) if and only if the provider continuously secures the provision of the service (condition-
ality)” [Wunder, 2006, p.50]. The definition given by Wunder is the most widely cited
one throughout the literature, even though he is well aware that criteria are stylised and
PES schemes constantly fail to meet all criteria, for example through intermediate gov-
ernment interventions, a lack of well-functioning monitoring systems and/ or ill-defined
environmental services. The definition given serves more as a ‘theoretical reference point’
[Vatn, 2010], assisting in the analysis of to what degree a certain PES scheme suffices the
theoretical description.
Since the publication of ‘The Economics of Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity’ (TEEB)
study, the debate over quantitative and monetary assessment methods of ecosystem ser-
vices has gained public and political attention, going beyond the purely academic sphere
which discovered the topic years before [Loft and Lux, 2010]. Costa Rica is considered an
‘early mover’ in the field, a country which laid the foundation for monetary compensation
for ecosystem service provision as early as 1996 through the establishment of the Forest
Law No. 7575, emerging out of heated discussions between various civil society and gov-
ernmental bodies [Porras et al., 2006]. In chapter one, article 3, paragraph k, the Forest
Law recognises four environmental services: i) Mitigation of greenhouse gases (fixation,
reduction, sequestration, storage and absorption), ii) water protection for urban, rural or
hydroelectric usage, iii) biodiversity protection for conservation and sustainable, scientific
and pharmaceutical usage, iv) ecosystem protection and protection of landscape beauty
for touristic and scientific ends. Instead of a polluter-pays principle, which is commonly
implemented by means of command-and-control approaches, PES is based on the ratio-
nal of beneficiary-pays [Engel et al., 2009] and is “conceptualized as a non-compulsory,
negotiated framework” [Wunder, 2006, p.50]. These characteristics find their economic
justification in the Coase theorem. The theorem, written in 1960, states that market
participants can overcome problems caused by external effects through bargaining or vol-
untary market-like transactions, given that transaction costs are low and well defined
property rights are in place. Under these conditions, the market secures the efficient dis-
tribution of resources and external effects are thus internalised. However, and as already
stated above, government interventions as well as constantly found high transaction costs
in PES schemes cast doubt upon the fulfilment of the Coasian pre-conditions (cf. Vatn
(2010), Porras (2010)).
The focus of this study will be placed on answering the research questions and outlining the
various theoretical considerations leading to the formulation of these. A broad description
of the different aspects circling around the Costa Rican payments for environmental service
schemes will not be given, as they have frequently been documented by other authors.
For a comprehensive overview of the PES programme in Costa Rica, see Camacho et al.
(2000), Porras et al. (2006), Wünscher et al. (2008) Daniels et al. (2010) or, for the most
recent and comprehensive overview of lessons learnt over the last 20 years in the field of
PES in Costa Rica, consult Porras et al. (2012). For studies undertaken on more specific
aspects of PES, such as the question of the programme’s impact, see Sierra and Russman
(2006), Sills et al. (2006), Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) or Pfaff et. al (2008). For
the literature on potential trade-offs between conservation and poverty alleviation goals,
constituting another block frequently discussed with reference to PES, refer to Pagiola et
al. (2002), Pagiola et al. (2005), Zbinden and Lee (2005) or Engel and Palmer (2008).
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Pursuing a quantitative approach, the aim of this study is to assess ex-post impacts of
payment for environmental service (PES) schemes in the region of Sarapiquí, Heredia
Province, Costa Rica. As unit of analysis, focus is placed on immediate neighbours to
PES areas to elicit spatio-temporal effects that the existence of a scheme may cause on
its surrounding environment. Therefore, this study is concerned with neighbourhood-
effects of payment for environmental services, i.e. analysing the influences PES schemes
exert beyond their demarcated areas over the surrounding environment (spill-over effects),
and understanding from this neighbourhood-perspective the effects and reactions that
are being triggered. The different notions inherent in the term ‘neighbourhood’ will
be picked up by using a narrow definition of geographical neighbourhood on the one
hand and a broader definition of neighbourhood dimension on the other. Furthermore,
the study will draw on the economic as well as on the social psychology literature and
theoretical concepts will include Self-Determination Theory, Cognitive Evaluation Theory
and Equity Theory. The research design will rely mainly on quantitative survey methods
with emphasis on Likert Scales (attitude measurements).
1.2 Purpose
Research is needed to identify what kind of influence the existence of a PES scheme in the
geographical neighbourhood or the receipt of information regarding PES out of familiar
and non-familiar information channels exercises over its surrounding environment. Gen-
erally, studies focus a) directly on the target group of PES schemes, assessing for example
income/poverty affects1, b) on overall PES participation, analysing profile differences be-
tween participants vs. non-participants2, c) on the question of additionality3 or d) on
leakage4. Potential spill-over effects have seldomly been assessed as the vast majority of
studies focus either on direct PES payment receivers or on potential PES providers. The
latter mentioned studies on leakage/slippage comprise an exception, as these frequently
draw buffer zones around PES contracts (cf. [Alix-Garcia et al., 2010]) and control for dis-
placement effects in the neighbouring area (e.g. increased/decreased deforestation). The
lack of analysis on the non-targeted population who could still be affected by PES through
neighbourhood effects might be explained through applied pre-matching methods in PES
impact evaluation studies, which generally pre-screen non-participants for PES eligibility
criteria (so called ‘potential providers’) before comparing them to PES participants, thus
1[Pagiola et al., 2002, Pagiola et al., 2005, Zbinden and Lee, 2005, Engel and Palmer, 2008].
2[Ortiz Malavasi et al., 2003, Miranda et al., 2003, Zbinden and Lee, 2005, Arriagada et al., 2009].
3[Sierra and Russman, 2006, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007, Pfaff et al., 2008, Wunder et al., 2008].
4[Murray et al., 2004, Sohngen and Brown, 2004].
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pre-set characteristics of study participants are favoured over distinct selection criteria,
such as neighbourhood vicinity for instance. By shifting the focus and placing emphasis
on these neighbourhood effects, the purpose of this case study is to explore potential
spatio-temporal effects triggered due to vicinity to a PES area on the one side and effects
being triggered due to the receipt of information regarding PES out of the broader neigh-
bourhood dimension on the other. Findings will be relevant to increase the effectiveness
of the PES policy instrument by fully realizing its unintended co-effects, investigating on
the one hand effects that PES schemes cause over its surrounding neighbourhood (e.g.
raise of fairness concerns) and on the other hand studying potential reactions to the newly
introduced effects (e.g. in form of motivational adjustments).
1.3 Rationale
Decision making never takes place in a completely individualistic, mutually independent
or uncoordinated way. As Wilson (1997, p.73) highlights, the “analysis of dynamics within
a farm district shifts the onus away from the assumption that farmers are autonomous
actors, and acknowledges that in reality decisions are made in more complex and dy-
namic ways” (see also [Skerratt, 1994, Morris and Potter, 1995]). Thus, the existence of a
PES scheme might, through the informational environment, stimulate information seek-
ing behaviour in the surrounding population or shape perceptions over the whole scheme
(usefulness); might change motivations towards the environment due to crowding-out of
intrinsic motivations, due to an increased view on the environment as a commodity or due
to fairness concerns; might influence attitudes towards the enforcement of environmen-
tal laws, towards views on the importance of forest conservation or towards perceptions
over deforestation bans of person’s living close to the implementation area. In general,
understanding factors such as neighbourhood effects is particularly relevant as they can
influence the creation of local patterns of uptake. Especially for effective delivery and
safeguarding of ecosystem services, these spatial clusters of uptake are important ingredi-
ents as environmental benefits normally take effect not on field scale or farm-level scale,
but on landscape scale.
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
The aim of this study is to assess ex-post neighbourhood-effects of payments for environ-
mental services, i.e. to analyse the influences PES schemes exert beyond their demarcated
areas over the surrounding environment (spill-over effects), and understanding from this
neighbourhood-perspective the effects and reactions (modified perceptions, motivational
adjustments etc.) that are being triggered. The different notions inherent in the term
‘neighbourhood’ will be picked up by using a narrow definition of geographical neighbour-
hood on the one hand and a broader definition of neighbourhood dimension on the other.
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Applying quantitative survey methods, effects will be measured in terms of ‘changes’,
‘correlations’ and ‘differences’ (see part ‘research method’ for further explanation), rely-
ing mainly on 5-point Likert Scales (attitude measurements). Furthermore, open ques-
tions will complement the questionnaire, encouraging study participants to express their
opinion in a more unstructured way, providing a second source to interpret quantitative
findings. The unit of analysis will be the individual.
The first part of the research question investigates the general knowledge about PES, if
neighbourhood effects can generally be identified and what perceptions people living close
to a PES contract hold over certain parts of PES or the environment in general.
• How many people who receive/have received PES payments interviewees generally
know?
• What are the main channels through which people hear and receive their information
about PES?
• Are interviewees aware that a PES contract exists in the distance of maximum of
500m from their homes?
• Have interviewees who know PES ever spoken about the programme with their
neighbours living at a distance of maximum of 500m?
• In which of the following areas are we able to identify the existence of neighbourhood
effects5? Which of these areas demonstrate being significantly impacted by the
introduction of a PES scheme close-by? Which areas demonstrate the least impact?
– Changes in information seeking behaviour.
– Changes in views over nature’s commodification and changes in motivations
towards environmental goals.
– Changes in views concerning the enforcement of environmental laws.
• Which perceptions do people located in the distance of maximum of 500m to a PES
site hold over PES with reference to its usefulness?
• How do people located close to a PES site view the deforestation ban imposed by
the Forest Law and the chances for illegal logging on private Fincas?
• How do people located close to PES site perceive the fairness of their neighbours
receiving PES, even though their land is already under a deforestation ban by the
Forest Law?
The second part of the research question investigates how identified neighbourhood effects
can be explained, looking at relationships between variables on the one side and theories
and their proposed effect-channels on the other. To this end, hypotheses will be tested.
5Note that a detailed description of the term ‘neighbourhood’ as well as of what the term encompasses
will be given in chapter five
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• Low motivations towards the environment are negatively correlated with self-reported
negative motivational effects concerning the environment due to the introduction of
a PES scheme close-by.
• Views on nature’s commodification are correlated with self-reported negative moti-
vational effects concerning the environment due to the introduction of a PES scheme
close-by.
• Fairness concerns with reference to the neighbour who receives PES are negatively
correlated with self-reported negative motivational effects concerning the environ-
ment due to introduction of a PES scheme close-by.
• Neighbourhood effects increase with the time of being located next to a PES site.
• Is the assessment of neighbourhood effects conducive to geographical analysis?
1.5 Thesis outline
In the following, chapter two will briefly introduce the case study’s research location. Af-
ter outlining summary statistics on Costa Rica in general, the focus will subsequently be
narrowed down to the canton level where this study was undertaken by shortly describing
Heredia (provincial level) as well as Sarapiquí (cantonal level). Chapter three will discuss
relevant research conducted on the topic of PES, exploring specifications of neighbour-
hood effects as well as highlighting approaches undertaken in different studies. This will
be a vital element to specify where the present research fits in.
Chapter four will built upon chapter three, picking up discussed effects and presenting a
model for analysis. Chapter five will describe the methodology and the data collection
method. At first, key terms and concepts will be explained, followed by a broad section
focusing on the sampling process, as sampling criteria and thus site and household selec-
tion influenced the characteristics of the obtained sample. At the end of the chapter, the
questionnaire as well as pre-test modifications will be outlined.
Chapter six pursues the objective to illustrate results. In a first step, the obtained sample
will be described in more detail and, where feasible, compared to overall Costa Rican
population statistics to gain an impression of the socio-economic composition of the sam-
ple. Then, questions belonging to part one of the formulated research questions will be
assessed, followed by the analysis of questions belonging to part two.
Chapter seven will summarise conclusions, succeeded by chapter eight listing recommen-
dations. Finally, Appendix I shows t-Test statistics for some selected variables in more
detail, whereas Appendix II illustrates the English version of the questionnaire employed
in this study.
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2 Case-study site
The aim of this chapter is to briefly introduce this case study’s research location. After
some summary statistics on Costa Rica in general, the focus will subsequently be narrowed
down to the cantonal level where this study was undertaken by shortly describing Heredia
(provincial level) as well as Sarapiquí (cantonal level). Fonafifo explicitly recommended
the canton of Sarapiquí as research site, together with the region of San Carlos, when
confronted with the research proposal. As the project PESILA-REDD6 is planning to
carry out farmer surveys in Sarapiquí as basis for an impact evaluation of PES where also
neighbourhood effects are addressed, it was decided to conduct interviews in Sarapiquí,
so that thesis results could directly gain practical relevance by flowing into this project.
2.1 Costa Rica
With a total area of 51,100km2, the Republic of Costa Rica is quite a small country in
Central America, bordering Nicaragua to the north and Panama to the south, having
access to both the Atlantic (east) as well as to the Pacific Ocean (west). According to the
most recent census, Costa Rica has a population of 4,3 million people [Census-CR, 2011]
and a GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP of roughly 14,1TInt$
[IMF-Stat, 2012], ranking top among Central American countries (see Figure 1), together
with Panama where the Gini-coefficient is, with 0.52 (2006), slightly higher than Costa
Rica’s 0.507 (2006) [WB, 2012]. The Happy Planet Index, an index trying to capture the
Figure 1: Latin American PPP GDP’s in TInt$, source: IMF-Stat (2012)
6Payments for Ecosystem Services in Latin America in the context of REDD: Integrating methods for
evaluating the enabling conditions and cost-effectiveness of PES.
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Figure 2: Map of Costa Rica. Squares: Heredia (province) and Sarapiquí (canton)
extent to which countries “deliver long, happy, sustainable lives for the people that live in
them” by using data on life expectancy, experienced well-being and ecological footprints,
ranks Costa Rica on top out of its 151 countries [Nef, 2012]. The human development
index (HDI) published by UNDP, which uses a composite measure to evaluate three di-
mensions of human development, namely health, education and income, lists Costa Rica
on position 69 out of 187 countries with a HDI of 0.744. This value is slightly higher than
the average of the whole Latin American and the Caribbean region, which is given with
0.731 [HDI, 2011].
Overall, Costa Rica is a stable country compared to its neighbours and has no standing
army, which was abolished in 1948. With more than two million international visitors
in 2010, tourism is an important sector and contributed 5.5 percent to national GDP
in 2010 [ICR, 2011]. An extensive network of national parks, biological reserves, forest
reserves, wildlife refugees, protected areas etc. continues to attract foreign investments
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and eco-tourism. By 2021, the country intends to become carbon neutral, a goal to whose
end a national strategy composed of a national agenda and an international agenda has
been developed [UNEP, 2012].
2.2 Heredia
Heredia is one of Costa Rica’s seven provinces and is located in the central-northern
part of the country. 86 percent of Heredia’s 434,000 inhabitants live in urban areas
[Census-CR, 2011] in the southern end of the province in the so called ‘valle central’, a
densely populated area which also hosts the capital San Jose. By contrast, the northern
part, which stretches up to the Nicaraguan border, is more dominated by agriculture.
Heredia’s 2,656km2, making it the smallest province in Costa Rica representing 5.2 percent
of total national territory only, are subdivided into 10 cantons (see Figure 3), where
Sarapiquí, this study’s research site, is the tenth canton.
Figure 3: Heredia province
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2.3 Sarapiquí
Sarapiquí is the name of the tenth canton in Heredia. The canton is subdivided into five
districts (Puerto Viejo, La Virgen, Las Horquetas, Llanuras del Gaspar, Cureña)7, with
Puerto Viejo representing the cantonal capital. The main part of the canton is located
on the so called ‘northern plain’ (hueter norte), one of six geographical regions in Costa
Rica. Even tough Heredia represents the smallest province in the country, Sarapiquí is,
Figure 4: Sarapiquí canton
with 2,140km2, one of the biggest cantons in the country, accounting for roughly 80 per-
cent of the province’s total territory, covering the entire northern section. Compared to
7Note that Figure 4 shows three districts only, even though Sarapiquí consists, since 1999, of five. The
two created districts Llanuras del Gaspar and Cureña are located on the northern end of Sarapiquí.
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the rest of the province, a decisive characteristic appear to be its inhabitants: Remember-
ing that around 86 percent of Heredia’s population lives in urban areas, Sarapiquí only
represents 2.7 percent of these. By contrast, 77 percent of Heredia’s total rural population
is explained by Sarapiquí [Census-CR, 2011]. Thus, it becomes clear that this extensive
canton is heavily dominated by rural areas.
Social Development Index To further characterise the Sarapiquí canton, it is useful to
look at the Social Development Index (SDI), a tool developed by MIDEPLAN (Ministerio
de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica) to evaluate the degree of development of
the country’s various geographical zones. The index uses 11 indicators from four areas
- education, political participation, health and economics - permitting to identify low-
developed areas which can then be targeted more directly by government interventions
[Mideplan, 2007]. Figure 5 displays the various indicators and shows the quartiles of the
social development index for the canton as well as for the district level.
Figure 5: Composition and quartiles SDI, canton/district level, source: Mideplan (2007)
Looking at Sarapiquí in the whole, the SDI gives a value of 21.2, placing the canton
clearly in the first and lowest category of all national cantons as the 25 percent quartile
has a value 27.0 (national average). Therefore, Sarapiquí has a position of 68 out of the
81 analysed cantons in the statistics of MIDEPLAN, indicating that the area is lacking
behind in terms of key socio-economic variables. MIDEPLAN’s data allow a more detailed
breakdown to district level, where the distributional dimension can be assessed further.
The two northern districts Llanuras del Gaspar (no. 41004, see Figure 6) and Cureña (no.
41005) represent one of the least developed areas in the whole country, ranking 465 and
465 respectively out of 469 national districts. Puerto Viejo (no. 41001), the place where
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Figure 6: Canton and district SDI’s Sarapiquí, source: Mideplan (2007)
the cantonal capital is located, ranks 445, thus it becomes clear that the research location
belongs to one of the least developed parts in Costa Rica. With a SDI of 45.5, only Las
Horquetas (no. 41003) to the south manages to cross the 45.3 threshold into the second
quartile.
PES in Sarapiquí As Sarapiquí is sparsely populated and characterised by a rural, forest-
rich landscape, it is here where the lion’s share of payments for environmental services
has been channelled into. Out of Heredia’s total 548 PES contracts protecting 41,534ha,
500 contracts and almost 90 percent of total hectares are absorbed by Sarapiquí, thus
the canton is heavily targeted by PES [Fonafifo, 2012]. The implications for the present
research have to be kept in mind: Only the canton of San Carlos in the Alajuela province
has, with 678, received more PES contracts than Sarapiquí. The similarly sized canton of
Perez Zeledon in the San Jose province ranks fourth with 309 contracts and the canton
of Nicoya in the Guanacaste province has received 352 contracts and ranks third, though
being smaller in size. Thus, PES contracts are widespread in Sarapiquí, a fact that cre-
ated difficulties at a later stage during site selection (problems related to this issue will
further be elaborated on in the methodology chapter).
Since the inauguration of the programme, Sarapiquí’s southern regions have received most
contracts, above all La Virgen (no. 41002, see Figure 6), with 254 contracts protecting
18,249ha, followed by Puerto Viejo with 107 contracts protecting 7,914ha and Horquetas
with 104 contracts protecting 7,523ha. The two northern districts Llanuras del Gaspar
and Cureña account together for only 34 of all 500 contracts in Sarapiquí, protecting an
area of 3,557ha or 9.5 percent of total hectares [Fonafifo, 2012]. Looking at the most
common PES types, Fonafifo’s data show that forest protection contracts rank top with
215 contracts, followed by the protection of wildlife refuges with 111 contracts, accounting
together for around 81 percent of total hectares protected. As forest protection and
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protection of wildlife refuges represented the most common PES contract types, it was
decided to conduct interviews around areas which received PES payments for one of the
two respective modalities. With this decision, a first criterion was established, narrowing
down possibilities for site selection.
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3 Literature review
In the following, research on the topic will be discussed by exploring specifications of
neighbourhood effects as well as by highlighting approaches undertaken in different stud-
ies. This will be a vital element to identify where the present research fits in. In the
literature, spatial effects that targeted conservation policies may cause on its surround-
ing, non-targeted environment are treated under the term spillover [Jaffe et al., 2005,
Galdeano-Gómez et al., 2008, Blackman, 2012] which can be either positive or negative,
implying beneficial or costly side effects. Depending on the definition of neighbourhood
assumed, different channels have been outlined through which these effects work: In geo-
graphical neighbourhood definitions, distance is decisive [Robalino and Pfaff, 2011]; using
political divisions, the whole unit is key (country, state, district etc.) [Grubb et al., 2002];
in market definitions, dependencies are crucial [Brock and Durlauf, 2001]; using a network
definition, social selection criteria (belief, political conviction etc.) might be deciding
[Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005]. This study will employ a narrow definition of geograph-
ical neighbourhood on the one hand (i.e. distance) and a broader definition of neighbour-
hood dimension encompassing neighbourly feelings and relations as of neighbours on the
other (see 5.1, ‘Definition of neighbourhood’ for a detailed description).
3.1 Substitution and slippage effects
As already indicated in chapter one (‘Introduction’), substitution and slippage effects rep-
resent one of the few effects which focus on the immediate surrounding environment, thus
comprising one set of studies dealing with neighbourhood effects in the literature. The
former term describes the displacement of activities that should be prevented by a scheme
(e.g. deforestation) to neighbouring areas [Blackman, 2012], reducing conservation efforts
to a ‘zero-sum game’. Alix-Garcia et al. (2010), for example, test substitution effects
by analysing an early cohort of payments for hydrological services in Mexico, assessing
if enrolment of one parcel leads to increased deforestation on other parcels belonging to
the same landholder. Using matched counterfactuals, empirical results indicate that the
probability for substitution to occur increases with poverty levels, thus this effect was
observable only for a certain group of people. Furthermore, areas with high poverty levels
also demonstrated lower levels of programme impact, a result that the authors attribute
to relaxed credit-constraints. Besides substitution effects, price slippage effects describe
price increases in local markets due to reductions in, for example, timber, leading to in-
creased production of these products in neighbouring areas [Blackman, 2012]. For this
to occur, markets have either to be sufficiently localised and unable to pass on these
changes to the entire national market or one has to make the assumption that protection
is large across the country. Alix-Garcia et al. (2010) empirically test this effect within a
50km buffer zone, using road density to proxy for market access. Results illustrate that
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a high degree of enrolment within the buffer zone is significantly related to changes in
deforestation in all buffer zones, with results varying with road density. Nevertheless, the
authors caution that the output price slippage test is not conclusive, “as it is possible that
high enrolment of area in the program is correlated with some other unobserved charac-
teristic of a region that also increases deforestation” [Alix-Garcia et al., 2010, p.30]. As
substitution and slippage effects are already addressed in other studies, they will not be
considered here, thus testing for them lies beyond the scope of this study.
3.2 Labour demand and NTFP
Pagiola et al. (2005) serve as another source where neighbourhood effects, i.e. effects
which are felt by the surrounding population, have been identified. As Table 1 shows,
they find that PES establishment can change labour demand through land use change,
with the extent and direction of this effect depending on overall employment opportunities
and the relationship between current and future PES labour demand. Referring to Costa
Rica, PES programmes are targeted mostly at existing forests. Therefore, only minor
changes can be expected, with negative labour effects seeming unlikely to occur as this
would imply that the area would have been used for labour intensive agricultural purposes
beforehand [Miranda et al., 2003]. A second potential impact on non-participants through
the introduction of PES concerns access to non-timber forest products (NTFP), with the
impact’s extent depending on availability of such products before and after programme
establishment. Nevertheless, also this effect seems neglectable in the case of Costa Rica
as PES programmes are implemented mostly not on communal but on private land, thus
NTFP have not been accessible for third parties in the first place.
3.3 Participation factors
A promising first entry point to further identify neighbourhood effects is to gain a bet-
ter understanding of the variables that affect the decision to participate in PES8. It is
clear that these variables are somewhat different from variables measuring effects that
are caused on the surrounding geographical environment due to results of a programme
activity, as the general accessibility to the Costa Rican PES application pool for all people
interested implies self-selection (only people fulfilling the basic requirements will apply.
For a list of requirements, see text-box on the following page). Thus, participation factors
might already imply some sort of eagerness of eligible individuals to gain funding, and
it is unclear what motivates this eagerness and the desire to implement a PES area at
a proposed location. Indeed, Kosoy et. al (2007) point towards substantial differences
between participants and non-participants (potential providers) in PES schemes, with the
8[Ortiz Malavasi et al., 2003, Miranda et al., 2003, Zbinden and Lee, 2005, Grieg-Gran et al., 2005].
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Table 1: Non-participants affected by PES, source: Pagiola et al. (2005)
former accepting payments below opportunity
costs and the latter “not [even being] willing to
take part in the research, clearly being opposed
to the PES scheme” (p.448, ibid), a finding which
could possibly be explained through different mo-
tivations towards the environment (people inher-
ently environmentally friendly or not). Never-
theless, participation factors give a valuable in-
dication of what factors are shaping PES per-
ceptions and which factors are crucial for further
uptake. Therefore, one useful approach would
be to elicit the views of neighbours on these al-
ready as decisive identified factors, analysing i)
if and ii) in which ways these variables are af-
fected through PES establishment in the nearby
neighbourhood. Furthermore, we can check if the
magnitude of these variables significantly vary (di-
minish/increase) with the time people being lo-
cated close to PES sites, which could be taken as
an indicator for temporal effects. Studies showed
that positive perceptions and attitudes towards
certain practises tended to promote participation
within conservation programmes9, thus positive
reactions of people to these neighbouring PES
sites could generally be beneficial.
Landowners who wish to participate in the pro-
gramme have to provide the following a) Applica-
tion form to the regional MINAE office; b) Proof
of identity or statutes of an organisation; c) Proof
that they hold a legal title to the land. If appli-
cant only have possession rights then other official
requirements are necessary: proof of sale, three
independent witnesses, description of the property
and its limits, proof that there are no conflicts over
the property, etc. All of these have to be publicly
authorised by an official lawyer (notario público);
d) Proof that they have paid local taxes; e) An
official cadastral map of the property; f) Verifica-
tion of the size of the area by a professional to-
pographer; g) (Copy of) a cartographic map on
a scale 1:50.000 to indicate location of the area;
h) Legal authentication of representative; i) For
sustainable forestry activities, a Forest Manage-
ment Plan drafted by a professional forestry engi-
neer and approved by the National Conservation
Areas System (SINAC). Reforestation can only be
financed after additional official approval by the
Ministry of Agriculture; j) Priority areas for ap-
proving projects are selected every year through a
decree. Source: Porras et al. (2006).
9See for example [Sheikh et al., 2003, Sidibe, 2005, Emden et al., 2008, Wei et al., 2009].
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Brotherton’s approach Generally, two approaches to categorise factors affecting the de-
cision to participate in environmental conservation schemes have been developed. Wilson
(1997) draws on Brotherton’s (1989, 1991) classification into ‘scheme factors’ and ‘farmer
factors’ (see Table 2), expanding his categories by adding variables such as ‘information
environment’ [Thacher et al., 1996, Adesina and Chianu, 2002], ‘attitudes towards the en-
vironment’ [Mcdowell and Sparks, 1989, Morris and Potter, 1995] and ‘dynamics within
the farm district’ [Wilson, 1992], stating that these are “neglected factors in the literature,
possibly due to its ‘intangible’ nature” [Wilson, 1997, p.86]. However, his findings were
very modest. Concerning the information environment and impact of available sources for
information provision on participation, no results were reached. He later acknowledged
that the disappointing result might “possibly suggest a weakness of the methodological
approach adopted in this study” (ibid, p.87), thus he does not regard his added variables
as unimportant. Indeed, Thacher et al. (1997), Adesina et al. (2000), Adesina and Chi-
anu (2002) and Zbinden and Lee (2005) all demonstrated that access to information is
positively related to uptake of conservation activities, Rigby et al. (2001) showed that
uptake increased if a farmer had received information primarily from other farmers (in-
terpersonal communication), Moss (1994) quantified this effect stating that 40 percent of
farmers applied to an Environmental Service Area (ESA) scheme as soon as is was brought
to their attention, a technical trip by IIED (International Institute for Environment and
Development) to Costa Rica’s PES concluded as a main policy lesson that “information
is key to spread participation” (Porras et al., 2006, p.45), Arriagada et al. (2009) state
Table 2: Participation factors, source: Wilson (1997)
15
Table 3: Reasons for not enrolling land in PES, source: Arriagada et al. (2009)
that many of interviewed non-participants do not participate simply due to a lack of infor-
mation about the programme and, vice versa, Van der Horst (2011) attributes low uptake
of an ecosystem service provision scheme to negative local publicity, further emphasising
the “high impact of localised information provision” (ibid, p.674). One interesting area of
research is thus to take up these ‘neglected factors’ and analyse in more detail the infor-
mation environment in the field of PES in Costa Rica, checking for instance if people are
familiar with the PES programme, if they possess knowledge about it, further addressing
issues related to access to information through the assessment of the different channels
through which people hear and receive information about PES. Furthermore, local dy-
namics can be investigated by directly asking study participants if they have spoken with
neighbours about the scheme, if they are aware that a property with PES is located next
to their place of residence, or if and how they were influenced through the establishment
of the PES site close-by. That questions regarding the information environment are highly
important is further illustrated by Table 3, where ‘lack of information’ dominates the list
naming reasons for non-participation (cf. [Arriagada et al., 2009]). This is followed by
the view that the system is ‘too complicated’, they ‘distrust’ its functioning, application
fees are viewed as too high or payments as being ‘too low’. Some points mentioned here
will further be taken up in the study, for instance if people regard these programmes as
useful or not or if they are of the opinion that through these programmes, the government
and its agencies are now better able to enforce environmental laws.
3.4 Motivational theories
Arriagada et al. (2009), with reference to Pagiola et al. (2005), develop Brotherton’s
approach further (see Figure 7), maintaining the division between scheme and farmer
factors (here termed ‘household characteristics’) but grouping participation factors into
three successive categories: Factors that affect eligibility to participate, factors that affect
their desire to participate, and factors that affect their ability to participate. Whereas
the first category depends on the programme’s targeting and thus cannot be influenced,
desire points directly towards motivations.
Motivational theories, especially with reference to PES, can generally be built upon two
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Figure 7: Factors influencing participation and non-particip., source: Pagiola et al. (2005)
stances. Standard economic theory regards individuals as self-contained with idiosyncratic
pay-off functions, where effort is negatively linked to marginal utility [Fehr and Falk, 2002a].
A desired behaviour can be stimulated by offering contingent rewards, serving as ‘positive
reinforcers’ by changing an individual’s utility calculus. Intrinsic motivation to carry out
certain tasks which require effort (i.e. implying ‘costs’) and do not offer any reward can
hardly be explained. Translating that to our case means that an individual’s desire to
participate in a PES scheme can only be understood if and only if the prospect of this
participation offers strictly more utility than abstaining from it. Strictly, as an equal
utility level implies indifference, and this term is incompatible with desire.
Kosoy et. al (2007) demonstrate that economic explanations often fall short when at-
tempting to justify phenomena within the field of PES. Analysing three PES schemes in
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watersheds in Central America, they conclude that opportunity costs are strictly larger
for enrolled landowners than the actual amounts received from the PES programme, thus
contradicting not only neoclassical axioms but also the ‘economic foundation’ of PES
itself. A theory which is able to explain such effects is described by the literature on
social psychology, where on the one side intrinsic motivations can serve as an incentive
to act and where, on the other side, rewards can impair performance and motivations,
thus turning intended positive reinforcers into negative ones. Furthermore, ‘intangibles’
such as perceptions over distributional issues (e.g. fairness) or over ‘the right thing to
do’ can trigger positive as well as negative motivational changes even if a person is just
in the position of an observer/third person and thus not the direct target of an utility
maximisation process [Benabou and Tirole, 2003].
Self-determination theory Trying to understand these puzzles makes it imperative to
look more closely at motivational theories. This is a complex matter. The following
paragraph will shortly describe basic considerations put forward in the literature - con-
siderations which are necessary to build the basis to better understand the theory some
analysed effects in this study rest upon, such as crowding-theory. Therefore, the next
abstract should be understood as a road-paver.
The literature generally distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, where
the afore mentioned stance-divide reappears (economic vs. social psychology literature).
Deci (1971, p.105) defines that “one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform
an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself” (see also
[Deci, 1975]), thus derived satisfaction suffices to act even in the absence of economic
incentives [Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997]. By contrast, extrinsic motivation is purely
instrumental with incentives coming from ‘outside’ of an individual [Frey and Jegen, 2001,
Villacorta et al., 2003], thus it can be regarded as means to achieve a certain end. Fehr
and Falk (2002) count for example social approval [Rege and Telle, 2001] or reciprocity
[Falk et al., 1999] in this category, emphasising that intrinsic motivation has to be task-
specific/targeted and constituting an end in itself. Both motivational types have often
been equated with ‘self-determination’ to describe intrinsic motivation, and ‘controlling’ or
‘autonomy enhancing events’ to describe extrinsic motivation, until Deci and Ryan (1985,
1991, 2000) formulated the Self Determination Theory (SDT), arguing that even though
self-determination is per definition explained through intrinsic motivation, extrinsic moti-
vation can also clearly be self-determined, meaning autonomously enforced behaviour as
illustrated by the social approval/reciprocity example. “We argue that extrinsically mo-
tivated action can vary in its degree of self-determination, thus having either a relatively
internal or a relatively external perceived locus of causality. Accordingly, any intentional
action can be described using the perceived locus of causality continuum and thus can be
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said to be more or less self-determined” [Deci and Ryan, 1991, p.250], where the contin-
uum is described by six in self-determination decreasing motivational subtypes10.
Referring to SDT appears convenient as Pelletier et al. (1998) developed the Motivation
Towards the Environment Scale (MTES) to be able to measure self-determination in the
field of the environment. The scale proved satisfactory levels of reliability and validity (see
ibid) and consists of 24 seven-point Likert-scale items, with four items each to reproduce
exactly the categories of the SDT. In the research proposal, it was planned to include the
MTES as the sample could have been easily described in terms of their motivation towards
the environment. However, the idea had to be dropped after pre-testing the questionnaire
(see 5.5, paragraph ‘Pre-test modifications’).
3.5 Crowding-out
Referring back to intrinsic motivation, a further issue studied in the social science lit-
erature concerns ‘crowding-out’ effects [Deci et al., 1999, Frey and Jegen, 2001], meaning
that externally introduced rewards (mostly pecuniary) may erode/crowd out task-specific
intrinsic motivation. Since PES work through monetary rewards, this effect represents
an object of interest. One of the first studies on this effect go back to Titmuss (1970),
who observed that paying for blood actually reduced total supply as the introduction
of a price incentive undermined social behaviour, a result confirmed by Upton (1973)
three years later. Many studies followed empirically validating the existence of such
crowding-out effects11, with Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) finding for example that
the acceptance rate for the construction of a nuclear waste repository close-by dropped
from 50.8 percent to 24.6 percent when compensation was offered compared to when no
reward was offered. The underlying reasons for the occurrence of this effect are either ex-
plained through Self-Perception Theory (SPT) [Bem, 1967, Bem, 1972] or Cognitive Eval-
uation Theory (CET) [Deci and Ryan, 1980, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Goudas et al., 1995],
where the latter “assumes that people have a psychological need for self-determination”
[Fehr and Falk, 2002b, p.37]. CET assumes that the level of self-determination depends
on whether an event is perceived as ‘controlling’ (contingent rewards, evaluation, surveil-
lance, deadlines etc.) or ‘autonomy enhancing’ (positive feedback, choice etc.), claiming
that these effects either weaken or strengthen self-determination. As PES are contingent
on compliance/delivery of services, one should expect crowing-out effects under CET, mea-
sured for example through correlation between task-specific motivations and self-reported
negative motivational effects due to the introduction of a PES scheme close by.
10The categories are: Intrinsic motivation, integration, identification, introjection, external regulation,
amotivation.
11Cf. [Freeman, 1997, Ostmann, 1998, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b,
Frey and Jegen, 2001].
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However, this study focuses on neighbourhood effects, i.e. interviewed participants do
not receive any form of reward or payments, thus the present study does not follow the
standard definition of crowding-out. This is important to keep in mind, as I use this
more as an entry point and then translate the standard definition to a different scenario.
Nevertheless, we might expect similar results as crowding-out relies partly on a psycho-
logical process named Impaired Self-Esteem (ISE). ISE is caused when “an intervention
from outside carries the notion that the actor’s motivation is not acknowledged, his or
her intrinsic motivation is effectively rejected. The person affected feels that his or her
involvement and competence is not appreciated which debases its value...As a result of im-
paired self-esteem, individuals reduce effort” [Frey and Jegen, 2001]. With the neighbour
being paid and oneself not, it appears reasonable to assume that such an effect of ‘own
efforts not being acknowledged’ could still be triggered. In addition, study participants
can be asked directly if their motivation to conserve the environment has increased or
decreased as a result of whether they perceive that their attempts are appreciated or not.
3.6 Commodification of nature
Going back to the study undertaken by Kosoy et. al (2007) where payments were lower
than opportunity costs in all three examined study sites, the literature also offers a sec-
ond route. In an experimental study conducted in rural Colombia, Cardenas et al. (2000)
examine the effects of externally imposed rules and regulations on behaviour and its
implication for environmental quality. They find that with a government-imposed regula-
tion, individuals are worse-off than without this top-down enforced action as they exhibit
less ‘other regarding behaviour’, thus making more self-interested choices than group-
oriented ones, with the result being lower environmental quality. Thus, the intended
welfare improving effects were not just absent, they even worsened the situation. As a
conclusion, the authors state that individuals “tend to strike a balance between self and
group interests” (ibid, p.1719), and that the policy somewhat facilitated a switch towards
Nash-equilibrium.
With the Institutions-as-Rationality-Contexts (IRC) hypothesis, Vatn (2009, 2010) pro-
vides a theory for explaining these effects. As already inherent in its name, IRC rests
upon the assumption of plural rationalities, one social and one individualistic. Insti-
tutions, comprised of societal norms and rules, are viewed as solving the coordination
problem of an individual of which rational to apply to a certain situation, thus signalling
if group interests and cooperation is the name of the game or if purely egoistic motives
should be pursued. A change in the logic of a situation through institutions can either
be triggered through pecuniary incentives or, as Kosoy et al. (2007) explain, “through
imposing a single language of valuation” (ibid, p.1232). Analysing PES, they criticise the
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commodification process12 of environmental services, which 1) disregards the complexity
of national ecosystems, 2) imposes one single exchange-value and 3) hides (‘masks’) any
social relations between ‘producers’ and ‘users’ of the services. Being able to analyse
issues related to the notion of nature’s commodification in the present research, it will
be examined if views on nature’s commodification are introduced through neighbourhood
effects of PES, meaning that if people living close to PES sites regard environmental
services now under a more ‘economic lens’, i.e. as source to derive financial gains from.
Furthermore, it can be assessed whether views are correlated with motivational changes
due to PES introduction.
3.7 Fairness concerns
One additional factor that affects motivation is fairness, with examples coming mostly
out of the organisational literature [Colquitt et al., 2001, Hartmann, 2012]. To concep-
tualise fairness in the environmental field, it is useful to draw on Environmental Justice
Theory (EJT), which generally separated between distributive on the one and procedural
justice on the other hand [Ikeme, 2003, Walker, 2010]. Fairness is frequently interchange-
ably used with distributive justice [Johansson-Stenman and Konow, 2011], with the lat-
ter being equalised with ‘equity’ [Svarstad et al., 2011, Corbera et al., 2007], thus Equity
Theory (ET) seems appropriate to examine fairness concerns. The basic proposition of
ET is that individuals review their respective inputs and outputs and check them with
others. In case unfairness or inequity is perceived, an individual will try to rebalance
through different actions. According to Carrell and Dittrich (1978, p.205), “two meth-
ods of inequity resolution have received strong support. First, individuals in situations
of underpayment may alter inputs to restore equity. Second, individuals may withdraw
from an inequitable situation either temporarily or permanently”, characterised through
for example absenteeism or quitting. Empirical evidence to support ET comes mainly
from research on organisational structures and labour supply, where underpaid work-
ers decrease their inputs (cf. [Patchen, 1961, Homans, 1966] for early studies) or where
managers of a firm report that the practise of firing a ‘lazy worker’ serves above all the
purpose to establish internal equity, preventing other workers from reviewing and adjust-
ing their input/output ratios due to perceived unfairness [Bewley, 1999]. Clements et al.
(2010) demonstrate that this effect is also relevant in the environmental PES field. They
compare three biodiversity conservation programmes in Cambodia, declaring that people
in one village in a bird’s nest protection programme were, even though receiving rela-
tively high payments, not sufficiently motivated as payments were perceived as benefiting
only a few individuals, thus the system was regarded as unfair. That unfairness can result
in negative emotions is further shown by Folger et. al (2001) and DeCremeer et al. (2005).
12Commodification should be understood here as the transformation of goods and services into objects
meant for trading.
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Theoretically differentiating equity, Pascual (2010) reminds us that equity can have dif-
ferent underlying fairness criteria. Equity based on merit for example implies application
of accountability principles associated with payments based on compensation for forgone
benefits or actual provision of services, whereas equity based on a ‘needs rule’ implies
having an eye on how well recipients are constituted, with payments following for exam-
ple a ‘maxi-min’13 criterion. Referring explicitly to the Costa Rican PES programme run
by Fonafifo14, they identify an egalitarian fairness criterion, as payments are not differ-
entiated between number of trees on a protected territory or types of trees for carbon
sequestration, but distributed equally across the entire country [Wünscher et al., 2008].
The field of fairness would appear to be an interesting topic for further research. One
possible way to analyse equity/fairness effects would be to investigate if any fairness con-
cerns are introduced with PES establishment in the neighbourhood or if people generally
think that the disbursement of PES payments to subscribed landowners is a just practise.
Furthermore, the correlation between fairness concerns and self-reported negative moti-
vational effects concerning the environment due to introduction of a PES scheme close-by
can be checked, which could be taken as an indicator for a negative effect.
13Defined as: “Payments aim to maximise the net benefit to the poorest landholders, even at a cost of
efficiency loss. Payments are differentiated according to the income of providers” [Pascual et al., 2010,
p.1240].
14Fonafifo (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal) is part of the Ministry for Environment and
Energy (Minae, Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía) and responsible for financial administration and
for the programme’s payments to landowners.
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4 The Model
Based on the literature review and the various effects discussed in the previous chapter,
a model has been developed to illustrate the proposed effect-channels. This chapter has
the objective to introduce and explain the model and its different components.
As with every model, the schema put forward (see Schema 1) represents a simplification
trying to capture real-world phenomena - phenomena which have been elaborated in the
literature review. It should be noted that the model tries to capture and explain effects
which are more related to the second part of the research question, as this part looks at
relationships between variables and their directions of influence whereas the first part in-
vestigates more generally if neighbourhood effects can be identified and what perceptions
people hold over certain parts of PES or the environment. To the left side of the model,
one finds the information source used, together with the independent components. Infor-
mation about PES can either flow directly from known sources out of the neighhourhood
dimension, for example from geographical proximity (geographical neighbours, knowledge
of PES in vicinity) and from inter-personal proximity (family, relatives, friends, other
known people), or from sources which lie outside of this dimension, for example from
contact to intermediaries, the attendance of an informational meeting about PES, from
radio, TV or newspapers, from direct contact to Fonafifo, Minae or other government
institutions etc.. The information source used represents just the channel through which
a certain information was obtained. The identification of this channel is needed to anal-
yse if an effect was triggered i) by the neighbourhood dimension, which then could be a
possible indicator for neighbourhood effects, or ii) if other information sources acted as
triggers for certain effects. In the latter case, these effects could not be related to the
neighbourhood dimension. This implication is captured by the connection of the first
with the last column of the model, titled ‘intensity’.
Before explaining the independent side and the effect-channels, we find the dependent
components encircled in the third column. They include attitudes and perceptions over
the usefulness of PES, over the capacity of the government to enforce the Forest Law, over
the deforestation ban imposed by the Forest Law and over chances for illegal logging on
private Fincas on the one side as well as motivations to do something for the environment
on the other. Attitudes, perceptions and motivations influence each other, therefore they
are represented together. I am well aware that this representation is, in an economic or
mathematical sense, questionable as dependent components per definition cannot have
an effect on other dependent components. Nevertheless, the relationship is undeniable.
When testing hypotheses, however, only one way of causality will be assumed and tested
- namely the one proposed in the literature. Remembering the literature on fairness, one
such hypothesis worth testing is if fairness concerns with reference to the neighbour who
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receives PES, are negatively correlated with self-reported negative motivational effects
concerning the environment due to introduction of a PES scheme close-by. Regarding the
literature on the commodification process of the natural environment, the model will check
if the proposed introduction of ‘one single monetary exchange-value’ for environmental
services has lowered the motivation to do something for it. Concerning the theory of
crowding-out, it will be analysed if, due to the neighbour receiving payments and oneself
not, an individual feels that their own efforts are not being acknowledged (impaired self-
esteem) and therefore reduces their motivation to do something for the environment. A
condition which is labelled controlling/autonomy enhancing in the model. Finally, it will
be analysed if the time period for which a person finds itself located next to a PES site
has an influence on the strength of attitudes, perceptions and motivations. Besides the
effects analysed, individual characteristics such as age, the education level or gender might
also have an influence on the dependent components and are therefore illustrated in the
model. However, these individual characteristics will only be dealt with at the margin,
as the focus of this study is placed on the afore mentioned effects.
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5 Methodology and data collection
The aim of the following chapter is to give a detailed understanding of the methodology
and the data collection method used in this study. After the definition and explanation
of some key terms and concepts, broad space will be given to the sampling process, as
sampling criteria and thus site and household selection highly influenced the characteris-
tics of the obtained sample, carrying the risk of biases. This section will be followed by
a description of how effects were measured. Finally, the questionnaire will be introduced
together with a description of modifications that had to be undertaken after pre-testing
- modifications which were quite numerous. The chapter closes with a short abstract on
ethical considerations.
The study follows a case study design, pursuing a quantitative approach supplemented by
semi-structured questions and qualitative interviews with key forest experts in the field.
Structured quantitative questionnaires with reliance on mainly pre-coded closed questions
provided a way to reach standardisation of not only questions outlined but also of answers
recorded, allowing to apply statistical assessments methods (using PASW/SPSS). As little
is known about the phenomenon of interest, the research design was of exploratory nature.
5.1 Definition of neighbourhood
As this study is concerned with neighbourhood effects, it is imperative to define what
is meant by this term. The Oxford English Dictionary lists three definitions i) “friendly
relations between neighbours; neighbourly feeling or conduct”, ii) “nearness” and iii) “the
vicinity, or near situation, of something” [Simpson and Weiner, 1989, p.308]. The Web-
ster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary lists on first position “friendly relations, as
of neighbours; neighbourliness” [Webster and McKechnie, 1983, p.1203]. The first defini-
tions given by both dictionaries already indicate that neighbourhood can be understood
in a broader sense than just being physically located next to someone/something. ‘Neigh-
bourly feelings’ or ‘friendly relations, as of neighbours’ are also encompassed. The litera-
ture review already outlined different effect-channels corresponding to the type of neigh-
bourhood definition assumed. For instance, in geographical neighbourhood definitions,
distance is decisive [Robalino and Pfaff, 2011]; using political divisions, the whole unit is
key (country, state, district etc.) [Grubb et al., 2002]; in market definitions, dependencies
are crucial [Brock and Durlauf, 2001]; using a network definition, social selection criteria
(belief, political conviction etc.) might be deciding [Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005].
The present study will pick up the different notions inherent in the term by using a
narrow definition of geographical neighbourhood, i.e. distance on the one hand and a
broader definition of neighbourhood dimension encompassing ‘neighbourly feelings’ and
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‘friendly relations, as of neighbours’ on the other. The former, narrow definition of ge-
ographical neighbourhood will be used for household sampling, using the distance to a
certain PES site as a selection criterion to determine if a household is still considered
to be a geographical neighbour or if the household is located already outside the defined
geographical boundaries and thus cannot considered to be a geographical neighbour. The
idea to use a geographical definition for household selection was derived out of the lit-
erature on substitution and slippage effects, which constantly draw buffer zones around
implementation areas to check whether deforestation ‘leaks’ to nearby places. Alix-Garcia
et al. (2010) use a one and a five kilometre buffer zone in a Mexican case study to check
for leaked deforestation, Kinnaird et al. (2003) and Curran et al. (2004) draw a buffer of
10 kilometres in studies of deforestation in Indonesia, and Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. (2002,
2003) use a one kilometre buffer zone in two studies on deforestation in Costa Rica.
Before going to the field, it has been planned (research proposal) to draw two spatial
zones (SZ) around a PES site where interviews were going to be conducted, the first one
(SZ1) being located from zero to one kilometre around a PES site (0m≤SZ1≤1000m)
and the second one (SZ2) from one to three kilometres (1001m≤SZ2≤3000m). However,
this approach interfered with site selection criteria when data on PES areas by Fonafifo
were obtained, thus the idea of using two spatial zones around each PES site had to
be dropped (see 5.3.1, ‘Sampling criteria for site selection’ and 5.3.6, ‘Consequences of
sampling criteria’). After a discussion with Catie researchers on the right translation of
‘neighbourhood’ in Spanish (possibilities included ‘vecindad’, ‘vecindario’, ‘barrio’ and
‘comunidad’), a local Costa Rican Catie researcher, who has lived all her life within the
country and is thus familiar with the local environment, stated that a 500m definition of
geographical neighbourhood would probably mirror best the understanding of most inter-
viewees. According to her view, a broader definition might turn out to be problematic.
Therefore, the geographical neighbourhood in this study is defined as one spatial zone
only, including all households living in the distance from zero up to 500m around a PES
site.
Besides this narrow definition for the household selection process, a broader definition of
neighbourhood dimension will be employed in the analysis of effects. Remembering the
definitions outlined above, it appears straightforward to assume that ‘neighbourly feelings
or conduct’ or ‘relations as of neighbours’ can be found among family members or friends
due to ties, bonds, feelings etc.. Therefore, this study will count effects being triggered
through contact to family members, relatives, friends, neighbours or due to knowledge of
a PES site in the vicinity as being representative of this neighbourhood dimension, stand-
ing apart from effects caused by other sources, such as the attendance of an informational
meeting about PES or information gained via TV or radio. Without doubt, to assume
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that family members/friends are per definition ‘close’ or have ‘neighbourly feelings’ for
each other is a simplification whose validity can be contested. Nevertheless, studies have
shown that Latin Americans, together with Asians, seem to possess “a collectivistic orien-
tation that emphasizes family members’ responsibilities and obligations to one another”
[Fuligni et al., 1999, 1030] which is stronger compared to Europeans (see ibid for more
sources), thus the assumption appears reasonable. For a graphical representation of the
effects treated as coming out of the neighbourhood dimension and effects being located
outside of this dimension, see Figure 4 (chapter 4, ‘The Model’).
5.2 Likert-scales
Besides the concept of neighbourhood, this study utilised Likert-scales, a tool or technique
allowing to assess attitudes developed by Rensis Likert (1932). Likert-scales [Spector, 1992,
Cohen et al., 2007, Bryman, 2008] can be described as “a set of items, composed of ap-
proximately an equal number of favourable and unfavourable statements concerning the
attitude object” [McIver and Carmines, 1981, p.22], which is given to a group of sub-
jects. Each subject is then asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement
with the confronted statement on an equidistant set of responses, comprised mainly of
five (e.g. strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree, strongly disagree) or seven points
(strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, undecided, slightly disagree, disagree, strongly dis-
agree). Some authors have stressed the importance to use multi-item measures for defining
and measuring a certain concept instead of single measures, claiming that complex issues
can hardly be captured by rating of one single statement. Furthermore, the demand has
been put forward to use reverse wording, i.e. opposite stances (positively and negatively
formulated statements) to minimise response sets and to address the issue of acquiescence
- the tendency to agree with all leading to biased results [Bryman, 2008].
For the present study, 105 items (including reverse-worded ones) have been constructed
measuring twelve concepts on a 7-point scale. To select the most feasible items, two re-
searchers at Catie as well as two researchers located in Norway were consulted to rank and
comment on the statements according to their usefulness. Out of the initial pool, 19 items
were retained and inserted into the pre-test questionnaire. In addition, twelve items out of
the Motivations Towards the Environment Scale (MTES) to measure self-determination
in the field of the environment (see 3.4, ‘Motivational theories’) as well as three items out
of a pre-defined personal conservation behaviour scale to measure how far people conserve
and protect resources in everyday live were included. Note that after the pre-test phase,
the questionnaire has again been modified (see 5.5 and ‘Pre-test modifications’).
Justifying parametric analysis of Likert-scales and items Regarding the analysis of
Likert-scales and items, a considerable amount of thought has been put into the question
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of whether data generated using individual Likert items should be treated on an ordinal
or interval scale. Strictly speaking, equidistance between the possible answers to an item
is difficult to assume, thus implying an ordinal scale, and as Kuzon (1996) remarks, using
parametric analysis on ordinal data is one of ‘seven deadly sins’ of statistical analysis,
with a second sin dealing with normality, stating that parametric measures can only be
applied to samples drawn from a normally distributed population. However, in the case
of Likert items, even sceptical writers acknowledge that interval scale might be justifiable,
but demanding that this assumption ‘should be considered at the design stage and must
be addressed by authors when they discuss their chosen methodology’ [Jamieson, 2004,
p.1218]. Recently, Norman (2010) tried to put an end to the controversy, using evidence
dating back to 1931 (cf. [Pearson, 1931], also [Boneau, 1960]) to show that parametric
analysis can be conducted with confidence on Likert data. He points towards robustness,
stating that results are stable even when assumptions are violated as the central limit
theorem shows that even “for sample sizes greater than 5 or 10 per group, the means are
approximately normally distributed regardless of the original distribution” [Norman, 2010,
p.628], concluding that “ANOVA and other tests of central tendency are highly robust to
things like skewness and non-normality” (ibid). Thus, parametric tests can be used on
Likert data without the fear of coming to the wrong conclusion.
5.3 Sampling
The data collection method consisted of 98 in-person survey questionnaires divided into
sub-samples. Furthermore, semi-structured qualitative interviews with forest experts in
the field of PES in Costa Rica were conducted, as forest experts by definition have large
knowledge about the various aspects of PES, thus their insights and convictions gained
throughout their years represented an important source of consultation. The following
subsection will firstly explain the sampling criteria for site selection and then, secondly,
the sampling process which led to the identification of survey participants (household
sampling).
5.3.1 Sampling criteria for site selection
The sampling criteria for the selection process of this study’s research location were es-
tablished before going to the field and encompassed six points.
a) First PES area ever established at site
b) PES area still receiving payments
c) Difference in years of PES contract establishment
d) PES sites are under protection contracts
e) Number of houses located around a PES contract > 30
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f) Local similarities of PES locations
The first criterion was set up to guarantee that the respective PES schemes around which
interviews were going to be conducted represent the first PES ever established at the
research site. The main consideration leading to the formulation of this criterion was
that in case an interviewee attributed an effect to the establishment of a PES site in the
nearby vicinity (zero to 500m), a clear isolation and attribution of this effect to a single
PES scheme wanted to be assured. Assuming that at the same research site various PES
schemes had existed in the past (e.g. eight or thirteen years before), it was thought that
it might become even more difficult for interviewees to remember and attribute a certain
change to one of the PES schemes that existed at the site. By choosing a ‘clean’ location,
i.e. a location where just one PES scheme ever existed, the task for the interviewee to
differentiate between the schemes was thought to be eliminated, thus making it easier
and demanding less from participants. However, it has to be kept in mind that this
geographically determined trigger of a neighbourhood effect represents just one possible
trigger out of eight. Others include information received from family/relatives, friends,
the attendance of an informational meeting regarding PES, information received from
radio, television or newspapers etc.. Nevertheless, the establishment of a PES site in the
distance of zero to 500m of interviewees’ place of residence was thought to be an impor-
tant act for obtaining information regarding PES, thus this criterion has thought to be
justifiable.
The following criteria b, c and d all describe requirements with reference to the charac-
teristics of selected PES sites. Besides still receiving payments and thus with the contract
not having ceased (criterion b), contracts should vary in their time of being established
in order to analyse temporal effects (criterion c), i.e. if neighbourhood effects for example
increase with the time of being located next to a PES site (see 1.4, ‘Research Questions
and Hypothesis’). In the research proposal, it was planned to select a first PES scheme
(C1) which had already been in existence for more than three and a half years but less
than four and a half years (3.5y≤C1≤4.5y) and a second PES scheme (C2) which has
been established for longer than six months but less than one year (6m≤C2≤1y). How-
ever, these temporal exigencies had to be altered upon arrival in Costa Rica due to data
limitations (see 5.3.3, ‘Obtaining Fonafifo data’). Remembering that protection contracts
account for roughly 81 percent of total hectares protected in Sarapiquí (see 2.3, ‘Sara-
piquí’), criterion d secured the selection of one of these contracts.
Criteria e and f characterise the broader landscape in which a PES scheme should be
embedded. Being able to randomly sample around 30 households in the vicinity of zero to
500 meters around a PES site, a sufficiently large population was required (criterion e).
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Finally, criterion f tried to control for local similarities by signifying that out of the pool
of eligible PES research locations identified, the ones with similar local characteristics
should be selected. Robalino and Pfaff (2012) for example list the distance to main roads
or the distance to city centres among such characteristics. As these two factors can easily
be assessed using satellite imagery, they formed the only factors considered for criterion
f.
In the whole, the criteria for site selection turned out to be highly restrictive. Criterion e,
for instance, ruled out rural areas. The implications of the restrictivity will be discussed
in sub-paragraph 5.3.5 ‘Sample sites’ and 5.3.6 ‘Consequences of sampling criteria’.
5.3.2 Arriagada’s data points
For site selection, I was asked by David N. Barton, senior research scientist at the Nor-
wegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA), to analyse PES data points provided by
Rodrigo Arriagada. Each one of his 137 data points indicated a point on a map of either
a PES participant or a non-participant - a point where he conducted an interview for
his doctoral thesis. To combine data sets, it would have been useful to select PES sites
from Arriagada’s data points. Therefore, the coordinates provided were projected into
the coordinate system WGS1984 using ArcGIS and imported into Google Earth (GE) to
evaluate, through satellite imagery, if any of the points sufficed the site selection criteria.
For assessment, the 87 data points of non-participants were omitted as only active par-
ticipants’ PES areas would serve as research sites. Out of the remaining 50 data points
of PES participants, a further 20 were excluded as they were located in the neighbouring
province Siquierres and thus not in Heredia and the Sarapiquí canton.
Figure 8 illustrates the results. Yellow dots (star-signed) indicate that the resolution of
the satellite image was not high enough to identify houses necessary for household se-
lection (criterion e). As financial resources were limited and a visit to the site was not
possible, I tried to obtain better satellite imagery by consulting a research group of PhD
students and professors based at the University of Idaho/United States and Catie. After
some discussions, I was granted access to their images. However, the resolution was once
again not high enough for household identification. In the central/southern Sarapiquí
region, the images obtained turned out to be even worse than the ones provided by GE.
As a consequence, the yellow dots could not be used further.
For blue dots (diamond-signed), high resolution imagery was available but after analysing
dot by dot, hardly any houses were detected, thus it would not had been possible to
sample sufficient households in a 500m spatial zone around these areas. Cross-checking
this finding, information on population spots out of the Costa Rican Atlas (2008) were
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Figure 8: Map of Sarapiquí with Arriagada’s data points
used and projected into ArcGIS. These data points (see Figure 9, red points) were com-
bined with Arriagada’s data points (blue points) and plotted into the same coordinate
system (CRTM 90), with the result confirming that most of Arriagada’s PES participants
are located outside population spots.
After yellow and blue dots turned out to be not useful, green dots (circle-signed) were
analysed. At first glance, they appeared to be located in more urban, populated areas,
which is confirmed by the created Figure 9. To check for criteria a, namely that the PES
is unique in the area, data (shape-files) provided by Fonafifo on PES areas from 2003 up
to 2011 were used, projected into the coordinate system WGS1984 to fit GE and mounted.
The result is shown in Figure 10, where orange areas indicate PES contracts established
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Figure 9: Population spots (Costa Rican Atlas 2008) and PES participants selected by
Arriagada, own representation using ArcGIS
Figure 10: Arriagada’s data points and Fonafifo’s PES data
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between 2003 and 200715, light green areas contracts established in 2008 and blue areas
contracts out of the year 2011. For illustrational purposes, the 500m spatial zone (distance
around PES scheme in which interviews were going to be conducted. One zone marked
red, one yellow.) was drawn around two PES sites corresponding to two data points given
by Arriagada. The image shows why none of the green dots could be used: With the
spatial zone drawn around a PES site, it was not possible to obtain a ‘clean’ research
location, i.e. an area where there has never existed a PES area before to clearly attribute
an effect to one single PES scheme. In the illustrated case, one such spatial overlap is
represented by the pink polygon. Therefore, it was decided not to use Arriagada’s data
further, and to pursue a different approach for the selection of research sites.
5.3.3 Obtaining Fonafifo data
To obtain more data on PES contracts in the Sarapiquí region and to gain local approval
and support for the study, three meetings with Fonafifo were set up, two in San Jose (main
office) and one in Sarapiquí (regional office, one of eight in the country). Fonafifo (Fondo
Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal - National Forestry Financing Fund) is part of the
Ministry for Environment and Energy (Minae, Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía) and
was brought into existence through the Forest Law passed in 1996. The semi-autonomous
agency is responsible for financial administration (above all disbursement of payments),
revision and approval of PES applications, and thus represents the main authority in the
Costa Rican PES programme. Prior to the meetings, a Spanish-written short version of
the research proposal was prepared and handed-over. Through a meeting with Fonafifo’s
monitoring department, I was told that the most recent PES shape-files16 available date
from the year 2010. Therefore, criterion c (difference in years of PES contract establish-
ment) had to be altered from the initially envisioned time intervals (3.5y≤C1≤4.5y and
6m≤C2≤1y). However, after three months in the country, shape-files for 2011 were re-
leased so that besides contracts sufficing 3.5y≤C1≤4.5y, newer ones out of the year 2010
and 2011 could be used to re-establish a reasonable time distance between PES sites.
5.3.4 Site selection with Fonafifo’s data
The files provided by Fonafifo included data on PES contracts in the Sarapiquí canton out
of the year 2003 until 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 201117. As different coordinate systems
15Data on PES contracts established between 2003 and 2007 were received in one file, thus it could not
be differentiated in more detail according to single years.
16Shape-files are, as the name already indicates, files in a format called *.shp (shape). In the present
case, they contain information on the geographical extension of a Finca with PES. Projected on a
map, these shape-files mark the exact boundaries of a Finca which has received PES payments. Note
that geographical zones indicate the boundaries of the whole Finca an enrolled person owns and not
just the parts which actually are under PES protection. Thus, in many cases, the zones illustrated
through the shape-files are larger than the area enrolled in PES.
17As mentioned under 5.3.3 ‘Obtaining Fonafifo data’, 2011 data were obtained after three months in
the field.
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were used, all data was projected into WGS1984 using ArcGIS and loaded into GE to
obtain a better picture where PES sites previously had been established. As described in
chapter two, Sarapiquí is heavily targeted by PES, thus when all PES contracts from 2003
until 2011 were loaded, the resulting map was cluttered with contracts. For the selection
Figure 11: PES protection contracts, 2008 (left) and 2010 (right)
process, PES protection contracts granted admission
to the programme in 2008 were analysed at first.
Contracts had a duration of five years, thus with
four and a half years of being established, they were
close to termination18. Each PES area was analysed
one by one for suitability and fulfilment of estab-
lished criteria. The picture to the left of Figure 11
illustrates results for the 2008 contracts, the part to
the right shows results for protection contracts out of
2010. As visible at first sight, PES areas have been
categorised according to certain attributes.
Green: Follow-up contract
(not able to isolate).
Orange: Not able to isolate,
have been other PES areas
around in the last ten years.
Light yellow: Not enough
houses around for sampling.
Blue: Resolution of satellite
image not high enough.
Pink: Eligible area.
Red: Area outside Sarapiquí.
18Note that the contract duration time has been altered. Whereas decree No. 36516-MINAE (Ministerio
del Ambiente y Energia) published in 2011 defines a contract duration period of five years for the forest
protection modality ($320US per hectare for the whole period, equalling $64US per year/ hectare),
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Green areas indicate that even though PES areas have gained approval in 2008, they
represent follow-up contracts, meaning that they have received payments at an earlier
stage. Therefore, these areas were deemed infeasible as they violated criterion a (see
5.3.1, ‘First PES area ever established at site’). Again, criterion was formulated as it
was thought that it might be more difficult for interviewees to remember and attribute
a certain change/effect to one specific PES area in case various PES areas had already
existed in the past at the same spot. By choosing a ‘clean’ location, i.e. a location where
just one PES scheme ever existed, the task for the interviewee to differentiate between
the schemes was thought to be eliminated, thus making it easier and demanding less for
participants.
Similar considerations led to the exclusion of orange areas. When projecting PES con-
tracts from 2003 until 2007 (for 2008 areas, left image) or from 2003 until 2009 (for 2010
areas, right image) in GE, areas were coloured orange because in one of the years in the
past, there have been other PES contracts exactly around these orange areas established
in 2008 or 2010 respectively. Therefore, it would had been impossible to get a ‘clean’
PES area in the sense that there had never existed another PES before. For visualisation
of this effect, Figure 10 can be consulted again. There, the pink area (spatial overlap)
illustrates a similar effect, even though in the present case, it has been checked if such a
spatial overlap had ever existed, even with PES contracts that have existed in the past
and have ceased already.
Yellow areas indicate that the PES contract analysed did not suffice site selection crite-
rion e, namely that a sufficiently large population can be found around the contract area
(number of houses > 30) to sample households.
Blue PES areas, only existent in the right 2010 picture, indicate that the resolution of the
satellite image available was not high enough to work with (e.g. to check if enough house-
holds were available for sampling), thus they were also regarded as not useful, together
with red PES areas which were located outside Sarapiquí and thus outside the research
location of this study.
Finally, pink areas represent contracts which fulfil the requirements postulated under 5.3.1
‘Sampling criteria for site selection’ and were thus deemed useful as research location.
Among PES areas enrolled in 2008, three such areas where found. Among the 2010
accepted ones, only one such area could be identified. With respect to criterion f (local
similarities of PES locations), two eligible areas out of the year 2008 were selected (named
A1-07/08 and A2-08) as well as the eligible area out of 2010 (named A-10/11). In the
decree No. 36935-MINAE published in 2012 speaks of a contract duration period of ten years ($640US
per hectare for the whole period, equalling $64US per year/ hectare).
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following, the PES sites around which interviews were conducted will be described in more
detail.
5.3.5 Sample sites
In total, three areas were selected, labelled A1-07/08, A2-08 and A3-10/11. A1-07/08 is
located right outside to the south-east of the city Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí, the canton’s
capital. The western boundary of the Finca runs directly alongside the national highway
four, and following this route for approximately 1.8 kilometres leads to the entrance of
town, thus A1-07/08 is located in an urban area close to a city centre with good road
connection. Figure 12 illustrates the Finca where the PES contract area is located on,
indicated by the yellow enclosed area. The red line shows the spatial zone which is drawn
500 meters around the Finca - the space between the yellow and the red line thus represents
the area where interview candidates were sampled from. Finally, blue lines indicate spatial
zones (500m) of other PES areas that had existed or still exist (e.g. the light green area
which was established in 2008 to the bottom right) near the chosen research site. The
pink polygons in Figure 12 indicate where these spatial zones interfered with the spatial
zone of A1-07/08. These overlapping areas were not considered eligible and thus were
excluded from household selection, as it would not have been possible to obtain a ‘clean’
household selection site within these spatial overlaps, i.e. a site where there has never
existed a PES area before to clearly attribute an effect to one single PES scheme (see
5.3.1, ‘Sampling criteria for site selection’, criterion a).
Figure 12: First PES area selected (A1-07/08, yellow), together with spatial zone (red),
geographical map
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The yellow enclosed Finca with the PES contract area lying within is subscribed to the
beneficiary ‘Industrias Agropecuarias Asociadas S.A.’, domiciled in San Jose. The Finca
actually has received two separate PES contracts, one in 2007 (SA-01-22-0132-200719)
and one in 2008 (SA-01-22-0022-2008), indicated through the light yellow line running
through the Finca. The lower part of the Finca, for instance, is documented in Fonafifo’s
archives as illustrated in Figure 13. The map shows that in this lower part of the Finca,
Figure 13: Technical map, lower part of A1-08, Fonafifo’s archives
85.2ha of forest (light green area to the right, labelled ‘Bosque con PSA 2007’) have been
protected in 2007, whereas 32.6ha of forest (dark green area to the left, labelled ‘Bosque
para PSA 2008) were enrolled in 2008. Together with the upper part of the Finca, the
contracts from both years protected an area of 332.6ha of forest in total.
The second research site A2-08 is located in the district of La Virgen, lying to the north-
east of the village of the same name La Virgen. The Finca with the PES contract area
within has no direct road passing by at its borders, but the main road running through
the centre of La Virgen is located just around 420m to the south-east. As visible from
the geographical map in Figure 14 (image shown to the right), A2-08 is located directly
at the entrance of the town La Virgen, thus the area is in general highly urban. As in
Figure 12, the yellow encircled area indicates the Finca where land for PES is contracted
on, the red line visualises the 500m spatial zone drawn around A2-08 and blue lines show
spatial zones (500m) of other PES areas that had existed or still exist near the chosen
research site, with pink polygons illustrating spatial overlaps.
The PES contract was established in 2008 (SA-01-22-0010-2008) for an area of 292ha, en-
compassing almost the entire Finca as visible from the technical map in Figure 14 (dark
green area in the image shown to the left titled ‘Bosque para PSA 2008’). A2-08 is sub-
scribed to the beneficiary ‘Reserva Biologica La Tirimbina LTDA.’, an “educational, sci-
entific and ecotourism destination” [TB, 2012]. The Tirimbina Rainforest Center, which
uses the protected area for various purposes such as guided tours through the forest, bird
watching or research interests, is located at the western border of the protected site with
19Number under which Fonafifo handles the contract.
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Figure 14: Second PES area selected (A2-08), technical (left) and geographical map (right)
direct access. As many researchers and especially tourists continuously arrive at the Tir-
imbina Rainforest Center, it is assumed that at least the organisation as owner of the PES
contract is quite well-known in the area compared to ‘Industrias Agropecuarias Asosiadas
S.A.’ (A1-07/08, to which the first research site is subscribed to).
The third and final research site A3-10/11 is also located in the district of La Virgen, lying
approximately six kilometres to the north of La Virgen’s city centre. Compared to the
other two research sites, this third area is less densely populated and the road passing the
Finca on its western border (this is where almost all households were located) is smaller
and not paved, thus the area in general is less traffic-intensive in comparison to the other
two research sites. However, the main road connecting Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí with La
Virgen passes just to the southern end of A3-10/11, and the town of Chilamate is around
two and a half kilometres away. Therefore, the area can still be described as more urban
than rural.
Figure 15 illustrates A3-10/11 geographically: The yellow encircled area marks the bound-
aries of the Finca where the PES contract area is located on, the red line indicates the
spatial zone (500m) drawn around the Finca, blue lines show the spatial zone (500m) of
other PES areas that had existed or still exist nearby with pink polygons demonstrating
spatial overlaps. The Finca is subscribed to the beneficiary ‘Collin Street Bakery Inc.’,
with the representative living outside of Sarapiquí in the Alajuela province. As A1-07/08,
the Finca actually has received two contracts, one in 2010 and one in 2011, which is
indicated by the light yellow line running through the yellow enclosed area in Figure 16.
The area established in 2010 (SA-01-222-0057-2010) is represented by the smaller part
lying to the south of the Finca, protecting 25ha. The upper part of the Finca started to
receive payments in 2011 (SA-01-22-0055-2011) for a total of 205.6ha for forest protection.
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Figure 15: Third PES area selected (A3-10/11), geographical map
Figure 16: Third PES area selected (A3-10/11), technical map
The technical map of the bigger upper part established in 2011 is illustrated by Figure
16, where a clear characteristic of this PES contract area becomes visible: Compared to
A1-07/08 and A2-08, this third contract area consists of eleven PES blocks which are
scattered within the Finca. Block A (125ha) and block B (20ha), lying to the south of the
Finca, protect 70 percent of the total PES area. The remaining 30 percent are subdivided
into nine areas, protecting 13ha (area marked ‘1’), 10ha (2), 4ha (3), 3ha (4), 7ha (5),
3ha (6), 2ha (7), 12ha (8) and 2ha (9) respectively. The space lying between the different
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PES blocks is, above all, used for pineapple cultivation.
5.3.6 Consequences of sampling criteria
Having described the three research sites, it is imperative to reconsider the process of how
these areas were deemed eligible and thus how these were selected. The sampling crite-
ria for the selection process were established before going to the field and encompassed
six points, namely a) first PES area ever established at site, b) PES area still receiving
payments, c) difference in years of PES contract establishment, d) PES sites are under
protection contracts, e) number of houses located around PES contract greater than 30
and f) local similarities of PES locations. As shown by Figure 11, these criteria turned
out to be highly restrictive as only four sites in total fulfilled the ‘entry requirements’
(criteria a to f). Criterion a for instance ruled out follow-up PES contracts which ac-
counted for the majority of enrolled contracts in 2008 and 2010 (see Figure 11, green
areas), whereas criterion e basically eliminated rural areas. The choices I made at the
outset thus determined to a large extent the outcome. Bryman (2008) identifies three
possible sources that can bias a sample: i) The usage of a non-probability or non-random
sampling method, ii) a deficient sampling frame and iii) non-response. The first source
causes some elements (here: PES sites) to be more likely to be selected, e.g. through cri-
teria of exclusion, thus the assumption to derive valid interferences from findings through
strong external validity and generalising them beyond the specific context in which the
study was conducted (representativeness) cannot be held. Through the pre-defined sam-
pling criteria for site selection, a “distortion in the representativeness of the sample” (ibid,
p.168) is clearly visible, leading the site selection process to be a non-probability sample.
As only four PES sites were considered eligible, the view of the “omnipresence of variabil-
ity”, as Peters (2011, p.53) terms it, and which should be addressed through an adequate
sampling design, is somewhat denied in this study. Furthermore, criterion f defined that
local similarities should exist between PES sites, which further led the sample to appear
more homogeneous, with research sites being located in urban areas and close to city
centres with good road connections. The criterion was formulated as the sample size of
three spots (A1, A2, A3) was relatively small and it was thought that, with reference to
Robalino and Pfaff (2012), the selection of similar research sites would present a simple
way to control for local similarities. However, this approach might be more prone to the
problem of correlated unobservables, i.e. the existence of some group specific component
that varies across groups, as with research sites featuring similar characteristics, chances
for the identification of such ‘group specific components’ (e.g. rural/urban) are minimal.
Before giving a brief justification and arguing context-specific why a non-probability sam-
pling for site selection was chosen, it appears worthwhile to formulate an argument on a
more technical level. By choosing a case-study design, a decision was made to investigate
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the complexity and particular nature of a single case (cf. Bryman 2008). Thus, the deci-
sion for this specific research design implied already that external validity (generalisability
of findings) considerations would be weak right from the outset. Clearly, weakened exter-
nal validity does by no means justifies its abolishment altogether. Therefore, case-specific
arguments have to be made:
• The first point concerns the availability of satellite imagery. Looking back at Figure
11, the area above the reversed yellow ‘z’-line running horizontally across the map
indicates where the resolution of the satellite images were not sufficiently high to
identify if enough households for household selection would have been located around
a PES site. As explained under 5.3.2 ‘Arriagada’s data points’, I tried to obtain
better images via a research group based at the University of Idaho and Catie, but
also their images did not provide an adequate resolution. Therefore, these areas had
to be excluded.
• Nevertheless, all shape-files with the geographical information of PES sites were
available and provided by Fonafifo, thus assuming abundant financial resources,
a different method could have been to set up a complete sampling frame, i.e. a
“listing of all units in the population [here: PES sites] from which the sample will
be selected” [Bryman, 2008, p.169], randomly select three areas and then visit each
site for eligibility-assessment by car. The necessity for satellite imagery would have
been obsolete. In case an area would not be deemed eligible, other sites would have
been randomly selected from the sampling frame and visited. This, however, was not
possible due to financial constraints which simply did not allow a cost-intensive site
identification process. Consequently, financial constraints mark the second point.
• Related to financial issues is the third point, namely the geographical definition of
neighbourhood which was set at 500m. Assuming that I would have kept the dis-
tances indicated in the research proposal (0m≤SZ1≤1000m and 1001m≤SZ2≤3000m),
it would had been possible to select more sites in a rural setting as the likelihood
to encounter sufficient households would have increased with greater spatial zones.
Certainly, the potential for spatial overlaps (pink areas in Figure 14 or Figure 15)
with other PES areas that had existed or still exist in the area would augment like-
wise, complicating the task of defining which areas would be eligible for household
selection. However, one of the main problems with this approach would have been
that I would have needed some sort of transportation to get from one interview point
to the next, whereas with the 500m definition of the spatial zone, the distance could
easily be walked. Without a license for instance, it proved difficult to even acquire
a motorcycle to ger around. Besides these imponderables, pursuing this approach
would have meant to ignore the advice given by a Costa Rican Catie researcher
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and expert that a geographical definition of neighbourhood of 500m would probably
mirror best the understanding of most interviewees. Thus this idea was dropped.
• A fourth point centers around the question of attribution and especially criterion a.
As already explained under 5.3.1 ‘Sampling criteria for site selection’, the criterion
was set up to guarantee that the respective PES schemes around which interviews
were going to be conducted represent the first PES ever established at the research
site. A different strategy would have been to set up a complete sampling frame (note
the problems with this approach as stated under point one and two), randomly select
three PES sites and then check which areas had existed or still exist in the spatial
distance of 500m around the selected site. With the list of ceased and valid contracts
at hand, interviewees could have directly been asked which PES sites they know and
which site was responsible for gaining knowledge about PES and triggered a certain
effect. However, in discussions at Catie, my suspicion was confirmed that it might
be difficult for interviewees to differentiate between PES schemes that had existed or
still exist nearby, thus it was decided to stay with a ‘clean’ research area and clarify
through the questionnaire if interviewees had knowledge about other PES schemes
(nearby or further away). Generally, the rigidity and restrictiveness of criterion
a due to the amount of PES contracts in Sarapiquí was underestimated (see part
2 ‘Case-study site’ for a detailed description). Undertaking the same study in a
province which has been targeted less by PES would have reduced the dominance
of criterion a. However, as Fonafifo explicitly recommended this province and the
canton of Sarapiquí when confronted with the research proposal, the location was
treated as given.
5.3.7 Target population and household sampling
It is evident that with the selection of research sites, characteristics of the population
living within these areas were determined. In contrast to site selection which was done
in a non-random fashion due to the encountered obstacles described above, household
sampling was conducted randomly as it proved more straightforward. Being able to se-
lect households through desk-identification, an online tool provided by Geo Midpoint was
used. Geo Midpoint (www.geomidpoint.com) provide freely accessible GIS tools, such as
a midpoint calculator, a bearing and distance calculator or a random point creator which
generates random points over a surface of the earth restricted to any circular or rectangu-
lar shaped area limited by latitude (northern and southern limit) and longitude (western
and eastern limit) coordinates. The tool can generate a maximum of 2000 random points
defined through coordinates, which can then be projected onto Google Maps.
To randomly sample houses, the coordinates of a rectangular area20 enclosing a selected
20“Note: This is not a true rectangle because latitude and longitude lines are curved and longitude lines
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Figure 17: Household sampling procedure, example
PES site (A1-07/08, A2-08 or A3-10/11) with its spatial zone were taken and inserted
into Geo Midpoint’s random point generator (coordinates had to be converted from de-
gree, decimal minutes to decimal degrees). Figure 17 illustrates the rectangle, where
longitudinal coordinates where taken from the upper left and the upper right corner and
latitudinal coordinates from the upper left and the lower left corner (white dots). Then,
2000 random points where projected onto the area which was displayed in Google Maps.
In the following, it was analysed where a created random point (red pin with black dot
inside, see Figure 18 or Figure 19) hit a house in the rectangle. Examples from selected
houses of PES site A1-07/08 are illustrated through a red circle in Figure 18, examples
from A2-08 in Figure 19. In case not enough houses were hit with the generated 2000
random points, a second round was conducted. Having all houses with its associated
coordinates identified, coordinates where at first transferred to Google Earth to display
them together with selected PES sites, and then uploaded onto a Garmin GPS device to
track each house while being at the research location.
In total, 100 observation points (roofs) have been identified using this approach, 33 in
A1-07/08, 34 in A2-08 and 33 in A3-10/11. As it was not possible to check whether a roof
identified via satellite images represented an inhabited house, five observation points had
to be replaced upon arrival at the research location. One point turned out to be a school, a
second one as a storage building, two were lying within the ‘Tirimbina Rainforest Center’
and one point could not be approached due to watching dogs. For houses where nobody
was encountered, a strategy pursued by Arriagada et al. (2010) was followed, namely that
in case I failed to find a person after three attempts, the house located directly to the left
(west) or opposite was selected as replacement21.
converge at the poles, however it is often a convenient way to define a region on the earth’s surface
and it does provide a way to generate true random points on a spherical earth” [GeoMid, 2012].
21In their study, the direction of the replacement is not indicated, only that a neighbour was selected.
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Figure 18: Household sampling A1-07/08, observation point 3, 4 and 5
Figure 19: Household sampling A2-08, observation point 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
In 15 cases, this approach had to be pursued. The total number of valid interviews
amounted to 98, thus the rate of non-response is given with 15.3 percent. Regarding
the ‘door policy’, I tried to interview only persons who have attained full age (mayoría
de edad), including every Costa Rican above the age of 18. However, as it would have
appeared rude to directly ask a potential participant for their age in case I was not sure if
the person opening the door was already of age or not, the decision whether to interview
the person or to ask for their parents was made right at the doorstep. Figure 27 illustrates
the age distribution on the sample, showing that the youngest participant was 18 years old.
Besides household selection for the quantitative survey questionnaire, semi-structured
qualitative interviews were conducted with forest and PES experts working in the can-
ton of Sarapiquí. Experts by definition have huge knowledge about the various aspects
of PES, thus their insights and convictions gained throughout their years represented
an important source to consult. Interviewees included the National Forestry Financing
Fund’s (Fonafifo) regional office in Sarapiquí, the Ministry for Environment and Energy’s
(Minae) office in Sarapiquí, and the Foundation for the Development of the Central Vol-
canic Mountain Range’s (Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Cordillera Volcánica Central,
Fundecor) regional office in Sarapiquí. Whereas the first two represent governmental in-
stitutions, Fundecor is a Costa Rican NGO funded in 1989 with the aim to protect forests
and to sustainably combine conservation and commercial timber interests. The organisa-
tion serves as a so called intermediary, i.e. Fundecor handles most of the administrative
procedures surrounding a PES application, supporting and finally submitting all necessary
documents to Fonafifo. For their support, they charge an intermediation percentage fee of
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around 15 percent of disbursed payments. The importance of this organisation cannot be
overestimated: According to Fonafifo’s regional office, around 85 percent of all received
contracts are generally submitted by Fundecor (personal communication, conservative
estimation).
Cost-intensity The sampling process for household selection has been carried out through
desk-identification, as staying at the research centre Catie was inexpensive compared to
accommodation in Sarapiquí. Therefore, it was decided to travel to the research location
in Sarapiquí only after all major preparations had been completed and observation point
coordinates had been uploaded onto the GPS device to commence interviewing more or
less timely upon arrival. Furthermore, being situated at Catie was convenient due to
the facilities provided such as an office room accessible 24h or a speedy internet connec-
tion. Transportation from Catie to Puerto Viejo de Sarapiquí took about 6 hours (public
buses), hence travelling between the two places wanted to be kept minimal.
Nevertheless, other less time consuming methods could have been employed. One such
method would have been to travel to each one of the three PES sites (A1-07/08, A2-08,
A3-10/11), assign a number to each house that was found within the eligible spatial zone
of zero to 500m around the respective PES site and then randomly select numbers from
the produced list. The distance could easily be walked, so the process could have been
completed within three to four days. Comparing this approach with the one pursued, I
am of the opinion that the actual sampling process using Geo Midpoint’s random point
generator did not take more time as visiting site by site personally. Certainly, the selection
of roofs which did not represent an inhabited household could have been avoided through
direct assessment. In the present case, this concerned just five out of 100 observation
points and is thus, in my view, no criteria for favouring a certain method. However,
imagining a rural setting where households engage in farm activities and barns, storage
buildings etc. are located close to houses, this consideration might become important
as the potential to select non-inhabited ‘roofs’ would be substantially higher. The main
reason leading the pursued approach to be more time consuming was the duration of
coming up with an innovative idea of how to randomly sample households without being
at the research site and finding a GIS tool such as the random point generator which can
be used together with Google Earth.
5.4 Measurement definitions
The following subsection will describe the different approaches of how effects and the po-
tential existence of neighbourhood effects will be measured in the present study. The main
questions assessing neighbourhood effects were phrased as statements to which responses
could either be given on a Likert-scale or, in few cases, with ‘Agree’ and ‘Disagree’. The
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latter case basically represents a simplification of a Likert-scale, limiting possibilities to
just two options. The reason for this reduction in options can be explained by expressed
concerns from a Costa Rican researcher working at Catie that having seven or five possible
options available (ranging from totally agree to totally disagree) to answer to an already
complex statement might impose difficulties upon interviewees. Thus, where a statement
was considered demanding, possible options were reduced so that interviewees had to just
indicate if they tend to agree or disagree with a given statement. Surely, in terms of
statistical analysis, the decision included drawbacks as the reduction in options from five
to two made parametric assessment methods impossible.
Addressing the first part of the research question22, statements were either framed in the
form of implying a specific ‘change’ (in the following termed ‘change’ statement) or in the
form of stating a ‘general’ opinion (in the following termed ‘general’ opinion statement).
Figure 20: Likert-scale item for a ‘change’ statement, example
An example of a ‘change’ statement is given by Figure 20. Note that during the cause
of an entire interview, all ‘change’ statements attributed an effect (here: ‘I became more
interested in the topic of PES’) only to one source, either to one belonging to the neigh-
bourhood dimension (in Figure 20, this corresponds to number 1, 2, 3 or 4) or to a source
lying outside of this dimension (number 5, 6, 7 or 8). The information source to which
all the respective effects where attributed to, i.e. if in all change statements number
1, number 2, number 3 etc. was used, was determined through the following question
posed at the beginning of the questionnaire: ‘In general, what is the first and the second
strongest source out of which you received information about PES?’ (see Figure 21). The
source that an interviewee indicated here as the strongest, defined if all change statements
attributed an effect to family/ relatives (no. 1), friends/other people a person knows (no.
2), neighbours (no. 3) etc..
22The first part of the research question investigates the general knowledge about PES, if neighbourhood
effects can generally be identified and what perceptions people living close to a PES contract hold
over certain parts of PES or the environment in general.
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Figure 21: Sources of PES information, used for the determination of ‘change’ statements
It is worth mentioning that when the research proposal has been drawn up, I wanted to
consider one source only, namely source number four in Figure 20 (’due to the existence
of a property with PES close-by...’). With various effects being attributed to this sole
event (existence of a PES property close-by), it would had been possible to quantify if
this event triggered certain effects or not (more interested in the PES topic, more moti-
vated to do something for the environment etc.). However, in case the mentioned effects
were triggered due to other events (family/friends talked about it, TV/radio transmitted
information etc.), the research would not have been able to capture this as interviewees
had only been asked to say how far the existence of a PES property close-by influenced
them and not other events. Therefore, it was decided to consider a broader range of effects.
To take the strongest source from which an interviewee received information about PES
and using this source for the change statements appeared reasonable, as this source per
definition shaped knowledge about PES. Overall, there was a risk and an opportunity
involved in allowing different sources: With a total number of around 80 interviews and
assuming that each one of the eight sources would be named with equal frequency, ev-
ery source would be described by ten observations only, limiting statistical assessment
methods. Contrarily, it might be possible to quantify through Likert-ratings which source
triggered the strongest effect and which source might be of minor importance, allowing
to produce a ranking which gives an indication of the strength of the various sources on
PES issues.
Overall, it is clear that with all ‘change’ statements, a high willingness of participants to
rethink and re-frame certain motivations/attitudes was demanded to finally being able to
attribute these to a specific source, quantifying how far a respective information source
was responsible for triggering a certain effect or for holding a certain opinion. Neverthe-
less, with the explicit reference to the specific source at the beginning of each item, it is
assumed that participants were well able to perform this task. By now, it should get clear
that these ‘change’ statements provided in itself an indication for neighbourhood effects.
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Regarding ‘general’ opinion statements, participants were asked to state their views on for
example the overall PES scheme, such as its usefulness or their overall motivation towards
the environment. In these statements, no explicit reference to a certain information source
was made, thus they only provide insights into attitudes. ‘I regard PES as an effective
instrument to preserve forests and enhance biodiversity richness’ serves as an example.
Through subsequently inserting open questions, attitudes could further be investigated in
a more unstructured way, with participants being encouraged to freely express their own
opinion on neighbourhood effects, thus providing another source to interpret quantitative
findings.
Addressing the second part of the research question23, ‘correlations’ and ‘difference’ mea-
surements were used. The rationale for ‘correlations’ was derived out of the theory, check-
ing if causality as suggested by certain theories in the literature can be found in the data.
The effect of fairness concerns, of views on nature’s commodification and of controlling/
autonomy enhancing effects (meaning that own efforts are not being acknowledged to
measure crowding-out) on an individual’s motivation were planned to be examined using
correlation coefficients.
Regarding ‘differences’, the hypothesis wanted to be tested that mean values of ‘change’
statements as well as of ‘general’ opinion statements identified through the first part of
the research question increase the longer a household finds itself located next to a PES
site. Therefore, and as explained under 5.3.1 (‘Sampling criteria for site selection’), PES
sites which differ in years of contract establishment were selected. These temporal effects
were planned to be tracked by checking the significance of the difference between the
means of sub-samples. For the analysis, non-parametric as well as parametric tests built
the basis.
5.5 The questionnaire
To design the questionnaire for this study, I orientated myself to the structure of a ques-
tionnaire produced by Signe Rugtveit, M.Sc. student at the University of Life Sciences
(UMB) in Norway who conducted her research in 2011 at Catie in Costa Rica. She, in
turn, drew on two surveys undertaken in Costa Rica in 2005, thus questions where already
adapted and formulated according to the local idiom. Her research was concerned with
landowners only and generally pursued different objectives. Therefore, only few question
regarding socio-economic aspects were adopted (age, education level, income etc.) as
23The second part of the research question investigates how identified neighbourhood effects can be
explained, looking at relationships between variables on the one side and certain theories and their
proposed effect-channels on the other.
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these variables were not tailored to the specific research context. Nevertheless, the overall
structure supported in gaining a clear view on how to organise questions.
The questionnaire for this study consisted of three parts. The first part dealt with general
information about PES, such as if an interviewee had ever heard of the PES programme,
how many PES receivers a person knew, out of which sources an interviewee had received
information about PES, if a person knew that a PES site was located in the nearby
vicinity (0 to 500m around), if an interviewee had ever applied for a PES contract and
questions of a more hypothetical nature, such as what an interviewee thought would hap-
pen in case a PES receiver cut trees in their Finca or in case the programme would not
had existed. Several questions posed at the beginning of this part were not directly rele-
vant for answering a specific research question, they rather checked preconditions for the
whole questionnaire to work. Furthermore, control questions screening for instance par-
ticipants own definition of geographical neighbourhood were inserted, as well as a section
on landowners who had applied and/or received PES payments, in case former applicants
or contract receivers were encountered during interviews.
The second part had the objective to measure attitudes via the developed Likert-scales. As
described under 5.2, this part consisted, before pre-testing the questionnaire, of 34 items,
some newly formulated and selected out of a pool of potential items and some taken from
pre-defined scales, rounded up with open questions. In total, 13 concepts wanted to be
measured with numerous questions being formulated in the way that a clear attribution
of an effect was possible (‘change’ statement, see Figure 20 above). This second part
built the basis for the analysis of the various theories and effects outlined in the literature
review, for instance of crowding theory, and was thus of major importance. Note that
this second part was altered quite substantially after pre-testing of the questionnaire
The third and last part of the questionnaire enquired about socio-economic variables,
such as gender, age, education level, income etc.. These information served as a basis to
describe the obtained sample in its socio-economic characteristics.
To guarantee that questions were phrased according to local language characteristics, a
native Spanish-speaker checked the whole questionnaire for errors/inconsistencies in a
first step. Then, a local Costa Rican researcher at Catie double-checked and re-phrased
where necessary. In general, interviewees were explicitly be told that no judgements will
be made about their responses, avoiding to become overly friendly with candidates to
address the social desirability bias [Bryman, 2008].
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Pre-test modifications To pre-test the questionnaire, five pilots were conducted in the
spatial zone of A1-07/08 (see yellow pins, Figure 22). The pre-test phase proved to be
highly instrumental in further tailoring the questionnaire to the local environment, as
several obstacles were identified:
Figure 22: Observation points for pre-test of questionnaire
• PES knowledge
When asked ‘Have you ever heard about the Payments for Environmental Services
(PES) programme?’, a question upon which the realisability of the questionnaire
depended, four out of five interviewees responded with ‘No’, jeopardising the whole
process. As I did not want to end the interview right at the spot, I tested some
other questions which came to my mind and it turned out that when asked ‘Do you
know if there exists a programme here in Costa Rica in which the government and
its institutions pay persons who protect forest or reforest on their private Finca?’,
almost all test persons knew that programmes of this sort existed. Therefore, more
questions on the knowledge of the PES scheme itself were included.
• PES site
The majority of interviewees answered to the following question ‘Do you know if
there is a property in the distance of maximum 500m from here which currently has
a PES contract?’ with ‘No’. I personally was somewhat surprised as these properties
were located close-by, so I was interested in whether interviewees thought that they
would be aware of the existence of a PES scheme on a property in the distance of
maximum 500m from the present location in case it existed. Therefore, this question
was inserted aswell.
• Likert-scales
The major configurations concerned the developed Likert-scales, as several problems
emerged during interviews. As a first point, it appeared to me that a differentiation
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according to a seven-point scale24 was perceived as too complex/nuanced. Therefore,
it was decided to reduce possibilities to a five-point scale25, further illustrating
options via a show-card which depicted thumps to better understand the meaning
of available options (see Figure 23).
Figure 23: Show-card for five-point Likert-scales
A second point concerned reverse wording of Likert items. As explained in 5.2
(‘Likert-scales’), a claim has been made in the literature to use reverse wording,
i.e. to use opposite stances (positively and negatively formulated statements) to
minimise response sets and to address the issue of acquiescence - the tendency to
agree with which leads results to be biased [Bryman, 2008]. Some negatively formu-
lated statements had to be read again as interviewees did not understand them right
away, thus it seemed that these statements were difficult to grasp in comparison to
positively formulated ones. As a tendency to agree with all could not be discovered,
it was decided to drop the idea of reverse wording. A third point circled around the
usage of the Motivations Towards the Environment Scale (MTES), with which the
motivation to do something for the environment should be measured in 12 items.
However, the long list of items proved exhausting and as the questionnaire had to
be slimmed in general (see next point), the MTES was excluded.
To be somehow able to measure a person’s motivation to take action for the en-
vironment, a question was used as replacement asking a person to self-rate their
motivation in a number ranging from zero to ten. I am well aware that this replace-
ment is not ideal as it is prone to social desirability bias, i.e. “a distortion of data
that is caused by respondents’ attempt to construct an account that conforms to a
socially acceptable model of belief or behaviour” [Bryman, 2008, p.699], but given
the circumstances, it was thought to be acceptable. Point four concerned the over-
all extent of the questionnaire which had to be reduced to stay manageable within
30-40 minutes. Besides cuts in part one and part three, concepts to be measured
in part two were reduced from thirteen to ten. Furthermore, also due to point two
24Strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, undecided, slightly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree
25Totally agree, agree, undecided, disagree, totally disagree
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and three, Likert-items were cut down from the initially 34 to eight. To maintain a
high level of meticulousness, more open questions were inserted following a Likert
statement.
In congruence with the first questionnaire, all alterations were double-checked by a native
speaker and a local Costa Rican researcher employed at Catie. In general, the pre-test
phase turned out to be highly useful to modify and improve the catalogue of questions.
5.6 Ethical considerations
Interviewees were informed about the purpose and possible uses of the research, thus
relevant information was given and participation only occurred after free prior informed
consent. My stance was best represented by ‘empathic neutrality’, meaning “an em-
pathic stance in working with study respondents seeks[ing] vicarious understanding with-
out judgement (neutrality) by showing openness, sensitivity, respect, awareness, and re-
sponsiveness” [USC, 2012].
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6 Results and discussion
The following chapter pursues the objective to highlight and discuss results. In a first
step, the obtained sample will be described in more detail and, where feasible, compared
to overall Costa Rican population statistics to gain an impression of the socio-economic
composition of the sample, checking in which ways it might be biased as the site selec-
tion was carried out in a non-random fashion. Next, results describing general sample
characteristics regarding PES will be presented. These results do not answer the outlined
research questions, they serve more the purpose to convey to the reader how familiar
interview participants generally were in terms of the PES programme. This subsection
will be followed by a paragraph evaluating questions belonging to part one of the research
question before, in a fourth and final step, the second part of formulated research ques-
tion and its hypotheses will be assessed and tested. Generally, obtained data has been
encrypted to prevent unauthorised access, using the open source software ‘TrueCrypt’.
The obtained sample resulting out of the household selection process is illustrated by Fig-
ure 24 (for A1-07/08), Figure 25 (for A2-08) and Figure 26 (for A3-10/11). The total num-
ber of interviews amounted to 98, with a rate of non-response of 15.3 percent (replacement
of 15 households due to unavailability after three attempts, cf. [Arriagada et al., 2010]).
17 interviewees were not aware that a PES programme or a programme in which the
government and its institutions pay landowners for forest protection or reforestation on
their private Fincas exist (see Appendix II, question 1a and 1c), thus these persons had to
be excluded as an interview could not be realised. Households belonging to this category
Figure 24: A1-07/08 with all household observation points
are indicated through a yellow vulcano in the afore mentioned Figures, leaving 81 valid
interviews, shown by blue pins. Nevertheless, socio-economic data has been collected
from all 98 potential interviewees, thus the group indicating that they were not aware of
any programmes such as PES can briefly be compared to eligible participants. For this
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Figure 25: A2-08 with all household observation points
Figure 26: A3-10/11 will all household observation points
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purpose, age, the attained education level as well as the household’s consumption level
appear of interest. With reference to the first two variables, the null-hypothesis stating
that means of the age as well of the attained education level are equal for both groups
cannot be rejected at a five percent significance level (see Table 31 and 32 in Appendix I
for more details). However, when comparing consumption levels, the null-hypothesis that
respondents who know about the existence of programmes such as PES are characterised
through higher average means with reference to consumption levels can be rejected (one-
tailed test, tstat(df:95)= 2.693, tcrit= 2.628, α = 0.005**). The 95 percent confidence
interval suggests in this case that with a probability of 95 percent, interviewees who did
not know about the PES programme were between 0.22 and 1.47 consumption categories
lower than people who knew about it. As the test was significant at p=0.005, also the 99
percent confidence interval could have been constructed.
6.1 Socio-economic sample characteristics
Figure 27: Population in Sarapiquí and in the sample
Remembering section 5.3.6 ‘Con-
sequences of sampling criteria’
and that site-selection was car-
ried out in a non-random fashion,
it might be worthwhile to check
the socio-economic composition
of the obtained sample to gain
further insights in which ways it
might be biased. Figure 27 for
instance shows the age distribu-
tion classified into age categories
of inhabitants of the Sarapiquí
region according to 2011 Census
data (upper part) and the age dis-
tribution of the sample, in per-
centage (primary y-axis) as well
as in absolute values (secondary
y-axis). Except for the first age
category 18 to 27, the declining
trend seems to be captured by
the study. Assuming that older
people on average have lived for
a longer time period in a certain
place and this is correlated with
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general knowledge of the close-by region, one implication of the under-representation of
the youngest age category in this study could be that study results are upward biased,
i.e. that more people indicate that they have heard about the PES programme than what
would be gained by having a closer representation of Sarapiquí’s population in the sample.
Figure 28: Attained education levels in Sarapiquí and in the sample
A second socio-economic characteristic worth assessing seems to be the attained education
level to check if sampled respondents are generally better or worse educated than average
citizens living in Sarapiquí, again drawing on 2011 Census data. Judging Figure 28 at
first sight, it appears reasonable to acknowledge that the overall education distribution in
Sarapiquí is quite well mirrored by the sample. Citizens without formal education make
up roughly 10 percent, primary education have received almost 60 percent of the popula-
tion. With respect to the latter two categories, i) citizens holding a university degree are
somewhat over-represented in the sample than in the actual population and ii) citizens
having attained secondary education are somewhat underrepresented. Nevertheless, the
tendency is well captured.
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Figure 29: Consumption levels, Rugtveit and sample
Another interesting variable to
investigate concerns income or
consumption levels. In the
questionnaire, interviewees have
been ask to express total house-
hold consumption per month, in-
cluding all expenses of house
members for food, clothing,
school fees, medicines, com-
bustibles, insurances etc. in
an approximate number corre-
sponding to one of ten cate-
gories. As the 2011 Census pro-
vides data on income per house-
hold only, no direct compari-
son can be made as consump-
tion expenses might be higher
or lower than income depend-
ing on individual saving or loan
patterns. For the whole re-
gion ‘Huetar Norte’ (the small-
est unit in the 2011 Census for
this variable), the total aver-
age household income is given
with roughly 640,000 Colones.
The first quintile is described
with 141,400, the second with
314,100, the third with 454,800,
the fourth with 703,500 and the fifth with 1,582,810. As the question investigating con-
sumption levels was taken over from a study conducted by Signe Rugtveit in Costa Rica
(see 5.5, ‘The questionnaire’) in 2011, a comparison can me made to her results. Her
research was concerned with landowners only, possessing on average a farm of 58ha which
might carry implications in itself for income and/or consumption levels. Furthermore, the
study was conducted in the canton of Hojancha in the Guanacaste province, lying to the
west of the country. Nevertheless, as data on the same variable are available, the oppor-
tunity to compare results and to catch a glimpse upon the sample should not be missed.
Figure 29 shows both distributions. It becomes clear that sampled households in this
study are described through lower consumption levels, even though the most frequently
cited consumption categories appear to be similar: In both studies, around 42 percent of
respondents indicated that they spend around 100,000 to 200,000 thousand Costa Rican
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Colones on consumption, and roughly 30 percent named the category standing for 200,000
to 300,000 thousand. However, the null-hypothesis stating that means are equal for both
groups can be rejected at a five percent significance level (2-tailed test, t(df:194.326)=
-2.236, p= 0.026*, α = 0.05).
Description Observations Total Percentage
Has plot of land or Finca (agricul- 1979 16158 0,122
tural/ livestock usage) in Sarapiquí
Has plot of land or Finca (agricul- 7535 125647 0,060
tural/ livestock usage) in Heredia
Has plot of land or Finca 9 97 0,093
in the Sample
Table 4: Land-owners in Heredia, Sarapiquí (both Census 2011) and in the sample
A final characteristic worth checking to further describe the socio-economic composition of
the sample concerns the amount of landowners in the sample. The 2011 Census enquires
about the existence of a plot of land or a Finca for agricultural and livestock uses only
(‘Tiene parcela o finca agropecuaria’), and it is not clear how far ownership of land
without such activities is considered in the definition. PES participants for example are
not allowed to undertake any land-use changes on their Fincas while receiving payments.
Thus, the comparison with numbers generated out of the study sample where interviewees
were just asked if they have a plot of land or a Finca in general has to be treated with
caution. Table 4 shows that in Sarapiquí, the percentage of respondents indicating that
they own a Finca as defined by the Census is, with 12.2 percent, more than double the
provincial average of 6 percent. The sample result of 9.3 percent lies well within.
6.2 General sample characteristics regarding PES
Having described the sample in socio-economic terms, a characterisation of general char-
acteristics of the sample regarding PES is the aim of the following, conveying to the reader
how familiar interview participants generally were with reference to the PES programme.
The leftmost graph of Figure 30 illustrates responses to the opening question of the
questionnaire. Here, roughly 18 percent responded with ‘Yes’ when asked if they had
ever heard about the PES programme, thus they were immediately deemed eligible for
conducting interviews. Further 63 interviewees who did not know about the existence
of such a programme knew that in Costa Rica, programmes have been set up in which
the government and its institutions pay individual persons who protect forest or reforest
on their private Finca, which is synonymous to PES. Therefore, these persons were also
26No integer due to due Levene’s test for equality of variances. Here, equality can be rejected at a five
percent significance level (F=5.097, p=0.025, α = 0.05).
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deemed eligible, leading to 81 valid interviews. The rightmost graph in Figure 30 depicts
this result, further showing that with 17 interviewees, the questionnaire could not be
realised. Note that also people who indicated that they knew the PES programme where
asked the question heading the rightmost graph, as inconsistencies could be discovered
here. The graph to the middle shows that Fonafifo, the administering agency, is generally
Figure 30: Questionnaire preconditions
not well known among study participants, even among people who have heard about the
PES programme. While being in the field, forest experts have been enquired about their
expectations regarding participant’s responses (people living in the Sarapiquí canton) over
the existence of programmes in which the government and its institutions pay persons who
protect forest or reforest on their private farm. Fernando Salaz Sarkis, head of Minae’s
regional office as well Eduardo Solórzano, head of Fonafifo’s regional office in Sarapiquí,
responded in a similar fashion by stating that according to their knowledge, the vast ma-
jority (la ‘gran mayoría’) should be aware of it. Whereas the former puts emphasis on his
view by verbally reaffirming his opinion twice (quote: “Si la gente si sabe, si lo conocen...”,
‘Yes, people do know it, yes they possess knowledge of it’), the latter quantifies his guess,
stating that around 80 percent of respondents would answer with ‘Yes’ when confronted
with the afore described question. Looking again at the rightmost graph in Figure 30,
we can calculate the sample rate which is given with 82 percent, thus the estimate put
forward by Eduardo Solórzano matches the study result extremely well.
Note that after the opening questions, I explicitly told eligible participants to refer from
now on to programmes in which the government and its institutions pay persons who
protect forest or reforest on their private farm as Payments for Environmental Service
programmes. Therefore, this terminology was used throughout the questionnaire.
Before turning towards the assessment of outlined research questions, it appears interest-
ing to describe the sample in terms of eligibility criteria for PES application. Participants
have not been pre-screened if they met demanded criteria or not, as this study desired
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to analyse the existence of effects triggered on the overall population - effects which are
not necessarily limited to eligible forest owners only. Out of the pool of 81 interviews,
just two persons stated that they had ever applied for PES. However, one person did not
remember much of the process as they applied around the year 2000 and the Finca had
to be sold years ago due to financial constraints facing the family. Table 5 demonstrates
that even though just two households ever applied
for PES, the number of households deeming them-
selves eligible for PES application is given with five
(note the difference to Table 4 where the number
of landowners in the sample is given with nine. El-
igibility is here defined as owning a Finca/ a plot
of land of a minimum size of two hectares with a
standing forest on it). This finding already illus-
Table 5: Eligibility for PES
trates that the vast majority of interview participants were simply not eligible for PES
participation, a finding which is described in more detail by Table 6. Here, 88.9 percent
of total participants or 92.3 percent of total valid observations for this variable (as three
Table 6: Reasons why never applied for PES
participants did not want to indicate anything, thus they were coded ‘missing’) expressed
that they did not have enough land/no Finca when asked why they never applied for
PES, thus they were per definition excluded from the programme. Furthermore, two
interviewees named a too complicated application process as main reason for not applying,
such as “lots of paperwork” (‘mucha papelera’) and “the government demands really a
lot...many formulars and documents” (‘el gobierno pide muchíssimo...muchos formularios
y papeles’). Other reasons, which were just named once, included the impression that the
61
programme did not appear very useful or the perception that no remuneration is needed
as the own motivation sufficed for forest protection. In addition, one participant stated
that he has to share the Finca with a relative, and that decisions regarding land use have
to be taken in conjunction. Whereas he supported the idea of PES, his relative opposed
it, thus the status-quo of the Finca could not be changed.
6.3 Results RQ part I
The subsection which follows will investigate every question belonging to part one of the
research question in more detail, assessing knowledge about PES, if neighbourhood effects
can generally be identified and what perceptions people living close to a PES contract
hold over certain parts of PES or the environment in general. To that end, various tables,
graphs and charts will be used to illustrate results.
• How many people who receive/have received
PES payments interviewees generally know?
It has been shown in section 6.2 ‘General sample characteristics regarding PES’ that
the majority (sample rate: 82 percent) of sampled participants were aware that PES
programmes or programmes in which the government and its institutions pay persons who
protect forest or reforest on their private farm exist in Costa Rica, a result which stands
in line with expectations expressed by forest experts. A subsequent question concerns
the amount of people interviewees knew who still receive or have received PES payments,
thus where a direct reference point would be given. Figure 31 gives a first indication,
grouping known people into categories such as if they belong to family/ relatives, to the
circle of friends, to the neighbourhood or if they are just ‘Others known’ (also ‘distant
acquaintances’ for the Spanish ‘conocidos’), further divided by their geographical location.
Note that every participant was asked to indicate the number of persons she knew out
of each category, thus multiple answers were permitted. The biggest group is represented
by ‘distant acquaintances’ coming mainly out of the Sarapiquí canton itself, followed by
family members/relatives and friends. Looking at the two latter groups, it can be said
that the geographical proximity defined by the canton’s boundaries appear of minor im-
portance, as in both groups the knowledge of people who have/had a PES contract living
inside and outside of Sarapiquí is more equally distributed compared to ‘Others known’.
The finding that four people knew neighbours who have/had a PES contract but live out-
side of Sarapiquí is explained by the fact that these persons lived themselves in a different
locality before moving to Sarapiquí.
Table 7 gives a more detailed description of obtained responses. Here, vertical summation
of one category leads to 81, thus responses of all interviewees are recorded according to
the amount of people known out of the various categories. In comparison to Figure 31,
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Figure 31: Knowing people who have/had a PES contract, sorted by categories
this table shows that in every category, except for ‘Other known inside Sarapiquí’, almost
three-fourths of respondents indicated that they knew not a single person (#0 = zero
persons known) belonging to one of the respective groups. In case an interviewee did
know a person in one out of the eight categories, she is quite likely to know just one as
the values for two, three, four or five persons known (#2, #3, #4, #5) are relatively
small.
Table 7: Knowing people who have/had a PES contract, detailed
Being enabled to make a point with reference to the amount of people interviewees gen-
erally knew who have/had received a PES contract, i.e. not depending on one out of
the eight categories, we have to consult Figure 32. Here, we see that 26 participants did
not know a single person who has ever received a PES contract, 30 participants knew
one, 9 were aware of two, 8 of three, 7 of four and 1 of five. As 26 interviewees had
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not a single person who has ever received PES among their circle of known people, it
appeared interesting to illustrate from where these persons heard for the first time about
the existence of PES. Therefore, these sources are represented here as-well. The Figure
illustrates that approximately 70 percent of respondents knew i) not a single person or ii)
one person only, and that for both groups publicly available information sources such as
radio, television or newspapers played the most important role for their first contact to
PES. For respondents who knew two or more PES contract receivers, this source seemed
to decrease in importance. Moreover, the fact that around one-third of participants did
not know a single person who has/had ever received a PES contract but were still aware
that PES programmes or programmes in which the government and its institutions pay
persons who protect forest or reforest on their private farm exist, implies that a direct
contact point is not necessary for a first information provision.
Figure 32: Knowing people who have/had a PES contract, sorted by first contact source
64
• What are the main channels through which people
hear and receive their information about PES?
Answering through which channels participants heard and received their information
about PES, responses to two questions posted in the questionnaire will be highlighted. At
first, the channel through which interviewees heard for the first time about PES will be de-
scribed. Then, an analysis of the strongest information source regarding PES information
will follow, as similarity between both channels cannot be assumed.
2012-2009 2008-2005 2004-2001 2000-1996 do not remember
20 23 16 17 5
Table 8: Year in which heard for the first time about PES
Table 8 and Figure 33 demonstrate in which year and from whom participants heard for
the first time about the existence of PES. The Figure is composed of twelve categories,
indicating a wide range of sources. The chart already differentiates according to sources
belonging to the neighbourhood dimension, represented through pieces set apart on the
rightern side, and sources lying outside of this dimension. As immediately visible, ra-
dio/TV and newspaper represent the most frequently cited first contact point with 25
percent, followed by information received through friendships with 16 percent (summa-
tion of friends who never had a PES contract and friends who have or have had a PES
contract), information received through the workplace with 15 percent and information
received from family members or relatives with 14 percent (summation). What appears
interesting is that the neighbourhood defined as geographical distance plays a minor role
only with 9 percent (summation), and that electronic transmission of information to-
gether with information received from the workplace are, combined, more important as
a first contact source for information dissemination regarding PES (40 percent vs. 39
percent) than the three summated sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension
(family/relatives, friends, neighbours). However, at this stage interviewees were asked
from whom they heard for the first time about the PES programme only.
By contrast, Figure 34 enquired about the strongest source out of which an interviewee
received information regarding PES. The chart is organised in a similar fashion as Figure
33 to facilitate comparison, with sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension again
being set apart. Comparing both charts, two aspects grow apparent at first sight: First,
when asked concerning the strongest source for information provision, two categories
describing from whom a person heard for the first time about PES became obsolete,
namely ‘Environmental group’ and ‘Do not remember’, thus Figure 34 is composed of less
categories (for Figure 33, n=81, for Figure 34, n=79). Second, sources grouped together
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Figure 33: First time heard about PES, sorted by categories
Figure 34: Strongest source for PES information I, sorted by categories
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under the term neighbourhood dimension account for a greater part of the pie chart than
before, namely 59 percent compared to 39 percent earlier. The increase in importance
of more than 50 percent indicates that family/relatives, friends as well as neighbours are
important sources for information transmission and that they, even when a different first
contact point to the PES topic has been made, can complement and deepen knowledge.
This is particularly relevant in case interviewees knew persons who still receive or had
received a PES contract in the past, as the most significant increase in percentage points
is registered in these three categories: For family/relatives, this increase amounts to 100
percent (9 percent to 18 percent); for friends to 45 percent (9 percent to 13 percent);
and for neighbours to 57 percent (7 percent to 11 percent). Overall, information received
through radio, TV or newspapers still represent the main channel through which partic-
ipants receive information about PES, again with 25 percent. That the importance of
publicly available information has not not ceased nor increased might be explained by the
fact that 26 participants in the questionnaire did not know a single person who ever had
a PES contract, thus an increase in favour of the neighbourhood dimension is ruled out.
When asked if a local or national level radio, TV or newspaper was responsible for the
knowledge transfer, all respondents (100 percent) stated it has been a national level one.
Furthermore, participants indicating a source belonging to the neighbourhood dimension
have been asked more openly why they received information about PES from their re-
spective surroundings, i.e. why for instance a family member or a friend spoke about
the topic and if they can imagine a reason why these particular persons have influenced
their knowledge of PES and others not. Table 9 lists answers, which could generally be
grouped into four categories. The majority of persons indicating a source belonging to
Table 9: Reasons for speaking about PES, sorted
the neighbourhood dimension stated that family/relatives, friends or neighbours made
just a comment about PES or that they just heard about it briefly (70.6 percent, 94.4
percent and 81.8 percent respectively), thus a proper explanation of the various aspects
surrounding PES does not seem to have taken place. A slight difference is noticeable when
participants heard from family members or relatives, as here roughly 30 percent indicated
that they received a proper explanation - two because it might had been of relevance for
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a Finca which they owned, one as she was thinking about acquiring a Finca in future and
two just for the pleasure of knowing.
• Are interviewees aware that a PES contract exists in
the distance of maximum of 500m from their homes?
• Have interviewees who know PES ever spoken about the programme
with their neighbours living at a distance of maximum of 500m?
Both research questions stated above concern effects related to the geographical neigh-
bourhood definition which was set at 500m in the study, thus they will be dealt with
together. Remembering subsection 5.1 ‘Definition of neighbourhood’, a 500m dimension
has been chosen due to the explicit recommendation by a local Catie researcher, stating
that this dimension would probably mirror best the understanding of geographical neigh-
bourhood of most interviewees. Table 10 displays that 69 interviewees, or 86.3 percent of
the valid percentage, did not know if there exist a property in the distance of maximum
of 500m from their place of residence which currently has a PES contract. This num-
ber somewhat surprised me as I thought it to be much lower. As outlined in the above
mentioned ‘Definition of neighbourhood’, I was planning to actually use a much broader
geographical definition of neighbourhood when drawing up the research proposal, namely
a first spatial zone up to 1km and a second one encircling up to 3km. After discussions
Table 10: Knowledge of PES in the vicinity
at Catie and the decision to significantly narrow down the geographical extent, I was
expecting that the majority of interviewees were aware of the existence of a Finca with
PES close-by, as all participants knew about the general existence of such programmes (see
Figure 30, ‘Questionnaire preconditions’). In addition, a geographical distance of 500m to
a PES property marked the outer boundary of the sampling area - many households were
located at a closer range even, for instance 100m, 200m or 300m away. Furthermore, out
of the nine responses indicating that they indeed knew of the existence, four were clearly
not the one still receiving payments, thus the amount of people who actually were aware
of the PES is around five.
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Table 11: Information-sharing within the vicinity
This finding, together with re-
sults shown by Table 11, namely
that 96.3 percent of participants
have never spoken about PES
with persons living in the distance
of maximum of 500m, indicates
that an argument for the exis-
tence of spill-overs due to geogra-
phical proximity can hardly be made. This finding appears consistent with a comment
made by Mr. González Chaverri, forest expert at Fundecor: “I would like to tell you that
in Costa Rica, farmers are very individualistic, they are...[pause]... they do not share a
lot with neighbours what they are doing on their Fincas. I noticed that there is a cul-
ture for doing things on your own rather than sharing them with the others ” (‘Quiere
decirle que en Costa Rica, los finceros son muy indivualistas, son muy...[pausa]...de no
compartir mucho con otros vecinos sobre lo que hacen en su finca. Yo he sentido que hay
mucha cultura de hacer las cosas por su cuenta, y no tanto compartitlas con los demás’).
Fortunately, geographical neighbourhood has just been one possible source for the attri-
bution of neighbourhood effects, with information received from family member, friends
etc. representing other sources27. Nevertheless, the finding was surprising. With reference
to the methodology employed in this study, the fact that an argument for the existence of
geographically determined spill-overs can hardly be made has severe consequences. In ret-
rospect, it can be said that the pre-set sampling criteria for site selection (see subsection
5.3.1), especially criterion a (‘first PES area ever established at site’) which substantially
complicated the sampling process, did not turn out to be useful as neighbours were sim-
ply not aware that a PES scheme existed in their geographical neighbourhood. Thus, the
restrictivity imposed by this criterion could have been circumnavigated with this insight,
shortening the amount of time needed for the preparation of this study.
Both research questions used a 500m definition of geographical neighbourhood, thus a
second thought over the usefulness of this measure seems desirable. The 500m level has
been pre-set, as it was thought to correspond with participants’ idiosyncratic perception
of geographical neighbourhood. Figure 35 shows if the extent has been over- or underes-
timated by illustrating participants’ personal definitions of geographical neighbourhood,
with results being further subdivided into groups according to interviewees’ responses if
they i) knew, ii) did not know or iii) were unsure about the existence of a property which
27At one stage during the process of formulating the research proposal, it was planned to attribute all
effects to geographical proximity. Likert statements would all then read as ‘Due to the existence of a
PES area in the distance of maximum 500m for here,...(insert: effect intended to measure)’. With the
majority of neighbours not being aware a the PES property close-by, this research would have been
impossible to conduct.
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currently has a PES contract in the distance of maximum 500m (n=74). Generally, we see
that the 500m definition is, with eleven mentions, the most frequently cited one, followed
by a definition of 1000m with 10 mentions. The median (Q2= 600m) indicates that our
500m definition represents roughly the level where the sample is split into two halves.
Figure 35: Participant’s definition of neighbourhood, sorted by categories
Regarding overestimation, it has to be said that for some respondents, the definition of
geographical neighbourhood put forward in the questionnaire might has been too large.
The first quartile is given with Q1= 400m, thus 25 percent of respondents conceptualised
geographical neighbourhood narrower. However, and as already stated, 500m marked the
outer boundary of the sampling area, thus in many cases households were located closer
to the PES site, thus this point of concern can partly be countered.
An alternative would have been to set a 1000m definition, but with the sample mean
of Ø= 888m, the extent of the geographical neighbourhood as conceptualised by partici-
pants would have been overestimated. In my view, overestimation entails more risks than
underestimation as in the letter case respondents indicating a value above the pre-set
value still regard the pre-set level as lying within their definition, thus this level is still
encompassed in their perception of geographical neighbourhood. In the former case, this
would not be the case.
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Looking again at Figure
35, it becomes apparent
that most of the intervie-
wees who indicated that
they know of the existence
of a PES property which
currently has a PES con-
tract, named a geograph-
ical neighbourhood defini-
tion in the range of 100m
to 1000m, thus tending to
favour smaller definitions
of geographical neighbour-
hood. The box-plot in Fig-
ure 36 confirms this result.
However, as the rightern bar
contains nine observations
only, this finding might not
be conclusive. Figure 36: Neighbourhood definition and PES knowledge
Since we have seen that the majority (n=69) of interviewees were not aware of the exis-
tence of a property which currently has a PES contract close-by, a last area of interest
concerns respondents’ own perception over their ‘information-radius’. Surprisingly, out of
all 69 respondents, 58 were convinced that they would know in case a property/a Finca
which receives government payments for reforestation or forest protection at the moment
exist in the distance of zero to 500m from their place of residence, thus substantially
overestimating their capacity to receive this sort of information. The most frequently na-
Table 12: Reasons for knowledge of PES in the vicinity
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med reason concerned proximity: 55 percent stated that simply because they ‘know the
area’, they would be aware of the existence of such a property/Finca. This is followed
by the impression that ‘people talk’ (21 percent), thus the information would surely had
spread. 11 respondents (16 percent) expressed that they would not know it.
• In which of the following areas are we able to identify the existence of neighbour-
hood effects? Which of these areas demonstrate being significantly impacted by the
introduction of a PES scheme close-by? Which areas demonstrate the least impact?
1. Changes in information seeking behaviour
2. Changes in views over nature’s commodification and
changes in motivations towards environmental goals
3. Changes in views concerning the enforcement of the Forest Law
In the following, each one of the enumerated points above will analysed separately.
‘Changes’ in all three areas of enquiry were measured using ‘change-statements’ (see 5.4,
‘Measurement definitions’), i.e. Likert statements in which a clear attribution of an effect
(e.g. changes in information seeking behaviour) to a specific source (e.g. ‘due to contact
with persons of my family/relatives...’, ‘due to contact with friends...’, ‘due to contact with
neighbours...’ etc.) was possible. Note that for one interviewee, all effects intended to
measure were attributed to one source only, namely to the one she indicated as being the
strongest for information provision regarding PES (see Appendix II, question No. 4). For
the four persons where no pre-set category corresponded to their strongest information
source and who thus indicated ‘Others’, the second strongest source was used which in
all four cases could be grouped into one of the defined categories28. This was done for the
sake of convenience, as four additional entries for a specific information source with just
one observation each would have made the tables exhaustively long.
- Changes in information seeking behaviour
Table 13 displays results for changes in the information seeking behaviour of interviewees,
i.e. if respondents felt more interested in the topic of PES when they received informa-
tion about it from one of the respective sources. It becomes apparent that 68 out of
79 respondents totally disagreed with the statement, and that this type of response is
the dominant one regardless of the respective information source. That means are all
distributed between one and two, translating into the range of ‘totally disagree’ to ‘dis-
agree’, indicates that none of the sources was, on average, able to induce participants to
pursue more information regarding PES. Separating means for sources belonging to the
28In the questionnaire, interviewees have been asked to indicate the first as well as the second strongest
source out of which they received information regarding PES.
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Table 13: Information seeking behaviour, sorted by knowledge sources
neighbourhood dimension (n= 48) and sources lying outside of this dimension (n= 31),
the null-hypothesis that both means are equal cannot be rejected at a five percent sig-
nificance level (2-tailed test, t(df:77)= 0.189, p= 0.851, α = 0.05, see Table 14 ‘All Areas’).
Taking a closer look at the three different research sites A1-07/08, A2-08 and A3-11/12
separately, Table 14 lists means and p-values testing the hypothesis that means of the
information seeking behaviour triggered due to information received from the neighbour-
hood dimension are equal to the means of the information seeking behaviour triggered
due to information received from sources lying outside this dimension, at a five percent
significance level. Here, results in each one of the three research sites confirm the result
obtained in the aggregate picture, since the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected in none of
the three areas. These results suggest that effects triggered due to information received
from sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension are, on average and at a five
percent significance level, not different from effects being triggered due to sources lying
outside the neighbourhood dimension, thus casting heavy doubt upon the relevance of the
distinction made.
Table 14: t-Test statistics, information seeking behaviour and dimensions
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Several interviewees indicated that they did not feel motivated to gain more information
regarding PES simply because they did not own land, thus the topic was regarded as
irrelevant. Therefore, it appeared sensible to separate respondents according to their
own perception regarding their eligibility for PES. Table 15 demonstrates results. With
a mean of 2.4, the group of land owners who regarded themselves as eligible rank top,
also compared to means listed in Table 13. However, as five observations only belong
to this category and as the mean is still distributed between ‘disagree’ and ‘indifference’
(response category two and three), positive effects defined as means falling into the range
of category three to five, indicating that some respondents indeed felt more motivated to
gain further information regarding PES, seem absent.
Table 15: Information seeking behaviour, sorted by PES eligibility
Overall, the existence of positive neighbourhood effects with reference to information
seeking behaviour has to be denied. At first sight, findings appear to stand somewhat in
contrast to study results outlined in the literature review. The majority of studies cited
in chapter three emphasised the overwhelmingly importance of access to information for
uptake of environmental activities. However, most of the studies outlined derived their
findings by focusing on potential PES providers, i.e. individuals/households who fulfil ba-
sic PES application requirements, such as ownership of land for instance. In the present
study, interviewees who regard themselves as eligible for PES application also exhibit,
with 2.4, the highest value, indicating that for this group access to information is indeed
of greater importance than for other groups. However, and as stated, a value of 2.4 still
stands for disagreement or indifference, thus the receipt of information did not stimulate
an information seeking effect, even though the small size of observations belonging to this
category impede a final judgement.
Furthermore, t-Test statistics have shown that responses given in case an effect was trig-
gered due to information sources which have been grouped under the term ‘neighbourhood
dimension’ and responses given in case an effect was triggered to sources which could not
be counted as coming out of this dimension did not, on average, seem to differ (at α =
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5 percent), thus the distinction made does not offer any insights. Note that a reversely
coded informational effect has not been analysed, for instance if a negative informational
effects was triggered since still-overs can generally work in both directions. However, in
case of information seeking behaviour, this seems unlikely.
- Changes in views over nature’s commodification and
changes in motivations towards environmental goals
In a first step, it will be examined if views on nature’s commodification are introduced
in the geographical neighbourhood to a PES area, meaning that if people living close
to PES sites regard environmental services now under a more ‘economic lens’, i.e. as a
source to derive financial gains from. Remembering subsection 3.6 ‘Commodification of
nature’ outlined in the literature review, the possibility for the introduction of such a
view has been documented, especially through “imposing a single language of valuation”
[Kosoy et al., 2007, p. 1232]. In a second step, changes in motivations towards environ-
mental goals will be dealt with, which will be necessary to analyse crowding-out effects.
To analyse changes in views over nature’s commodification, three ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ statements
as well as one open question were included in the questionnaire. The first two statements
investigated if new economic evaluation tendencies with reference to nature and forests
were introduced, such as if PES information received from one of the respective informa-
tion sources led interviewees to think that nature and forests have a price now which is
more or less defined or if the statement read as “before, I thought that it is not possi-
ble to quantify the value of nature and forests, but now, due to...[respective information
source]... I think that it is well possible to quantify it” was true or false. A positive re-
sponse to both questions was taken as a precondition for the analysis of commodification
effects (see tick-marks in Figure 37, after ‘price’ for the first and after ‘quantify value’ for
the second statement). Overall, 18 respondents fell into this category. The third state-
ment was formulated as “I still view the environment and forests as a whole ecosystem
and not as a particular service, the...[respective information source]... had no effect at all
on this view (way of thinking)”.
Figure 37 illustrates that, with the first bar on the bottom, one interviewee answered
in this specific way, giving no answer (‘99’ was coded as ‘missing value’) to the fourth
and final question which enquired about participants’ view if programmes such as PES
contribute to regard nature and forests as a commercial good (‘mercancía’). The second
bar counted from the bottom in Figure 37 shows the most frequent response given regard-
ing notions of nature’s and forests’ commodification. Ten participants stated here that
it is ‘True’ that due to information received regarding PES, they now regarded nature
and forests as having a more or less defined prices and that it now became possible to
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quantify the value of both. However, this introduction of economic evaluation methods
did not lead interviewees to think that the environment and forests can now be seen as
particular services, changing the view of both belonging to a whole ecosystem towards
a point of view where each aspect of the environment can be separated and stand apart
from each other, each aspect as a full-fledged service. Furthermore, these respondents
were not of the opinion that programmes such as PES contribute to regard nature and
forests as a commercial good. On the one hand, this could be interpreted as a puzzle
since the possibility to assign a value to something, thus putting a price tag on it, is a
Figure 37: Views regarding nature’s and forests’ commodification
decisive characteristic of a tangible economic good. On the other hand, this result might
indicate that even though a process of commodification of nature and forests is introduced
through the establishment of PES programmes, these forces are not strong enough to
disrupt the perception of a holistic picture of nature which simply cannot be parcelled and
treated as a commercial good. In the latter case, it would be a subject for further research
to determine the condition/threshold where such a complete shift towards a commercial
view on nature and forests would become possible. Similar considerations might be able
to explain findings represented in the second bar to the top of Figure 37. Six respondents,
fulfilling the two basic pre-conditions (‘price’ and ‘quantify value’), indicated here that
even though they are of the opinion that programmes such as PES contribute to regard
nature and forests as a commercial good, they hold a holistic ecosystem view in which
different parts can not be singled out as a specific service. However, these six respondents
rated ‘True’ that programmes such as PES contribute to perceive nature and forests as
some sort of commodity.
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Assigning the eighteen observations represented in Figure 37 to the various information
sources which were responsible for the change in view, Table 16 highlights that respondents
who participated in an informational meeting regarding PES (with 100 percent) and who
received information from neighbours who never had a PES contract (with 50 percent)
were, on a percentage basis, the most likely group indicating views on nature’s and forests’
commodification29. However, with two observations only in the former category and four
observations only in the latter, results appear weak.
Table 16: Commodification of nature and forests, sorted by knowledge sources
Grouping information sources according to the two defined respective dimensions (inside
vs. outside of neighbourhood dimension), the degree of association between the two binary
variables can be analysed using the Phi (Φ) coefficient. Phi statistics represent the only
valid method for assessment as both variables are dichotomous in type, i.e. they “contain
data that have only two categories” [Bryman, 2008, p.321]. Table 17 shows the description
of the test, for which a Phi value of Φ = −0.24 is generated, implying that the likelihood
that commodification effects were triggered was somewhat greater in case information was
received from sources lying outside of the neighbourhood dimension compared to when
information was received from sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension.
Screening Table 16 for further insights and looking at sources related to the neighbour-
hood dimension only, it appears that in case an interviewee named a person who never
had a PES contract as strongest information source, the likelihood that this interviewee
29Note that Table 16 separates only for the fulfilment of the two basic pre-conditions as defined earlier,
namely that interviewees think that nature and forests have a price now which is more or less defined
and that the value of both can now be quantified whereas this task could not be carried out before.
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Table 17: Commodification of nature and forests, sorted by information dimension
indicated tendencies related to the commodification of nature and forests, defined through
validating ‘True’ the first two statements forming the pre-condition, seemed increased. In
case information came from the family/relatives who have or had a PES contract, only
1 person (7 percent) stated that nature and forests have a more or less defined price
now and that it is now possible to quantify its value. If information came from friends
or neighbours who have or had a PES contract, not a single person held that view. To
check for bivariate correlation within the neighbourhood dimension, comparing intervie-
wees who received their primary information from persons who have/had a PES contract
themselves and interviewees who heard about PES from persons who never had a PES
contract with reference to the fulfilment of the two pre-conditions, the Phi (Φ) statistics
can be used again. The description of the test as well as the degree of association between
the two binary variables are given in Table 18 and Table 19.
Table 18: Description of the Φ−Test
Table 19: Φ-Test statistic
The Phi value of Φ = −0.486 indicates a good neg-
ative pattern of association, implying that respon-
dents who’s primary information source is described
by persons who never had a PES contract themselves
are more likely to express views related to the com-
modification of nature and forests than in case an
interviewee received information regarding PES from
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persons who already had a PES contract. Explaining this finding is not possible out of
the collected data. However, a first guess can be formulated: Out of the 32 respondents
shown in Table 18, six (20 percent) stated that, when asked the more open question if
they are of the opinion that programmes such as PES contribute to regard nature and
forests as a commercial good, they did not hold this view because the payment levels
of these programmes were considered low. The reason of financial compensation being
perceived as too low was never mentioned in case interviewees named persons who never
had a PES contract as strongest source for PES information provision. Thus, a guess
would be that both groups conveyed information to the respective interviewee differently,
with persons who had a PES contract themselves emphasising the low payment level for
the ecosystem service they provide, which could possibly lead to a reduced likelihood of
interviewees seeing these programmes as promoting nature’s and forests’ commodification.
To summarise, we are able to state that notions of nature’s and forests’ commodification
are indeed introduced through PES programmes. 18 interviewees attributed a change to-
wards a more economic evaluation method of nature and forests, expressed through a view
that the price of both can now more or less be defined and its value quantified, directly
to the receipt of information regarding the PES programme. However, and as Figure
37 depicted, not a single interviewee responded to all four statements and questions in
the way which stood for a commodification/commercialisation view of nature of forests.
Rather, some statements and questions were validated ‘True’ and others ‘False’, resulting
in a mixed picture which offers, as discussed above, two different routes for explanation.
Furthermore, we have seen that the likelihood that commodification effects were triggered
was somewhat greater in case information was received from sources lying outside com-
pared to sources lying inside the neighbourhood dimension (Φ = −0.24). Considering only
the neighbourhood dimension, the likelihood that commodification effects were triggered
was greater (Φ = 0.486) in case an interviewee heard about PES from persons who never
had a contract themselves compared to interviewees who’s contact persons were enrolled
at some point in time, which might indicate differences in information transmission.
- Changes in motivations towards environmental goals
Having found that around 22 percent of respondents (n=18) in the collected sample
expressed the existence of commodification effects, a subsequent question concerns moti-
vational changes regarding the environment. These changes will become important when
assessing crowding-out effects which will be examined in the second part of the research
question. The motivation leading to the formulation of this block of question is, as out-
lined in chapter three ‘Literature Review’, the analysis of notions related to Impaired
Self-Esteem (ISE), a psychological processes caused when “an intervention from outside
carries the notion that the actor’s motivation is not acknowledged, his or her intrinsic
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motivation is effectively rejected. The person affected feels that his or her involvement
and competence is not appreciated which debases its value...As a result of impaired self-
esteem, individuals reduce effort” [Frey and Jegen, 2001]. For the analysis of this effect,
two required Likert statements as well as two optional question were included in the
questionnaire. The former enquired about whether interviewees’ motivations to conserve
the environment decreased on receiving information regarding PES from their respective
information source as they felt that their ‘own attempts to conserve the environment are
not appreciated’ or whether a reversely directed motivational effect kicked in, namely that
respondents felt ‘more motivated than before to undertake actions in the conservation of
the environment’. The two optional questions were asked only in case a participant agreed
with a statement (Likert-scale rating four= ‘agree’ or five= ‘totally agree’), requesting to
more openly explain the reasons for the de- or increase in motivation.
Table 20: Decrease in motivation, sorted by knowledge sources
Table 20 and Table 21 list results, revealing an unambiguous picture. In none of the two
cases, an effect in either direction is detectable since all responses given can be described
by Likert-scale ratings belonging to category one, standing for ‘totally disagree’, and cat-
egory two, representing plain disagreement. As not a single person indicated motivational
changes, a deeper analysis of the data can be skipped as the chance to reach a fruitful
result appears not to be given. With reference to our outlined theories, this has several
implications. First, an effect as suggested by the theory of impaired self-esteem cannot
be validated through the present study, thus respondents did not seem to adjust their
motivational levels with reference to the conservation of the environment on receiving
information regarding PES from on of their respective information sources. Second, since
no motivational changes can be detected, the theory of crowding-out of motivations can
further not be validated.
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Table 21: Increase in motivation, sorted by knowledge sources
However, he have to keep in mind that this case-study did not draw on the standard
definition of crowding theory. As outlined under 3.5 ‘Crowding-out’, cognitive evalua-
tion theory (CET) was used for explaining the underlying effects for the occurrence of
crowding-out. This theory, based on the assumption that people have a psychological
need for self-determination, argues that individual actors ‘categorise’ events according to
whether they are perceived as ‘controlling’ (contingent rewards, evaluation, surveillance,
deadlines etc.) or as ‘autonomy enhancing’ (positive feedback, choice etc.), claiming that
these effects either weaken or strengthen self-determination. PES schemes built their
success upon compliance, i.e. the delivery of the subscribed environmental service, thus
PES compliance can be regarded as an ‘controlling’ event which, in a second phase, could
lead to impaired self-esteem as the monetary incentive can cater a feeling in which a per-
sons regards his own attempts as not being sufficiently acknowledged. However, this study
translated the standard definition to a modified context where interviewees did not receive
payments themselves, thus the perception of being under a ‘controlling’ environment due
to the necessity to comply with PES regulation could be missing, explaining why we were
unable to detect any motivational changes. Nevertheless, due to the theory of impaired
self-esteem upon which crowding-theory partly rests, this transformation represented a
sensible approach.
Unfortunately, it was decided to pose the two more open questions only in case motiva-
tional changes were indicated (Likert-scale rating four= ‘agree’ or five= ‘totally agree’). To
further analyse why we were unable to detect modifications in the motivational structure
of participants, it would had been desirable to enquire about reasons why respondents
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disagreed with the confronted statements. With reference to the developed model put
forward in chapter four, the proposed effect-channel suggesting that events which are per-
ceived as controlling or autonomy enhancing influence motivations to do something for
the environment cannot be validated (independent vs. dependent component). However,
and as discussed above, the absence of an effect might be explained through the modified
context to which the theory for the occurrence of a controlling or an autonomy enhancing
effects was tailored to.
• Changes in views concerning the enforcement of the Forest Law
Analysing if changes in views concerning the enforcement of the Forest Law were triggered
upon receiving information regarding PES and if sources belonging to the neighbourhood
dimension triggered, on average, distinct effects than sources which can not be treated as
belonging to this dimension, builds the following subsection’s object of interest. Changes
were assessed through responses to a single Likert statement, requesting interviewees to
indicate their degree of (dis)agreement whether PES information received from their re-
spective information source lead them to think that the ‘the government is now more
capable than before to enforce the Forest Law’.
To filter eligible respondents, an introductory question checked if an interviewee was aware
of the existence and the meaning of the Forest Law, a question to which 80 out of the
81 interviewees agreed to (98.7 percent). Through qualitative interviews, forest officials
confirmed that generally every citizen is aware of the existence of the Forest Law and
its proclaimed deforestation ban. Table 22 links responses given to the various sources
responsible for the PES knowledge effect. At first sight, it becomes noticeable that hete-
Table 22: Enforcement of Forest Law, sorted by knowledge sources
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rogeneous responses were given, with all five possible answers ranging from ‘totally dis-
agree’ to ‘totally agree’ being mentioned. Examining the last column, we can observe that
means are all distributed between Likert-scale ratings three to five, demonstrating that
interviewees were indeed of the opinion that the receipt of information regarding PES
positively stimulated perceptions over the government’s capacity to enforce the Forest
Law. This result in itself could be taken as an indication for the existence of neighbour-
hood effects. However, the finding that PES information received from the workplace,
via electronic transmission, through newspapers or through the participation in an infor-
mational meeting about PES seem to have triggered similar effects, casts doubt upon the
importance of the distinction made between the neighbourhood dimension and informa-
tion sources lying outside of this dimension. t-Test statistics testing the null-hypothesis
that means out of both dimension over all three research sites are equal, at a five percent
significance level, reveal no difference (t(df:78)= 1.247, p=0.216, α = 0.05). The same
picture is obtained when testing the null-hypothesis for each research site individually
(see Table 23, α= 5 percent).
Table 23: t-Test statistics, enforcement of Forest Law and dimensions
Again, as in the analysis of information seeking effects, results suggest that effects trig-
gered due to information received from sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension
are, on average and at a five percent significance level, not different from effects triggered
due to sources lying outside the neighbourhood dimension, thus once more calling into
question that the distinction made between the two dimensions appears useful. How-
ever, it remains unclear if participants understood the statement in the way I intended
to phrase it. With the direct reference to the information source from which information
regarding PES was obtained, I tried to assure the attribution of the change in the gov-
ernment’s capability to enforce the Forest Law to this same process of having received
PES information. When recording responses to this Likert statement, many participants
named reasons why they held a particular view, i.e. why agreement or disagreement was
expressed. Figure 38 illustrates that 21 respondents stated for instance that the main
reason why they held the view that the government is now better able to enforce the
Forest Law is due to the fact that there exist more controls nowadays compared to in the
past (police checkpoints where permissions are revised, more presence of forest officials in
the countryside, generally more people working in the ‘green sector’ who pay attention
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Figure 38: Reasons for agreement/disagreement, enforcement of Forest Law
etc.). Four interviewees named improved facilities as the main reason for agreement (new
cars and motorcycles, more facilities to access remote areas, availability of satellite im-
agery etc.), whereas 12 persons disagreed by pointing towards corruption in the system (a
sufficiently high payment will cover illegal actions) or by simply stating that the situation
did not change at all.
In my opinion, it remains uncertain whether interviewees voiced their general impression
over the government’s capacity now compared to an earlier situation or whether this
change in view was really triggered due to the receipt of information regarding PES
(which surely can include information on how the government tries to assure compliance,
namely through better presence in remote areas, satellite imagery etc.). As mentioned
in subsection 5.4 ‘Measurement definitions’, it was a-priori clear that a high willingness
of participants to rethink and re-frame certain motivations/attitudes was demanded to
finally being able to attribute these to a specific information source, quantifying how far
this source was responsible for triggering a certain effect or for holding a certain opinion.
With the explicit reference to the information source at the beginning of the statement,
it was assumed that participants were well able to perform this task. In retrospect, it
might had been useful to reassure the attribution through a subsequent question.
• Which perceptions do people located in the distance of maximum of 500m to a PES
site hold over PES with reference to its usefulness?
To elicit participants’ views on the usefulness of PES programmes, interviewees were
asked to indicate, on a 5-point Likert scale, their degree of (dis)agreement to the follow-
ing statement: ‘I regard PES as an useful instrument to preserve forests and enhance
biodiversity richness’. In methodological terms, this statement represents a ‘general opin-
ion statement’ (see 5.4, ‘Measurement definitions’). Therefore, no explicit reference to
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a certain information source was made to which an effect could be attributed to, thus
answers provide insights into attitudes only. Table 24 provides an overview of responses
given, further subdivided according to whether the government was deemed more capable
than before to enforce the Forest Law. Considering at first the horizontally listed variable,
one notices the high rate of agreement: 95.5 percent asserted that the PES programme
was indeed useful. Disagreement articulated one person only, whereas four respondents
expressed indifference. Including the vertically ordered variable, a prominent feature ap-
pears that interviewees evaluating the PES programme useful were further of the opinion
that the government’s capacity to enforce the Forest Law has increased. On the contrary,
all five responses given pertaining to Likert-scale ratings one (‘totally disagree’) to three
(‘indifference’) with reference to the usefulness of PES can be described by the same
rating-scale ranging from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘indifference’ of the government’s capacity
variable, indicating relationships between both views.
Table 24: Usefulness of PES, sorted by enforcement of Forest Law
Testing for bivariate correlation, Spearman’s rho (ρ) has to be calculated as variables are
not at an interval/ ratio level of measurement, thus Pearson’s r cannot be used. Table 25
shows the correlation coefficient which is given with ρ = 0.272, indicating a moderate
positive relationship. At a significance level of α = 5 percent, the alternative hypothesis
that a correlation between the two variables exist (2-tailed test) cannot be rejected (N=
78, p= 0.016*), thus attesting a significant result.
Analysing for which reasons interviewees judged the PES programme as useful, Figure 39
can be consulted. The most frequently stated response included the view that without
these programmes, land owners would simply deforest “People are destructive” (‘la gente
es destructora’) or “there are rude people” (‘hay gente grosera’) was mentioned several
times in this category. Some older participants referred to Guanacaste province, stating
that when they were young, deforestation led this strip of land appear like a desert, thus
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Table 25: Spearman’s rho (ρ) test statistics
experience has shown that without payments, people would just cut down trees. One
interviewee claimed that some laws do not function well, thus programmes such as PES
are deeply needed to impede deforestation. This response points towards a relevant issue:
The Forest Law already bans deforestation, limiting the possibilities to cut down trees to
a small amount of cases. From a legal point of view, the clearing of a large amount of
land represents already an illegal act in itself in case it is not covered by the law, which
seems sensible to assume in this case. Assuming further that people generally stick to the
law, the receiving of PES payments should be detached from the actual decision whether
to clear a forest or not.
Figure 39: Reasons for usefulness of PES
If interviewees perceive the possibilities for illegal logging on private Fincas subscribed to
PES compared to Fincas without any contract agreement differently, will be assessed in
more detail in the following research question. Referring back to Figure 39, we see that
nine respondents explained the usefulness of PES programmes with felt consequences of
climate change. The majority of persons based their answer on the feeling of climate
warming, stating that they are able to notice an increase in temperatures over the last
years/decades. Six respondents saw the usefulness of PES in its function as a motivation
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source for forest protection, whereas five interviewees mentioned that these programmes
simply support in protecting the overall environment better.
To summarise, it becomes apparent that a large majority of participants deemed PES
programmes as being useful (95.5 percent) out of displayed reasons. Furthermore, a
significant correlation was found between the perceptions on the usefulness of PES and
the government’s capacity to enforce the Forest Law (α = 5 percent).
• How do people located close to a PES site view the deforestation ban im-
posed by the Forest Law and the chances for illegal logging on private Fincas?
In the following, the assessment of how questionnaire participants view the deforestation
ban imposed by the Forest Law will form the object of interest. This part will be suc-
ceeded by analysing whether interviewees perceive the possibilities for illegal logging on
private Fincas subscribed to PES compared to Fincas without any contract agreement
differently - an issue which the previous research question already touched upon.
As participants’ general knowledge of the existence and meaning of the Forest Law has
already been verified through study results, interviewees were asked to rate the following
question using one out of three possible answers, including ‘Reasonable’, ‘Undecided’ or
‘Not reasonable’: ‘Let us think now of a person that you know who has a Finca/property
with forest. Do you think that it is reasonable that, even though it is her private property,
the Forest Law says that it is not permitted to cut trees there or do you think that normally
the owner should have the right to change the land use as she desires to?’. Answers are
recorded in Table 26, further subdivided according to property ownership. The division
was derived out of the assumption that interviewees who own land might perceive the
imposed deforestation ban differently, as they are directly affected by the law. However,
with eight out of nine property owners rating the imposed ban as reasonable, results
provide no support for this expectation.
Table 26: Perception of Forest Law, sorted by property ownership
Accordingly, no significant correlation could be found between land owners (ownership of
land ≥ 1ha) interpreting the imposed ban as ‘Not reasonable’ and interviewees without
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any land title considering the deforestation ban as ‘Reasonable’ using Spearman’s rank
order correlation coefficient (n=81, ρ = -0.3, p= 0.76)30. Overall, it becomes visible that
approximately 88 percent (70 observations) regard the deforestation ban imposed by the
Forest Law as reasonable, indicating that respondents did not evaluate individual rights
to forest clearing on private land/Finca as standing above the general necessity to protect
forests.
Besides enquiring about whether the implications of the Forest Law are perceived as
reasonable or not, interviewees have been asked whether they consider the Forest Law to
be of greater importance nowadays compared to what they have thought earlier. Results
are depicted in Table 27, demonstrating that 87 percent of respondents (71 observations)
Table 27: Importance of Forest Law, sorted by usefulness of PES
indeed held that view, confirming an increase in importance of the Forest Law over the
past. Ten study participants (12 percent) did not agree, implying either a view that
the importance has not changed at all or that it has decreased in meaning. The Table
further links responses recorded to whether the PES programme was regarded as use-
ful or not to preserve forests and enhance biodiversity richness. An interesting feature
observable appears that eight out of the ten persons deeming the Forest Law as being
of no greater importance still regarded PES as a useful instrument. Unfortunately, the
claim that interviewees are more aware of the usefulness of the specific PES instrument
than the usefulness of the overall Forest Law cannot be made, since questions differ in
their phrasing. Whereas the horizontally listed variable asks for an increase in the level
of importance, the vertically listed variable enquires about usefulness only, thus without
knowing the initial level of importance that an interviewee had in mind when responding,
no conclusion can be drawn. This represents a weakness in the formulation, as a similar
verbalisation of both questions might have resulted in a deeper insight.
30To compute the Spearman’s rank coefficient, property owners have been coded ‘0’ and interviewees
without land as ‘1’ to match the categories ‘Not reasonable’ (coded ‘0’), ‘Undecided’ (‘1’) and ‘Rea-
sonable’ (‘2’). Therefore, the test input is slightly different that represented in Table 26.
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Analysing the second part of the above stated research question, namely whether inter-
viewees perceived the possibilities for illegal logging on private Fincas subscribed to PES
compared to Fincas without any contract agreement differently, interviewees were con-
fronted with two similar questions. At first, questionnaire participants were asked what
they would expect to happen ‘in case a person cuts trees in a forest standing on her
private Finca which is under a PES contract’, followed by enquiring about whether the
consequences would be any different ‘in case a person cuts trees in a forest standing on
her private Finca which has no contract whatsoever’. Possible answers were pre-coded,
and results are depicted in Figure 40 and Figure 41. Judging both Figures at first sight,
it becomes apparent that the most dominant sector, ‘Pay a fine’, is bigger in the upper
than in the lower Figure. Looking at the numbers, this implies that participants saw it
10 percent more likely that persons who cut trees in a PES protected forest have to pay
a fine compared to when no contract whatsoever is made for the forest. Furthermore, the
possibility that ‘nothing’ will happen (‘no one applies the law’) is more than doubled in
the latter case (7 percent compared to 17 percent). In almost one third of cases (five out
of 14 observations) where interviewees stated that the illegal activity generally does not
entail repercussions, the impression was expressed that Minea and other relevant agencies
do not work on the weekend, thus on saturdays and sundays tree-cutting could still take
place without consequences. Thus, it got apparent that these five persons applied their
view that ‘nothing’ would happen to the weekend only, and not to every singly day during
the week.
This issue has been taken up in qualitative interviews with forest experts, leading to a
mixed result. Fernando Salaz Sarkis, head of Minae’s regional office in Sarapiquí agreed by
stating that weekends represent the time when most of forest related delicts are occurring.
Therefore, Minae tried to change the working schedule of some government employees
(‘funccionarios del estado’) to secure more presence during the weekend. However, these
plans were rejected by the administration. “We should be more preventive” (‘deberíamos
ser más preventidos’), he acknowledged, but at the same time pointing towards the 2002
established ‘brigada de control de tala ilegal’, a group of four ‘funccionarios’ created out
of an alliance between Minae, Fundecor and an NGO to show institutional presence by
visiting sites registered as problematic by motorcycle. Pedro González Chaverri, forest
expert at Fundecor also refers to the 2002 established forest brigade, emphasising that
these should not be understood as a substitute for the police but more as means to demon-
strate presence. Only Eduardo Solórzano, head of Fonafifo’s regional office in Sarapiquí,
disagreed with the statement that much of the deforestation that is still occurring could
be curtailed by showing more presence during the weekend. In case a person is determined
to cut down a tree, he claimed, that person will somehow find a way, thus the weekday
does not appear to matter.
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Figure 40: Consequences for cutting trees in a PES protected forest
Figure 41: Consequences for cutting trees in a non-protected forest
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Referring back to Figure 40 and Figure 41, differences in responses can be analysed using
the Mann-Whitney-U -Test, as data are on an ordinal level of measurement only. This
non-parametric statistical hypothesis test enables us to assess whether consequences to
the act of tree-cutting in case i) a forest is under a PES contract or ii) no contract what-
soever is made for the forest are perceived differently. Table 42 shows test statistics,
demonstrating that the null-hypothesis stating that no statistical difference in the central
tendency between perceived consequences exist, can be rejected at a five percent signif-
icance level (2-tailed test, p= 0.025*, α = 0.05). Furthermore, we see that the mean
rank is higher in case a forest is PES protected, implying stricter reactions to the act of
tree-cutting compared to when no contract whatsoever is made for the forest.
Figure 42: Mann-Whitney-U -Test, PES protected Finca vs. no contract
Despite the significant results, it appears interesting that in the second case (tree cutting
in a non-protected forest), 83 percent of interviewees generally expected a reaction of any
kind to happen, such as the receipt of a warning, the payment of a fine or imprisonment.
Understandably, this rate is, with 93 percent, higher in the first case (tree-cutting in a PES
protected forest) as signing of a contract might be associated with controls or supervision.
However, the fact that 83 percent of respondents expected consequences for tree-cutting
in a non-protected forest implies that the chances for illegal logging on private Fincas are
generally considered to be low in the sample. This finding is consistent with responses
given to the statement that the government is now more capable than before to enforce the
Forest Law (see research question above). Here, 85 percent of interviewees (67 out of 79
observations) did not disagree. Further checking the consistency of the responses, views
expressing that ‘nothing’ will happen in a case a person cuts trees in a forest standing on
her private Finca can be examined together with attitudes not agreeing to the statement
that PES is an effective instrument to preserve forests and enhance biodiversity richness.
A reasonable assumption would be to expect a relationship between both views. However,
out of the five respondents who disagreed to the statement that PES is a useful instrument
to preserve forests and enhance biodiversity richness, only one person stated that nothing
would happen in case the illegal activity was undertaken in a PES protected forest. In
a non-protected forest, two out of the five persons voiced that nothing would happen,
indicating that the majority of respondents who did not agree to the usefulness of PES
still considered a reaction in the form of a warning, a fine or imprisonment in case trees
were being cut on private land. This insight points either towards an inconsistency in
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responses or might tell us that for these interviewees, the law in itself is sufficient for
enforcement and no monetary incentive mechanisms are needed to assure compliance.
• How do people located close to PES site perceive the fairness
of their neighbours receiving PES, even though their land
is already under a deforestation ban by the Forest Law?
The deforestation ban imposed by the Forest Law already prohibits to cut trees and
change the land use in forests standing on private property, only in some circumstances
permits are issued, such as for the construction of houses, offices, infrastructural projects
of national interest, security reasons, for the prevention of forest fires etc.. Since the
condemnation of tree cutting is already inscribed in law, an interesting topic to conduct
research on concerns the question of fairness, namely whether the disbursement of PES
payments to subscribed landowners is perceived as a just practise, even though the Forest
Law already forbids to cut down trees or change the land use in a forest standing on
private property (except in the above mentioned cases). For the assessment of fairness
concerns, participants were asked to rate a statement using a five-point Likert scale. De-
pending on the response given, one to three open questions followed.
Table 28: Fairness of PES payments, sorted by property ownership
Table 28 depicts responses, further being subdivided according to whether interviewees
were property owners or not (ownership of land ≥ 1ha). Out of all 80 valid responses, 88
percent (71 observations) did not disagree with the view that the receipt of payments is
fair, despite the existence of the Forest Law. Before highlighting mentioned reasons for
holding a certain view, it is worth remembering that subsection 3.7 (‘Fairness concerns’) in
the literature review proposed equity theory as appropriate approach to examine fairness
concerns. The basic proposition of this theory is that individuals review their respective
inputs and outputs and check them with others, with negative motivational consequences
in case unfairness is perceived. This effect-channel has been picked up in the developed
model, with fairness concerns affecting motivations (see chapter 4, ‘The Model’). However,
with nine observations only disagreeing, possibilities for the analysis of fairness concerns
are severely hampered. This in itself can already be taken as a first finding, namely that
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the majority of respondents (88 percent) were indeed of the opinion that the receipt of
payments for forest protection is a just practise. Differentiating between property owners
and respondents without land title does, at first sight, not appear to reveal patterns of
association. Using a non-parametric test, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient testing
the null-hypothesis that there is no correlation in the data is given with ρ = 0.06 and
a significance of sig.= 0.56 (2-tailed), thus the hypothesis that there is no correlation
in the data cannot be rejected (N=80, α = 0.05). That no significant correlation can
be found implies for instance that interviewees without land title did not tend to regard
made PES payments as unfair whereas property owners, potentially qualifying to enter
the PES application pool, view payments as fair.
Taking a closer look at Figure 43, we recognise that the most frequently cited reason
for regarding payments as fair was that respondents thought of payments more as a
compensation or a support for the services contracted PES receivers provide. “Because
Figure 43: Reasons for perceived fairness/unfairness of PES
they keep protecting” (‘porque siguen protejiendo’), “because they do something” (‘porque
están haciendo algo’) or “with [financial] support, it is easier for these persons to accept
such programmes” (‘con el apoyo, es más facil para esas personas de aceptar los pro-
gramas’) was put forward. Most of the reasons belonging to this category emphasised
an active component, as illustrated by the first two quotes. By contrast, responses be-
ing grouped into the second category were characterised through a more passive notion.
Twelve interviewees stated here that PES receivers have to profit somehow from the land
they own, otherwise a forest standing on private property would be of no use. “They
also have to aliment their families, and if they cannot take advantage of their territory...”
(‘también tienen que dar comida a su familia, y si no pueden aprovechar su tierra...’),
“somehow, land owners have to have a benefit from their Finca” (‘de alguna manera, la
gente tiene que beneficiar de su finca’) or “people have to eat, people hace to support
their children...that is why its very good that they pay” (‘hay que comer, hay que apoyar
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a sus hijos...por eso es muy bien que pagan’) represented some responses.
As mentioned already, nine participants disagreed with the confronted statement, thus
expressing fairness concerns. The reason that every person should conserve the environ-
ment and forests out of their own motivation without the necessity of being paid was put
forward four times, followed by the view that the Forest Law already prohibts tree cut-
ting, thus payments are simply not needed, a reason articulated twice. One participant
said that “it is unfair because only few people receive payments but we are all paying
with our money for it. They use taxes for the payment” (‘Es injusto, porque solo al-
guna gente recibe pagos pero todos de nosotros pagamos con nuestra plata. Ellos utilizan
impuestos para pagar’.). After enquiring about reasons, these nine persons have further
been asked if, due to their view on payments as being unfair, new perceptions, feelings,
changes in motivations etc. resulted out of the perceived unfairness with reference to the
receivers of these payments. Besides the intention to discover motivational changes to
support the proposed model, space wanted to be given to catch further effects, such as
conflict potential for example attributable to these changes in motivations. However, not
a single person indicated any modifications in perceptions, feelings or motivations. As
a consequence, the effect-channel as proposed in the model cannot be validated. How-
ever, it has to be kept in mind that the analysis included nine observations only, thus
the sample is extremely small. As outlined, the majority perceived made payments as fair.
Referring back to Figure 43, the main reason for interviewees being ‘undecided’ (Likert-
scale rating three) or to plainly ‘agree’ (Likert-scale rating four) can be found in the bar
to the middle of the graph. Most out of the eight questionnaire participants adduced
two arguments, describing one reason in favour of fairness and one why the same practise
could be regarded as unfair. Furthermore, five respondents attributed fairness to the fact
that without payments, forest owners would simply deforest. This aspect already figured
prominently when analysing reasons for the usefulness of PES as illustrated in Figure
39. The reason that the receipt of PES payments is fair i) but protection should also
be possible without payments or ii) due the fact that all citizens profit from increased
environmental protection were named four times each.
6.4 Results RQ part II
The objective of the second part of the research question has been to investigate how iden-
tified neighbourhood effects could be explained, looking at relationships between variables
on the one side and certain theories and their proposed effect-channels on the other. Re-
search questions belonging to this part two are distinct from questions belonging to the
former part, as the possibility for analysis depends partly on responses given to part
one. Thus, the characteristic of results can determine whether the analysis of a proposed
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effect-channel put forward in the literature becomes possible or not.
• Low motivations towards the environment are negatively correlated
with self-reported negative motivational effects concerning the
environment due to the introduction of a PES scheme close-by
This research question has been formulated with the intention to measure tangible ‘cowd-
ing out’ effects. The feasibility for the analysis of crowding out effects depended on the
responses given to two Likert-scale items, one enquiring about whether interviewees’ mo-
tivations to conserve the environment decreased on receiving information regarding PES
from their respective information source as they felt that their ‘own attempts to conserve
the environment are not appreciated’ or whether a reversely directed motivational effect
kicked in, namely that respondents felt ‘more motivated than before to undertake actions
in the conservation of the environment’. However, it has been demonstrated that no ef-
fect in either direction could be detected, thus respondents did not seem to adjust their
motivational levels with reference to the conservation of the environment on receiving
information regarding PES from on of their respective information sources. This result
makes the analysis of the proposed correlation impossible to carry out.
• Views on nature’s commodification are correlated with
self-reported negative motivational effects concerning the
environment due to the introduction of a PES scheme close-by
Assessing whether the introduction of monetary evaluation methods for the description of
the environment is correlated with motivational modifications should be examined in the
following. In sub-section 3.6 ’Commodification of nature’, the theoretical considerations
for the occurrence of such an effect have already been outlined. Furthermore, we have
shown that 18 respondents indeed stated that they are now of the opinion that nature and
forests have a price which is more or less defined and that it became possible to quantify
the value of nature and forests whereas this has been impossible at earlier times. However,
a correlation between views on nature’s commodification and self-reported motivational
effects concerning the environment due to the introduction of a PES scheme close-by has to
be denied right from the outset, as no motivational adjustments are reported in the study.
Being enabled to formulate a first guess, it might be worthwhile to substitute self-reported
negative motivational effects with expressed motivations towards the environment, using
the latter as a proxy for the former. In the questionnaire, interviewees were asked to
self-rate their motivation to take action for the environment in a number ranging from
zero to ten (for potential biases associated with this question, see sub-section 5.5 and
‘Pre-test modifications’). Thus, the alternative hypothesis could be tested that partici-
pants who fulfilled the two basic preconditions with reference to commodification effects
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exhibit a lower value in terms of their motivation to take action in favour of the envi-
ronment than participants who did not indicate commodification effects (one-tailed test).
Surely, the test is not conclusive as we do not know participants’ initial level of moti-
vation to take actions in favour of the environment, thus a lowered value of the group
expressing commodification effects cannot be attributed exclusively to the imposition of
“a single language of valuation” [Kosoy et al., 2007, p.1232] triggered through a change in
the logic of a situation. However, a significant result could be taken as an indication that
a relationship exists between low motivations to take action in favour of the environment
and the introduction of economic evaluation methods. Taking a first look at descriptive
statistics as depicted in Table 29, we can discard these thoughts: With a higher mean
value and a lower standard deviation of the group indicating commodification effects, the
existence of an effect as proposed is unlikely.
Table 29: Descriptives, commodification effects and motivation towards the environment
• Fairness concerns with reference to the neighbour who receives PES are
negatively correlated with self-reported negative motivational effects
concerning the environment due to introduction of a PES scheme close-by
The possibility for the analysis of the described correlation is hindered in two ways. Be-
sides the fact that no motivational effects could be detected, which already hampered
the analysis of the two previous research questions, it has been shown that only nine
participants articulated fairness concerns. This number is relatively small, thus limiting
statistical assessment methods. Therefore, only descriptive statistics will be presented to
provide a first impression, again with expressed motivations towards the environment as
proxy for self-reported negative motivational effects concerning the environment due to
introduction of a PES scheme close-by.
Table 30 highlights results, showing an opposite trend than proposed in the research
question. Respondents perceiving the disbursement of PES payments as unfair exhibit a
slightly higher mean combined with a lower standard deviation, indicating that the data
points are scattered closer to the mean. However, a meaningful analysis seems difficult to
conduct due to the small amount of observations in one of the two categories.
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Table 30: Descriptives, fairness and motivation towards the environment
• Neighbourhood effects increase with the time of being located next to a PES site
With households being sampled in the distance of zero to 500m from a property which
currently receives PES payments, it was assumed that most of participants were aware
of the existence of such a PES site due to the narrow geographical radius. Based on
this assumption, the hypothesis has been formulated that neighbourhood effects increase
with the time households find themselves located next to a PES site as more possibilities
for influences are given. However, with only nine out of 80 respondents (see Table 10)
expressing awareness, the scope of the analysis is severely constrained. Therefore, the
formulated hypothesis seems difficult to test as even a significant result demonstrating
for instance that the information seeking behaviour with reference to PES is higher, on
average, for interviewees who have lived for a longer time period close to a PES site com-
pared to respondents who living in an area where the PES site has just recently been
established, could not properly be explained.
Nevertheless, for the matter of interest, t-Test statistics have been calculated for the four
variables where information received from the neighbourhood dimension could be sepa-
rated from information sources lying outside of this definition, retaining only the former
observations: i) Information seeking behaviour; ii) decrease in motivation due to own
attempts to conserve the environment not being appreciated; iii) more motivated than
before to undertake actions to conserve the environment; iv) increase in the government’s
capacity to enforce the Forest Law. For each one of these four variables, interviewees
naming that information about PES was received from sources belonging to the neigh-
bourhood dimension were selected and grouped according to whether they belonged to
research site A1-07/08 and A2-08 on the one side or to A3-11/12 on the other to check
for temporal effects. Testing for differences in means between both groups (information
received from the neighbourhood dimension and living in research site A1-07/08 or A2-08
vs. information received from the neighbourhood dimension and living in research site
A3-11/12) using t-Tests with an alpha-level of α = 0.05 reached no significant results,
thus in all four cases the null-hypothesis could not be rejected. Given the fact explained
above, namely that only nine out of 80 respondents expressed awareness, the assumption
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that neighbourhood effects increase with the time a household finds itself located next to
PES site cannot be verified.
• Is the assessment of neighbourhood effects conducive to geographical analysis?
This question dates back to when it was planned in the research proposal to focus exclu-
sively on geographical neighbourhood effects, i.e. to attribute all effects analysed in this
study to geographical proximity only without opening up for effects triggered due to the
wider neighbourhood dimension, i.e. effects triggered due to contact to the family, friends
etc.. To analyse if the assessment of neighbourhood effects is conducive to geographical
analysis, it appears useful to examine at first how often interviewees attributed an effect
to an information source which can be linked to geographical proximity. For this pur-
pose, we can organise the already depicted pie chart represented in Figure 34 in a slightly
different way as done in the illustrated Figure 44. Looking at the three sources belong-
Figure 44: Strongest source for PES information II, sorted by categories
ing to the neighbourhood dimension such as a) family/relatives, b) friends and c) neigh-
bours, only the final information source ‘Neighbours’ can clearly be linked to geographical
proximity. As shown in Figure 44 ‘Family/relatives’ rank first with 22 percent, followed by
information received from friends with 20 percent. However, the category of ‘Neighbours’
stands, with 16 percent, last when ranking the importance of the three sources belonging
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to the neighbourhood dimension.
This finding seems consistent with other results found in the study. As outlined in the pre-
vious research question, only nine out of 80 respondents were aware that a property with
PES exists in the distance of zero to 500m from their place of residence. Re-considering
Table 11 and PES information-sharing within the vicinity, we have further seen that 96.3
percent of study participants have never spoken about PES with persons living in the
distance of maximum of 500m from their homes. Taking results out of all three areas
together, these indicate that i) an argument for the relevance of a geographical neigh-
bourhood definition over other, more wider neighbourhood definitions cannot be made
(comparison-perspective) and that ii) an analysis of spill-over effects focusing exclusively
on geographically determined triggers does not seem to be conducive for the analysis of
neighbourhood effects in the case-study region (single-perspective), as other, potentially
more important factors than geographical distance could be missed out.
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7 Conclusions
The aim of this study has been to assess ex-post neighbourhood-effects of payments for
environmental services, i.e. to analyse the influences PES schemes exert beyond its de-
marcated area over the surrounding environment (spill-over effects), and understanding
from this neighbourhood perspective the effects and reactions that are being triggered.
For this purpose, a case-study in the Sarapiquí canton in Costa Rica has been designed
and undertaken.
I found that the distinction made between whether an interviewee received information
regarding PES out of sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension, i.e. from fam-
ily/relatives, friends and neighbours, or whether information was obtained from contact
to intermediaries, the attendance of an informational meeting, radio, TV and newspapers,
thus from sources which are not related to the neighbourhood dimension, could not be
used as an indication for the strength of measured effects. In fact, with reference to infor-
mation seeking behaviour and the perception over the government’s capacity to enforce
the Forest Law, parametric tests resulted in non-rejection of the hypothesis that means of
responses grouped according to the two defined dimensions are equal, thus casting heavy
doubt upon the usefulness of the distinction made. Moreover, this result was not only
confirmed in the aggregate picture when data over all three research sites were analysed
(A1-07/08, A2-08, A3-11/12), it was also stable when carrying out the same test for each
research site individually. Only in the case of commodification effects, non-parametric
tests led to a moderate correlation, implying that the likelihood that commodification ef-
fects were triggered was somewhat greater in case information was received from sources
lying outside the neighbourhood dimension compared to when information was received
from sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension. However, also in this case a
stronger relationship could be found when examining the neighbourhood dimension only,
separating whether information was received from persons who had a PES contract at
some point in time compared to whether information came from persons who never had
such a contract, possibly indicating differences in information transmission. Overall, the
implications for the proposed model are clear: A distinction in intensity levels of effects
triggered due to one of the two respective information sources cannot be verified.
However, when information sources which served only as a first contact point to PES were
contrasted with the strongest sources responsible for PES knowledge transfers, a substan-
tial increase in the importance of the neighbourhood dimension could be identified. This
finding indicates that family/relatives, friends as well as neighbours are important sources
for information transmission and that they, even when a different first contact point to the
PES topic has been made, can complement and deepen knowledge. In this case, contact
to persons who still receive or had received a PES contract in the past appeared of par-
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ticular relevance, as the most significant increase in percentage points was registered there.
The analysis of proposed effect-channels put forward in the literature, i.e. the direction in
which independent components exert an influence over dependent ones, revealed a mixed
picture. With reference to the developed model, four variables were examined in more
detail.
• The effect suggesting that events which are perceived as controlling or autonomy
enhancing influence motivations to do something for the environment could not be
validated. Therefore, no evidence for the validity of the theory of impaired self-
esteem could be found in the present study. In consequence, possibilities for the
assessment of crowding-out effects were ruled out. However, the absence of an effect
might be explained through the modified context to which the theory was tailored
to.
• Notions related to nature’s and forests’ commodification could be traced in the
study. However, not a single interviewee responded to all statements and questions
in a way which stood for a commodification/commercialisation view, implying that
even though economic evaluation methods are introduced through the promotion of
PES, these views are still not intense enough to dominate. That interviewees who
expressed commodification views are characterised through a lower value in terms
of their motivation to take action in favour of the environment than participants
who did not indicate commodification effects, could not be supported.
• Fairness concerns were found to be minimal. For the few participants expressing
concerns, no one indicated any modifications in perceptions, feelings or motivations
attributable to the felt unfairness, thus an effect of fairness concerns on motivations,
as proposed by the developed model has to be denied. Generally, it was found that
interviewees regarded made payments as fair and just, with the most cited reasons
being that PES providers contribute to environmental protection (active component)
or that providers should somehow profit from their territory (passive component).
• The majority of questionnaire participants was not aware that at the time of re-
search, a property with PES was located in the distance of zero to 500m from their
place of residence. Furthermore, information sharing within the vicinity was close
to non-existent. Therefore, preconditions for the analysis of temporal effects at-
tributable to the fact of being situated for a shorter/longer time period next to a
PES site were not fulfilled, rendering the assessment impossible. Thus, an analysis
of spill-over effects focusing exclusively on geographically determined triggers does
not seem to be conducive for the analysis of neighbourhood effects.
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Regarding the Forest Law, I found that interviewees were indeed of the opinion that the
receipt of information regarding PES positively stimulated perceptions over the govern-
ment’s capacity to enforce the Law established in 1996. Furthermore, the imposed de-
forestation ban was generally considered to be reasonable, irrespective of whether study
participants owned land or not, indicating that respondents did not evaluate individual
rights to forest clearing on private land as standing above the general necessity for forest
protection.
With respect to the consequences of tree-cutting, a significant difference could be identified
whether the act is carried out on PES protected or non-PES protected land, a result
which is consistent with views over the usefulness of PES and the government’s capacity
to enforce the Forest Law. In itself, this result appears straightforward as signing of a
contract might be associated with controls or supervision. However, the finding that the
great majority of interviewees expected consequences of any sort to happen (receipt of
a warning, the payment of a fine or imprisonment) even in case no contract was made
whatsoever, indicates that chances for illegal logging on private Fincas were generally
considered to be low.
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8 Recommendations
Methodological improvements
Besides the distinction made in this study between whether an interviewee received in-
formation regarding PES out of sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension or
not, particular attention was directed towards geographically determined triggers. In
methodological terms, this has been expressed in the formulation of sampling criteria.
As discussed, these pre-set criteria turned out to be highly restrictive, thus complicating
and lengthening the sampling process quite substantially. However, results found in this
study suggest that an analysis of spill-over effects focusing exclusively on geographically
determined triggers does not seem to be conducive for the analysis of neighbourhood ef-
fects. Therefore, less thought should be put into the question of how spatial overlaps can
be controlled for, i.e. where PES sites had previously been established at a research site.
Policy recommendations
• Results demonstrated that interviewees’ awareness of the existence of a PES site in
the nearby geographical neighbourhood is minimal. This finding is inconsistent with
views expressed by forest experts, as I was told during qualitative interviews that
neighbours generally should be aware of the existence of a PES site. All experts
attributed their impression to the mandatory labelling of a PES receiving Finca
(‘rotulación’), stating that the sign put up signaling that the respective territory is
enrolled in the PES programme is enough to raise awareness. As Fernando Salaz
Sarkis (Minae) puts it, these signs indeed represent “a way to promote, at the level
of neighbours, that he [PES receiver] is enrolled in PES” (‘una manera de promover
a nivel de los vecinos que él está en PSA’). To improve awareness, i) the amount of
signs could be increased or ii) more criteria for the placement of signs could be set,
e.g. to installing them near main roads where visibility is assured.
• As no difference in intensity levels of effects being triggered due to either infor-
matioun sources belonging to the neighbourhood dimension or due to information
sources lying outside of this dimension could be detected in the study, a state-
ment for the superiority of one dimension for information provison cannot be made.
This means, in turn, that a broad approach to information dissemination should
be pursued. However, particular attention should be placed upon radio, television
or newspapers (above all: television). These mediums did not only represent the
most frequently cited first contact point to PES or ranked top when assessing the
strongest source from which information regarding PES was received, they further
were of substantial relevance for interviewees who had not a single person who has
ever received PES among their family members, friends, or distant aquintances.
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• Concerns that awareness raising, as suggeested by both points described above,
might lead to motivational crowding-out effects or the fuelling of envy can, according
to study results, be put aside. As the majority of questionnaire participants did not
express fairness concerns or indicated motivational adjustments, the promotion of
information can be pursued without doubts.
• The study demonstrated that chances for illegal logging are generally considered
to be low by study participants. However, some respondents indicating that tree-
cutting could still take place without legel repercussions attributed their view to
relaxed controls during the weekend. Therefore, an increase in presence on saturdays
and sundays should be considered, e.g. through an increase in the usage of the ‘forest
brigades’ (‘brigada de control de tala ilegal’) during these days.
104
References
[Adesina and Chianu, 2002] Adesina, A. and Chianu, J. (2002). Determinants of farmers’ adoption and adaptation of alley
farming technology in nigeria. Agroforestry Systems, 55(2):99–112.
[Adesina et al., 2000] Adesina, A., Mbila, D., Nkamleu, G., and Endamana, S. (2000). Econometric analysis of the deter-
minants of adoption of alley farming by farmers in the forest zone of southwest cameroon. Agriculture, ecosystems &
environment, 80(3):255–265.
[Alix-Garcia et al., 2010] Alix-Garcia, J., Shapiro, E., and Sims, K. (2010). Forest conservation and slippage: Evidence
from mexicos national payments for ecosystem services program. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, Staff Paper Series, 548:1–53.
[Arriagada et al., 2010] Arriagada, R., Ferraro, P., Sills, E., Pattanayak, S., and Cordero, S. (2010). Do payments for
environmental services reduce deforestation? a farm level evaluation from costa rica. Arbor, 1001:48195.
[Arriagada et al., 2009] Arriagada, R., Sills, E., Pattanayak, S., and Ferraro, P. (2009). Combining qualitative and quan-
titative methods to evaluate participation in costa rica’s program of payments for environmental services. Journal of
Sustainable Forestry, 28(3-5):343–367.
[Bem, 1967] Bem, D. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psycho-
logical Review; Psychological Review, 74(3):183.
[Bem, 1972] Bem, D. (1972). Self-perception theory. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 6, pp.1-62),
New York: Academic Press, volume 6, pages 1–62.
[Benabou and Tirole, 2003] Benabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of economic
studies, 70(3):489–520.
[Bewley, 1999] Bewley, T. (1999). Why wages don’t fall during a recession. Harvard University Press.
[Blackman, 2012] Blackman, A. (2012). Ex post evaluation of forest conservation policies using remote sensing data.
[Boneau, 1960] Boneau, C. (1960). The effects of violations of assumptions underlying the t test. Psychological bulletin,
57(1):49.
[Brock and Durlauf, 2001] Brock, W. and Durlauf, S. (2001). Discrete choice with social interactions. Review of Economic
studies, 68(2):235–260.
[Brotherton, 1989] Brotherton, I. (1989). Farmer participation in voluntary land diversion schemes: some observations
from theory. Journal of Rural Studies, 5(3):299–304.
[Brotherton, 1991] Brotherton, I. (1991). What limits participation in esas? Journal of Environmental Management,
32(3):241–249.
[Bryman, 2008] Bryman, A. (2008). Social research methods- Third edition. CSIRO.
[Camacho et al., 2000] Camacho, M., Segura, O., Reyes, V., and Aguilar, A. (2000). Pago por servicios ambientales en
costa rica. PRISMA.
[Camacho et al., 2012] Camacho, M., Segura, O., Reyes, V., and Aguilar, A. (2012). De rio a rio+: Lecciones de 20 años
de experiencia en servicios ambientales en costa rica. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
[Cardenas et al., 2000] Cardenas, J., Stranlund, J., and Willis, C. (2000). Local environmental control and institutional
crowding-out. World Development, 28(10):1719–1733.
[Carrell and Dittrich, 1978] Carrell, M. and Dittrich, J. (1978). Equity theory: The recent literature, methodological
considerations, and new directions. Academy of Management Review, pages 202–210.
[Census-CR, 2011] Census-CR (2011). C01. población total, zona, sexo, provincia, cantón, distrito. Instituto Nacional de
EstadÃstica y Censos (INEC).
XVII
[Clements et al., 2010] Clements, T., John, A., Nielsen, K., An, D., Tan, S., and Milner-Gulland, E. (2010). Payments for
biodiversity conservation in the context of weak institutions: Comparison of three programs from cambodia. Ecological
Economics, 69(6):1283–1291.
[Cohen et al., 2007] Cohen, L., Manion, L., Morrison, K., and Morrison, K. (2007). Research methods in education.
Psychology Press.
[Colquitt et al., 2001] Colquitt, J., Conlon, D., Wesson, M., Porter, C., and Ng, K. (2001). Justice at the millennium: a
meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research. Journal of applied psychology, 86(3):425.
[Corbera et al., 2007] Corbera, E., Brown, K., and Adger, W. (2007). The equity and legitimacy of markets for ecosystem
services. Development and Change, 38(4):587–613.
[Curran et al., 2004] Curran, L., Trigg, S., McDonald, A., Astiani, D., Hardiono, Y., Siregar, P., Caniago, I., and Kasischke,
E. (2004). Lowland forest loss in protected areas of indonesian borneo. Science, 303(5660):1000–1003.
[Daniels et al., 2010] Daniels, A., Bagstad, K., Esposito, V., Moulaert, A., and Rodriguez, C. (2010). Understanding the
impacts of costa rica’s pes: Are we asking the right questions? Ecological economics, 69(11):2116–2126.
[De Cremer and Stouten, 2005] De Cremer, D. and Stouten, J. (2005). When does giving voice or not matter? procedural
fairness effects as a function of closeness of reference points. Current psychology, 24(3):203–213.
[Deci, 1971] Deci, E. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of personality and
Social Psychology, 18(1):105–115.
[Deci, 1975] Deci, E. (1975). Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum Publishing Co.
[Deci et al., 1999] Deci, E., Koestner, R., and Ryan, R. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the
effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological bulletin, 125(6):627.
[Deci and Ryan, 1980] Deci, E. and Ryan, R. (1980). The empirical exploration of intrinsic motivational processes. In
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 13, pp.39-80), New York: Academic Press, volume 13, pages 39–80.
[Deci and Ryan, 1985] Deci, E. and Ryan, R. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior.
Springer.
[Deci and Ryan, 1991] Deci, E. and Ryan, R. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 38. Perspectives on motivation, University of Nebraska Press, volume 38,
pages 237–288.
[Deci and Ryan, 2000] Deci, E. and Ryan, R. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the
self-determination of behavior. Psychological inquiry, 11(4):227–268.
[Emden et al., 2008] Emden, F., Llewellyn, R., and Burton, M. (2008). Factors influencing adoption of conservation tillage
in australian cropping regions. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 52(2):169–182.
[Engel and Palmer, 2008] Engel, S. and Palmer, C. (2008). Payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging
under weak property rights: the case of indonesia. Ecological Economics, 65(4):799–809.
[Engel et al., 2009] Engel, S., Wünscher, T., and Wunder, S. (2009). Increasing the efficiency of forest conservation: The
case of payments for environmental services in costa rica. Avoided deforestation: Prospects for mitigating climate change.
Oxford, Routledge, pages 314–328.
[Falk et al., 1999] Falk, A., Gächter, S., and Kovács, J. (1999). Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated
game with incomplete contracts. Journal of Economic Psychology, 20(3):251–284.
[Fehr and Falk, 2002a] Fehr, E. and Falk, A. (2002a). Psychological foundations of incentives. European Economic Review,
46(4):687–724.
[Fehr and Falk, 2002b] Fehr, E. and Falk, A. (2002b). Psychological foundations of incentives. The Institute for the Study
of Labor (IZA).
[Folger and Cropanzano, 2001] Folger, R. and Cropanzano, R. (2001). Fairness theory: Justice as accountability. Advances
in organizational justice, 1:3–33.
XVIII
[Fonafifo, 2012] Fonafifo (2012). Statistics on sarapiquí. Fonafifo online database, retrieved 07.10.2012
http://www.fonafifo.go.cr.
[Freeman, 1997] Freeman, R. (1997). Working for nothing: The supply of volunteer labor. Journal of Labor Economics,
15(1):140–166.
[Frey and Jegen, 2001] Frey, B. and Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of economic surveys, 15(5):589–
611.
[Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997] Frey, B. and Oberholzer-Gee, F. (1997). The cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis
of motivation crowding-out. The American economic review, 87(4):746–755.
[Fuligni et al., 1999] Fuligni, A., Tseng, V., and Lam, M. (1999). Attitudes toward family obligations among american
adolescents with asian, latin american, and european backgrounds. Child Development, 70(4):1030–1044.
[Galdeano-Gómez et al., 2008] Galdeano-Gómez, E., Céspedes-Lorente, J., and Martínez-del Río, J. (2008). Environmental
performance and spillover effects on productivity: evidence from horticultural firms. Journal of environmental manage-
ment, 88(4):1552–1561.
[GeoMid, 2012] GeoMid (2012). Calculation methods - random points, rectangular region. GeoMidpoint, retrieved
01.11.2012 http://www.geomidpoint.com/random/calculation.html.
[Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a] Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000a). Fine is a price, a. J. Legal Stud., 29:1.
[Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b] Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A. (2000b). Pay enough or don’t pay at all. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(3):791–810.
[Goudas et al., 1995] Goudas, M., Biddle, S., Fox, K., and Underwood, M. (1995). It ain’t what you do, it’s the way that
you do it! teaching style affects children’s motivation in track and field lessons. Sport Psychologist, 9:254–254.
[Grieg-Gran et al., 2005] Grieg-Gran, M., Porras, I., and Wunder, S. (2005). How can market mechanisms for forest
environmental services help the poor? preliminary lessons from latin america. World development, 33(9):1511–1527.
[Grubb et al., 2002] Grubb, M., Hope, C., and Fouquet, R. (2002). Climatic implications of the kyoto protocol: the
contribution of international spillover. Climatic Change, 54(1):11–28.
[Hartmann, 2012] Hartmann, F. (2012). Pay fairness and intrinsic motivation: the role of pay transparency. The Interna-
tional Journal of Human Management.
[HDI, 2011] HDI (2011). Human development report 2011, sustainability and equity: A better future for all, explanatory
note on 2011 hdr composite indices costa rica. UNDP HDR.
[Homans, 1966] Homans, G. (1966). Social behaviour: Its elementary forms. Taylor & Francis.
[ICR, 2011] ICR (2011). Annuario estadistico 2010. Instituto Costarricense de Turismo.
[Ikeme, 2003] Ikeme, J. (2003). Equity, environmental justice and sustainability: incomplete approaches in climate change
politics. Global Environmental Change, 13(3):195–206.
[IMF-Stat, 2012] IMF-Stat (2012). World economic outlook database, april 2012. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Statistics, retrieved 04.10.2012 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx.
[Jaffe et al., 2005] Jaffe, A., Newell, R., and Stavins, R. (2005). A tale of two market failures: Technology and environmental
policy. Ecological Economics, 54(2):164–174.
[Jamieson, 2004] Jamieson, S. (2004). Likert scales: how to (ab) use them. Medical Education, 38(12):1217–1218.
[Johansson-Stenman and Konow, 2011] Johansson-Stenman, O. and Konow, J. (2011). Fairness concerns in environmental
economics â“ do they really matter and if so how? In Three types of environmental justice: From concepts to empirical
studies of social impacts of policy instruments for conservation of biodiversity.
[Kinnaird et al., 2003] Kinnaird, M., Sanderson, E., O’Brien, T., Wibisono, H., and Woolmer, G. (2003). Deforestation
trends in a tropical landscape and implications for endangered large mammals. Conservation Biology, 17(1):245–257.
XIX
[Kosoy and Corbera, 2010] Kosoy, N. and Corbera, E. (2010). Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism.
Ecological Economics, 69(6):1228–1236.
[Kosoy et al., 2007] Kosoy, N., Martinez-Tuna, M., Muradian, R., and Martinez-Alier, J. (2007). Payments for environmen-
tal services in watersheds: Insights from a comparative study of three cases in central america. Ecological Economics,
61(2):446–455.
[Kuzon et al., 1996] Kuzon, W., Urbanchek, M., and McCabe, S. (1996). The seven deadly sins of statistical analysis.
Annals of plastic surgery, 37:265–272.
[Likert, 1932] Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of psychology.
[Loft and Lux, 2010] Loft, L. and Lux, A. (2010). Ecosystem services–ökonomische analyse ihres verlusts, ihre bewertung
und steuerung. BiKF Knowledge Flow Paper, 10.
[Mcdowell and Sparks, 1989] Mcdowell, C. and Sparks, R. (1989). The multivariate modelling and prediction of farmers’
conservation behaviour towards natural ecosystems. Journal of Environmental Management, 28(3):185–210.
[McIver and Carmines, 1981] McIver, J. and Carmines, E. (1981). Unidimensional scaling, volume 24. Sage Publications,
Incorporated.
[Mideplan, 2007] Mideplan (2007). Indice de desarollo social 2007. Ministerio de Planificacion Nacional y Politica Eco-
nomica (MIDEPLAN), 33(2):237–253.
[Miranda et al., 2003] Miranda, M., Porras, I., and Moreno, M. (2003). The social impacts of payments for environmen-
tal services in costa rica. a quantitative field survey and analysis of the virilla watershed. International Institute for
Environment and Development, IIED.
[Morris and Potter, 1995] Morris, C. and Potter, C. (1995). Recruiting the new conservationists: farmers’ adoption of
agri-environmental schemes in the uk. Journal of rural studies, 11(1):51–63.
[Moss, 1994] Moss, J. (1994). The baseline assessment for a new esa: the case of the mourne mountains and slieve croob.
Incentives for countryside management: the case of Environmentally Sensitive Areas., pages 153–178.
[Murray et al., 2004] Murray, B., Mccarl, B., and Lee, H. (2004). Estimating leakage from forest carbon sequestration
programs. Land Economics, 80(1):109–124.
[Nef, 2012] Nef (2012). The happy planet index. About the Happy Planet Index, retrieved 05.10.2012
http://www.happyplanetindex.org/about/.
[Norman, 2010] Norman, G. (2010). Likert scales, levels of measurement and the âœlawsâ of statistics. Advances in health
sciences education, 15(5):625–632.
[Ortiz Malavasi et al., 2003] Ortiz Malavasi, E., Sage Mora, L., and Borge Carvajal, C. (2003). Impacto del programa de
pago de servicios ambientales en costa rica como medio de reducción de la pobreza en los medios rurales. Rute, San José.
[Ostmann, 1998] Ostmann, A. (1998). External control may destroy the commons. Rationality and Society, 10(1):103–122.
[Pagiola et al., 2005] Pagiola, S., Arcenas, A., and Platais, G. (2005). Can payments for environmental services help reduce
poverty? an exploration of the issues and the evidence to date from latin america. World Development, 33(2):237–253.
[Pagiola et al., 2002] Pagiola, S., Landell-Mills, N., and Bishop, J. (2002). Making market-based mechanisms work for
forests and people. Selling forest environmental services: market-based mechanisms for conservation and development.
[Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005] Parker, G. and Van Alstyne, M. (2005). Two-sided network effects: A theory of information
product design. Management Science, pages 1494–1504.
[Pascual et al., 2010] Pascual, U., Muradian, R., Rodríguez, L., and Duraiappah, A. (2010). Exploring the links between
equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: A conceptual approach. Ecological Economics, 69(6):1237–
1244.
[Patchen, 1961] Patchen, M. (1961). The choice of wage comparisons. Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
[Pearson, 1931] Pearson, E. (1931). The analysis of variance in cases of non-normal variation. Biometrika, 23(1-2):114–133.
XX
[Pelletier et al., 1998] Pelletier, L., Tuson, K., Green-Demers, I., Noels, K., and Beaton, A. (1998). Why are you doing
things for the environment? the motivation toward the environment scale (mtes) 1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
28(5):437–468.
[Peters, 2011] Peters, S. (2011). Robust understanding of statistical variation. Statistics Education Research Journal,
10(1):52–88.
[Pfaff et al., 2008] Pfaff, A., Robalino, J., and Sanchez-Azofeifa, G. (2008). Payments for environmental services: empirical
analysis for costa rica. Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA.
[Porras, 2010] Porras, I. (2010). Fair and Green? Social Impacts of Payments for Environmental Services in Costa Rica.
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
[Porras et al., 2006] Porras, I., Neves, N., and Miranda, M. (2006). Developing markets for watershed protection services
and improved livelihoods. International Institute for Environment and Development, IIED.
[Rege and Telle, 2001] Rege, M. and Telle, K. (2001). An experimental investigation of social norms. Discussion papers.
[Rigby et al., 2001] Rigby, D., Young, T., and Burton, M. (2001). The development of and prospects for organic farming
in the uk. Food Policy, 26(6):599–613.
[Robalino and Pfaff, 2011] Robalino, J. and Pfaff, A. (2011). Contagious development: Neighbor interactions in deforesta-
tion. Journal of Development Economics.
[Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2003] Sánchez-Azofeifa, G., Daily, G., Pfaff, A., and Busch, C. (2003). Integrity and isolation of
costa rica’s national parks and biological reserves: examining the dynamics of land-cover change. Biological Conservation,
109(1):123–135.
[Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007] Sánchez-Azofeifa, G., Pfaff, A., Robalino, J., and Boomhower, J. (2007). Costa rica’s pay-
ment for environmental services program: intention, implementation, and impact. Conservation Biology, 21(5):1165–
1173.
[Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2002] Sánchez-Azofeifa, G., Rivard, B., Calvo, J., and Moorthy, I. (2002). Dynamics of tropical
deforestation around national parks: remote sensing of forest change on the osa peninsula of costa rica. Mountain
Research and Development, 22(4):352–358.
[Sheikh et al., 2003] Sheikh, A., Rehman, T., and Yates, C. (2003). Logit models for identifying the factors that influence
the uptake of new no-tillage’technologies. Agricultural Systems, 75(1):79–95.
[Sidibe, 2005] Sidibe, A. (2005). Farm-level adoption of soil and water conservation techniques in northern bf. Agricultural
water management, 71(3):211–224.
[Sierra and Russman, 2006] Sierra, R. and Russman, E. (2006). On the efficiency of environmental service payments: A
forest conservation assessment in the osa peninsula, costa rica. Ecological Economics, 59(1):131–141.
[Sills et al., 2006] Sills, E., Arriagada, R., Pattanayak, S., Ferraro, P., Carrasco, L., Ortiz, E., and Cordero, S. (2006).
Impact of the psa program on land use. In Workshop on Costa Ricas Experience with Payments for Environmental
Services. San José, pages 25–26.
[Simpson and Weiner, 1989] Simpson, J. and Weiner, E. (1989). The Oxford English Dictionary, Moul-Ovum, volume 10.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[Skerratt, 1994] Skerratt, S. (1994). Itemized payment systems within a scheme: the case of breadalbane.
[Sohngen and Brown, 2004] Sohngen, B. and Brown, S. (2004). Measuring leakage from carbon projects in open economies:
a stop timber harvesting project in bolivia as a case study. Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 34(4):829–839.
[Spector, 1992] Spector, P. (1992). Summated rating scale construction: An introduction. Number 82. Sage Publications,
Inc.
[Svarstad et al., 2011] Svarstad, H., Sletten, A., Paloniemi, R., Barton, D., and Grieg-Gran, M. (2011). Three types of
environmental justice: From concepts to empirical studies of social impacts of policy instruments for conservation of
biodiversity. Policymix.
XXI
[TB, 2012] TB (2012). Home-welcome to the tirimbina rainforest center. La Tirimbina, retrieved 25.10.2012
http://www.tirimbina.org.
[Thacher et al., 1996] Thacher, T., Lee, D., and Schelhas, J. (1996). Farmer participation in reforestation incentive pro-
grams in costa rica. Agroforestry Systems, 35(3):269–289.
[Titmuss, 1970] Titmuss, R. M. (1970). The Gift Relationship. Allen and Unwin, London.
[UNEP, 2012] UNEP (2012). About costa rica. UNEP, retrieved 06.10.2012 http://www.unep.org/climateneutral/ De-
fault.aspx?tabid=235.
[Uptorn, 1973] Uptorn, W. (1973). Altruism, attribution, and intrinsic motivation in the recruitment of blood donors.
Cornell University.
[USC, 2012] USC (2012). Organizing Your Social Sciences Research Paper, Characteristics of Qualitative Research. Uni-
versity of Southern California, retrieved 07.11.2012 http://libguides.usc.edu/content.php?pid=83009sid=615866.
[Vatn, 2009] Vatn, A. (2009). Cooperative behavior and institutions. Journal of Socio-Economics, 38(1):188–196.
[Vatn, 2010] Vatn, A. (2010). An institutional analysis of payments for environmental services. Ecological Economics,
69(6):1245–1252.
[Villacorta et al., 2003] Villacorta, M., Koestner, R., and Lekes, N. (2003). Further validation of the motivation toward
the environment scale. Environment and Behavior, 35(4):486–505.
[Walker, 2010] Walker, G. (2010). Environmental justice, impact assessment and the politics of knowledge: The implications
of assessing the social distribution of environmental outcomes. Environmental impact assessment review, 30(5):312–318.
[WB, 2012] WB (2012). World development indicators. The World Bank, retrieved 04.10.2012
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?order=wbapidatavalue2009 + wbapidatavalue&sort = asc.
[Webster and McKechnie, 1983] Webster, N. and McKechnie, J. (1983). Websters New Universal Unabridged Dictionary.
Dorset and Baber.
[Wei et al., 2009] Wei, Y., Chen, D., White, R., Willett, I., Edis, R., and Langford, J. (2009). Farmers’ perception
of environmental degradation and their adoption of improved management practices in alxa. Land Degradation &
Development, 20(3):336–346.
[Wilson, 1992] Wilson, G. (1992). A survey on attitudes of landholders to native forest on farmland. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Management, 34(2):117–136.
[Wilson, 1997] Wilson, G. (1997). Factors influencing farmer participation in the environmentally sensitive areas scheme.
Journal of environmental management, 50(1):67–93.
[Wunder, 2006] Wunder, S. (2006). The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation. Con-
servation biology, 21(1):48–58.
[Wunder et al., 2008] Wunder, S., Engel, S., and Pagiola, S. (2008). Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments
for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries. Ecological Economics, 65(4):834–852.
[Wünscher et al., 2008] Wünscher, T., Engel, S., and Wunder, S. (2008). Spatial targeting of payments for environmental
services: A tool for boosting conservation benefits. Ecological Economics, 65(4):822–833.
[Zbinden and Lee, 2005] Zbinden, S. and Lee, D. (2005). Paying for environmental services: an analysis of participation
in costa ricas psa program. World Development, 33(2):255–272.
XXII
Appendix I
Table 31: t-Test for education level, eligible vs. not eligible interviewees
Table 32: t-Test for age, eligible vs. not eligible interviewees
Table 33: t-Test for consumption, eligible vs. not eligible interviewees
XXIII
Appendix II
 
 
Encuesta sobre Efectos de Vecindad de Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA)  
 
Número de Encuesta: ___________                        
Coordenadas GPS:  ______________________________________________________ 
Fecha:   _______________      En vecindad del contrato:  C1,  C2,  C3 
 Hora de inicio:___________ Hora de finalización:___________             Duración: _____ min 
 
Buenos días/tardes. Soy estudiante de la Universidad Noruega de Ciencias de la Vida (UMB). Estoy  
realizando una encuesta en Sarapiquí para hacer un estudio que será parte de mi tesis final de una 
maestría de los estudios de desarrollo. Esta investigación será realizada en colaboración con el CATIE 
(Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza) de Turrialba, Cartago.  
El fin de esta encuesta es investigar efectos de vecindad de Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) en 
la zona de Sarapiquí. Para esto, vamos a entrevistar a aproximadamente 80 personas para poder 
comparar los asuntos mencionados.  
Participación en la encuesta es voluntaria y usted tiene la posibilidad de terminar en cualquier 
momento si así lo desea. En caso de que se retire, toda la información proporcionada será anónima. 
La información solicitada para este estudio será tratada de forma confidencial y no se utilizará para 
otros fines. La información será analizada únicamente en forma grupál.. Toda la información será 
anónima al finalizar el proyecto.  
La duración de la encuesta es de entre  30-45 minutos. Si a Usted le interesa los resultados del 
estudio, le puedo de enviar la conclusión de la investigación por correo electrónico. En ese caso, por 
favor indiquelo en la última página de esta encuesta.  
Si tiene alguna pregunta, me pueden llamar al número 8411-4308  o enviar un correo a 
julian.michel@student.umb.no. También puede ponerse en contacto con mi persona de contacto en 
CATIE, Muhammad Ibrahim al número 8313-4091. 
 
Confirmo haber entendido el propósito de la encuesta y doy permiso para realizar la encuesta: 
 
Firma: ………………………………………………………………… 
Muchas gracias por su colaboración.  
 
XXIV
A. General information about PES 
 
1  a. Have you ever heard about the Payments for Environmental Services (PES) programme? 
 No      ( →   continue with 1b) 
 Yes     ( →   continue with 1c)  
b1. Have you ever heard the name “Fonafifo”?        
               Yes       →    b2. Do you know what they do? ________________________________ 
               No 
c. Do you know if there exists a programme here in Costa Rica in which the government and its 
institutions pay persons who protect forest or reforest on their private finca?     
 No      ( → Impossible to realize the interview →  continue with part C) 
 Yes     ( →   continue with 1c) 
d. What is the name of this programme? ___________________________________(name)
  
 
  
 
e. In which year ____________ (year) and  
f. From whom did you hear for the first time about the PES programme? _________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
           
2 How many people do you know who have/ had a PES contract within your/the: 
a1. Family/ relatives: _____________ a2. How many of them live in Sarapiquí? _________           
b1. Friends: __________        b2. How many of them live in Sarapiquí? _________ 
c1. Neighbours: ____________  c2. How many of them live in Sarapiquí?  _________      
d1. People who work in the field of PES, such as Fonafifo or Minaet? _____________  
d2. How many of them live in Sarapiquí?  _________      
e1. Other people that you know: ______ e2. How many of them live in Sarapiquí? ________          
    
3 a. If you, departing from your home where we are at the moment, would say “this is my 
neighbourhood”, how many meters/ blocks/ cubits/ minutes of walking etc. does your own 
definition of “neighbourhood” include? _____________________________ (unit and number) 
 
[Has she indicated the distance in meter units?      
 No  →  continue with 3b 
 Yes →  continue with 3c] 
 
b. In how many meters does this translate more or less? _____________ (meters) 
 
[Muestra copias del área de Google Earth] 
c. Could you please indicate the area that you regard as your neighbourhood on the maps that I 
have got here?  
Now, I would like to refer to this programme as  
Payments for Environmental Services, that is to say PES 
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 4 a. In general, what is the first and the second strongest source out of which you received 
information about PES? (Please indicate the first and the second strongest source) 
             ■      Family/ relatives who                  z  iit1)  never had 2)  had/have...  PES. 
             ■      Friends/ other people who                1)  never had 2)  had/have...  PES. 
             ■      Neighbours who          kii ikillf      1)  never had 2)  had/have...  PES. 
 Intermediaries (Fundecor etc.)               
 Participation in informational meeting    
 Radio/TV/ Newspapers  
 Fonafifo/ Minaet 
 Other:  ______________      
[For each participant, ask the two corresponding blocks of questions (first and second strongest 
source of information respectively). Then  → continue with 5a]  
 
(In case she has marked      i) “Family/never…” →   4b1, 4c, 4d;              ii) “had/have“   →   4b2 
(In case she has marked       i) “Friends/never…” →   4e1, 4f, 4g;               ii) “had/have”   →   4e2 
(In case she has marked       i) “Neighbours/never…” →   4h1, 4i, 4j                  ii) “had/have”  →   4h2 
(In case she has marked       “Intermediaries…”     →   4k, 4l 
(In case she has marked       “Participation in informational meeting”  →   4m, 4n 
(In case she has marked       “Radio/TV/ Newspaper”     →   4o, 4p 
(In case she has marked       “Fonafifo/ Minaet”     →   4q, 4r) 
 
[Show political map of Costa Rica] 
b1.  Could you please indicate on this map where the persons of your family/ relatives live 
that have influenced your knowledge about PES?  
         b2.  Could you also indicate in which area approximately their property with PES was   
iiiiiiiiiilocated?  
c. Why did they speak with you about PES? What did they say? ________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
d. Can you think of any reason why these particular persons of your family/ relatives have 
influenced your knowledge of PES and other persons of your family/relatives not? _________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
[Show political map of Costa Rica] 
e1.  Could you please indicate on this map where your friends/ other people live that have 
influenced your knowledge about PES? 
        e2. Could you also indicate in which area approximately their property with PES was 
iiiiiiiiilocated? 
f. Why did they speak with you about PES? What did they say?  ________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
g. Can you think of any reason why these particular persons of your friends/ other persons 
have influenced your knowledge of PES and other friends or persons not? _______________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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[Show political map of Costa Rica and Google Earth printouts where she has marked her 
definition of neighbourhood] 
h1. Could you please indicate on this map where your neighbours live that have influenced 
your knowledge about PES? 
         h2. Could you also indicate in which area approximately their property with PES was 
iiiiiiiiiilocated? 
i. Why did they speak with you about PES? What did they say?  ________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________
j. Can you think of any reason why these particular persons of your neighbourhood have 
influenced your knowledge of PES and other neighbours not?  _________________________ 
 
k. About which intermediary/ organisation are you talking? _____________________(name) 
l. Where is the office located where you received your information? ______________(place) 
 
m. In which city/ town did you participate in the meeting? ______________________(place) 
n. Do you remember who organised that event? ______________________________(name) 
 
o. Do you remember the name of the Radio Station/ Channel/ Newspaper? ________(name) 
p. Do you know if it was a local or a national Radio Station/ Channel/ Newspaper?  
        local                    national 
 
q. In which year did you receive information from Fonafifo/Minaet? _______________(year) 
 r. Which role played Fonafifo's Regional Office here in Sarapiquí in this process? __________ 
 ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5 a.  Do you know if there is a property in the  distance of maximum 500m from here which 
currently has a PES contract?  
 Yes ( →   continue with 5b) 
 No ( →   continue with 5j1) 
 
[Show Google Earth printouts of the area] 
b.  Where is it located? 
c.  Do you know who the owner is? ___________________(name)  
d.  How many hectares does the Finca with PES contract have? _____________(ha) 
e.  Do you remember in which year it was established? _______________(year) 
f.  Do you know for which modality she receives PES payments? _______________ (modality) 
 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
g. Now, I would like to go back to question 4a. In case you would have again the chance to 
choose the first and the second strongest source out of which you received information about 
PES, only with the additional option to choose this property with PES close-by, how would you 
decide? 
   Different                ( →   continue with 5i) 
   Same as before     ( →   continue with 5j) 
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h.           
■      Family/ relatives who  1)  never had  2)  had/have...  PES. 
■      Friends/ other people who  1)  never had  2)  had/have...  PES. 
■      Neighbours who   1)  never had  2)  had/have...  PES. 
      Intermediaries (Fundecor etc.) 
      Participation in informational meeting 
      Radio/ TV/ Newspapers 
      Property with PES close-by 
      Fonafifo/ Minaet 
      Other: _______________________ 
 
i. What do you think is the reason why the person living nearby participates in the PES 
programme? 
      Payment of the programme     
      Help the environment 
      Other land uses are not possible     
      Easy application process  
      Recommendation by family/ relatives/ friends   
      Other: ______________________ 
 
 
j1. If there exists a property/ a finca in the distance of zero to 500m from here, so more or less 
nearby, which receives government payments for reforestation or forest protection at the 
moment, would you know?     
  Yes  →     j2. Why? __________________________________________________  
  No 
 
k. How many persons do you know in the  distance of maximum 500m from here who had/have                     
a PES contract? _____________(persons) 
 
 
l. Have you ever spoken with people who live in the distance of maximum 500m from here 
about PES?  
  Yes   
  No 
 
6 a.  Have you ever applied for PES? 
 Yes  →    b.  Did you receive a contract? 
 Yes     →      [If “Yes” and “Yes”   →   continue with 7a. After 12  →   go to 14a] 
 No      →      [If “Yes” and “No”   →   continue with 7a. After   9  →   go to 13] 
 No     →      [If “No”  →   go to 13] 
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7 a. Please indicate the factors that have influenced your decision to apply for PES the most 
(max. 3 factors): 
■      Family/ relatives who  1)  never had  2)  had/have...  PES. 
■      Friends/ other people who  1)  never had  2)  had/have...  PES. 
■      Neighbours who   1)  never had  2)  had/have...  PES. 
     Payment of the programme   
     Contact to intermediaries 
     Easy application process   
     Participation in informational meeting 
     Radio/TV/ Newspapers 
     Did not know what to do with the land 
     Help the environment 
     Contact to Fonafifo/ Minaet  
     Other:  ______________      
 
[For each participant, ask the corresponding blocks of questions (1
st
,  2
nd
 and 3
rd
 strongest factor of 
influence, depending on how many factors chosen). Then  → continue with 8] 
 
(In case she has marked      i) “Family/never…”  →   7b, 7c1, 7d        ii) “had/have”  →  7c2 
(In case she has marked       i) “Friends/never…” →   7e, 7f1, 7g        ii) “had/have”  →  7f2 
(In case she has marked       i) “Neighbours/never…”  →   7h, 7i1, 7j        ii) “had/have”  →  7i2 
(In case she has marked       “Contact to intermediaries”   →   7k, 7l, 7m  
(In case she has marked       “Participation in informational meeting”  →   7n, 7o, 7p 
 (In case she has marked      “Radio/TV/ Newspapers”    →   7q, 7r, 7s 
(In case she has marked       “Fonafifo/ Minaet”     →   7t, 7u, 7v 
(In case she has marked       “Did not know what to do with the land”  →   7w   
 
[Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7b 
If No  →   continue with 7c1] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
b. Are you talking about the same persons that served as a source of information about PES as 
indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   ( →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence) 
        No    ( →   continue with 7c1) 
[Show political map of Costa Rica] 
c1.  Could you please indicate on this map where the persons of your family/ relatives live that have 
influenced your decision to apply for PES?  
           c2.  Could you also indicate in which area approximately their property with PES was located?  
d. Can you think of any reason why these particular persons of your family/ relatives have influenced 
your decision to apply for PES and other persons of your family/relatives not? _________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 [Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7e 
If No  →   continue with 7f1] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
e. Are you talking about the same persons that served as a source of information about PES as 
indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   ( →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence) 
        No    ( →   continue with 7f1) 
 
f1. Could you please indicate on this map where your friends/ other people live that have influenced 
your decision to apply for PES?  
            f2. Could you also indicate in which area approximately their property with PES was located?  
g. Can you think of any reason why these particular persons of your friends/ other persons have 
influenced your decision to apply for PES and other friends or persons not? _____________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
[Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7h 
If No  →   continue with 7i1] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
h. Are you talking about the same persons that served as a source of information about PES as 
indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   ( →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence) 
        No    ( →   continue with 7i1) 
 
 [Show political map of Costa Rica and Google Earth printouts where she has marked her definition 
of neighbourhood] 
i1. Could you please indicate on this map where your neighbours live that have influenced your 
decision to apply for PES? 
                i2. Could you also indicate in which area approximately their property with PES was located? 
j. Can you think of any reason why these particular persons of your neighbourhood have influenced 
your decision to apply for PES and other neighbours not? ___________________________________ 
 
 
 [Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7k 
If No  →   continue with 7l] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
k. Are you talking about the same Intermediary(ies) that served as a source of information about PES 
as indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   ( →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence) 
        No    ( →   continue with 7l) 
 
l. About which intermediary/ organisation are you talking? ______________________(name) 
m. Where is the office located where you received your information? _________________(place) 
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[Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7n 
If No  →   continue with 7o] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
n. Are you talking about the same informational meeting that served as a source of information 
about PES as indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   ( →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence) 
        No    ( →   continue with 7o) 
o. In which city/ town did you participate in the meeting? ________________(place) 
p. Do you remember who organised that event? _______________________ (name) 
 
 
[Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7q 
If No  →   continue with 7r] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
q. Are you talking about the same Radio Station/ Channel/ Newspaper that served as a source of 
information about PES as indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   [ →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence] 
        No    ( →   continue with 7r) 
r. Do you remember the name of the Radio Station/ Channel/ Newspaper? ________(name) 
s. Do you know if it is a local or a national Radio Station/ Channel/ Newspaper?  
        local                    national 
 
 
[Has the same box already been ticked under 4a? 
If Yes →   continue with 7t 
If No  →   continue with 7u] 
[Show question 4a on the paper “Answer sheet for the interviewee” that the interviewee has] 
t. Are you talking about the same Fonafifo/Minaet that served as a source of information about PES 
as indicated under question 4a?  
        Yes   [ →   Block is done. Check for other mentioned factors of influence] 
        No    ( →   continue with 7u) 
u. In which year did you receive information from Fonafifo/Minaet? _______(year)   
v. Which role played Fonafifo's Regional Office here in Sarapiquí in this process? _________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
w. Why did you not know what to do with the land? Can you explain it a bit? ____________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8 When and for which modality did you apply for the first time to the PES programme? 
a. In the year: ___________  b.  For the PES modality: ________________________ 
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 9 a.  What was the outcome of the application process?    
 It was approved      
 It was rejected  
 It is still on the waiting list  
 Invalid contract  
 It expired  
 Other: ______________________ 
  
[In case “It was approved” →  continue with 10 
In all other cases                  →  continue with 9b] 
 
b. What was the land used for at the time of application to PES? ________________________ 
c. Can you explain a bit what changes have occurred to the land for which you wanted to 
obtain PES since then? Any changes in land use for example?_________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________  
 
[Remember relevance of the following questions is based on answer to question 6] 
 
10 Please list the PES contracts that you have had/ have: 
*1 The contract number refers to the number under which Fonafifo manages the contract.   
*2 Was/is the PES contract signed in the name of the owner as physical person or in the name of an 
entity as a legal person?  
*3 Are you or is your family the principal person that takes the decisions that affect the Finca?   
*4 If under “good soils” [soil class I and II] one understands soils which are appropriate for 
agricultural production and soils that are appropriate but need a development plan such as irrigation, 
fertilization etc., how much, in percentage points, of your Finca possesses “good soils”?   
*5 If under “poor soils” [soil class VII and VIII] one understands soils which limit agricultural 
production quite a lot and soils which are appropriate only for forest plantations or forest 
management or protection of basins, how much, in percentage points, of your Finca possesses “poor 
soils”? 
 
11 a. In case you would not have been in the PES programme, what do you think you have done 
with the territory that is/was under PES protection? 
 I'd have waited till the value of the territory had increased and put if for sale 
 I would have sold it  
 I would have kept it in the same state as it was 
 Conversion to pasture 
 Conversion to forest plantation  
Contract and 
contract-nr.*1 Year Ha 
Physical (name of owner)  
or legal (name of entity)*2 
Principal 
person?*3 
Soil classes I 
and II (in %)*4 
Soil classes VII 
and VIII (in %)*5 
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 Conversion to farming 
 I don't know  
 Other: __________________________________ 
 
11b.  Did you know that the Forest Law (Nr. 7575, established in 1996) generally prohibits 
to cut trees and change land use in forests standing on private property, except in certain 
cases such as the construction of houses, offices, infrastructural projects of national 
interest, security reasons, prevent forest fire etc.?   
    Yes                            
    No 
 
12 In case you would not have been in the PES programme and there would not be any laws 
restricting the usage of your forest/ land, what do you think you would have done with the 
forest/ land that is/was under PES protection? 
 I'd have waited till the value of the territory had increased and put if for sale 
 I would have sold it  
 I would have kept it in the same state as it was 
 Conversion to pasture 
 Conversion to forest plantation 
 Conversion to farming 
 I don't know  
 Other: ___________________________ 
      
[Remember relevance of the following question is based on answer to question 6] 
 
13 Why did you never apply for a PES contract? (max. 2 factors)  
 I don’t know the programme very well 
 I don’t know how to apply/ very complicated 
 The application process is very costly 
 The programme does not appear very useful 
 I don’t trust the government or the intermediaries (or I don’t want them in my property)  
 The payment is less than what I could earn when I use the land for something else 
→   for what? ______________________________________________________________ 
 I don’t have enough money for the application process 
 I don’t think that I would be eligible for PES 
o Not enough land/ forest 
o Insecure property rights 
o Other: _________________________________ 
 Other: _____________________________________ 
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14 If a person cuts trees in a forest standing on her private Finca which is under a PES contract, 
what would you expect to happen?  
 Nothing (no one applies the law)  
 She will receive a warning   
 She will have to pay a fine 
 She will have to go to prison 
 
15 And if a person has no PES contract whatsoever and cuts trees, what would you expect to 
happen? 
 Nothing (no one applies the law)  
 She will receive a warning   
 She will have to pay a fine 
 She will have to go to prison 
 
 
16 Imagine you would own a Finca with a forest on it for which you would like to receive 
payments to protect it, or you would like to reforest a part of your Finca and wish to receive 
payments por this activity, where would you go? ____________________________________ 
 
17 a. Please think now about a typical person in your neighbourhood who had/ has a PES 
contract for forest protection or reforestation: In case no PES programme had existed, what 
do you think they would have done with the land that is/was under PES contract? 
 They'd have waited till the value of the territory had increased and put if for sale 
 They would have sold it 
 They would have kept it in the same state as it was 
 Conversion to pasture 
 Conversion to forest plantation 
 Conversion to farming 
 Don't know, everyone would have had a different use  
 Other: _____________________________________        
 
[17b only in case she does not have already answered questions 11b] 
17b.  Did you know that the Forest Law (Nr. 7575, established in 1996) generally prohibits 
to cut trees and change the land use in forests standing on private property, except in 
certain cases such as the construction of houses, offices, infrastructural projects of national 
interest, security reasons, prevent forest fire etc.?            
    Yes                            
    No 
 
 
18 You are offered to formulate your view on PES in a sentence or two. What  would you say? 
___________________________________________________________________________
XXXIV
 B.  Attitude measurements                                                                                          jj 
 
In this part, I would like to ask a series of questions about if you agree or disagree to certain 
statements. It is important for me to be able to measure the degree of how much you agree or 
disagree or if you are “neither hot, nor cold” (indifferent).  
Please use the scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) as indicated in this 
showcard to select which response reflects best what you think. 
 
[Show showcard and explain the 5 options] 
 
  
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
1. Information Seeking Behaviour Degree of  (dis)agreement 
a. Due to…     1) contact with persons of my family/ relatives who know about PES, 
                        2) contact with friends/ other people who know about PES, 
                        3) contact with neighbours who know about PES,  
                        4) the existence of a property with PES close-by, 
                        5) contact I had with intermediaries, 
                        6) my participation in an informational meeting about PES,   
                        7) hearing about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper,   
                        8) contact I had with Fonafifo/ Minaet,   
  
…I became more interested in the topic of PES. 
 
 
      
[Has she has checked a box with the number 4 or 5?                 
 Yes  →  continue with 1b              
 No   →  continue with block 2] 
 
b. What was it in particular that you wanted to know about PES? ______________________________________ 
 
2. Regard Nature as a Commodity      True             False 
a. 1) The contact with persons of my family/ relatives who know about PES 
    2) The contact with friends/ other people who know about PES                                       
    3) The contact with neighbours who know about PES 
    4) The existence of a property with PES close-by 
    5) The contact I had with intermediaries 
    6) The participation in an informational meeting about PES 
    7) The hearing about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper  
    8) The contact I had with Finafifo/ Minaet 
 
... led me to think that the nature and the forests now have a price which is more or 
less defined. 
        O                            
 
b. Before, I though that it is not possible to quantify the value of nature and forests, 
but now, due to  
                        1) contact with persons of my family/ relatives who know about PES, 
                        2) contact with friends/ other people who know about PES, 
                        3) contact with neighbours who know about PES,  
                        4) the existence of a property with PES close-by, 
                        5) contact I had with intermediaries, 
                        6) my participation in an informational meeting about PES,   
                        7) hearing about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper,   
                        8) contact I had with Fonafifo/ Minaet,   
 
... I think that it is well possible to quantify it.  
        O                            
 
c. I still view the environment and forests as a whole ecosystem and not as a 
particular service,  
                    1) the contact with persons of my family/ relatives who know about PES 
                    2) the contact with friends/ other people who know about PES                        
                         O           
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                     3) the contact with neighbours who know about PES 
                    4) the existence of a property with PES close-by 
                    5) the contact I had with intermediaries 
                    6) the participation in an informational meeting about PES 
                    7) the hearing about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper  
                    8) the contact I had with Finafifo/ Minaet 
 
... had no effect at all on this view (way of thinking). 
d. Do you think that these programms contribute to regard nature as a commodity/ good or do these 
programms have nothing to do with this?  ________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Perception over Usefulness of PES  Degree of  (dis)agreement 
a. I regard PES as a useful instrument to preserve forests and enhance biodiversity 
richness. 
       
 [Has she has checked a box with the number 4 or 5?                 
 Yes  →  continue with 3b              
 No   →  continue with block 3c] 
 
b. Why do you think that it is a useful instrument?  _________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c. Why do you think that it does not seem like a useful instrument? ____________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Motivational Changes Regarding the Environment   Degree of  (dis)agreement 
a. When    1a) I heard about PES from family-members/ relatives who know               
aaaaaaaaaaaaaiabout PES, 
                   1b) I noticed that family-members/ relatives had/have a PES contract,  
                   2a) I heard about PES from friends/ other people who know about PES,  
                   2b) I noticed that friends/ other people had/ have a PES contract,                   
kkkkkk kkk3a) I heard about PES from neighbours who know about PES,  
                   3b) I noticed that neighbours had/ have a PES contract,  
                     4) I noticed that there exists a property with PES close-by, 
                     5) I had contact with intermediaries,   
                     6) I participated in an informational meeting about PES,   
                     7) I heard about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper,   
                     8) I had contact with Finafifo/ Minaet, 
 
... my motivation to conserve the environment has gone down as I think that my 
own attempts to conserve the environment are not appreciated. 
       
 [Has she has checked a box with the number 4 or 5?                 
 Yes  →  continue with 4b              
 No   →  continue with block 4c] 
 
b. Can you explain a bit why your motivation has gone down? ________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c. When    1a) I heard about PES from family-members/ relatives who know               
aaaaaaaaaaaaaiabout PES, 
                   1b) I noticed that family-members/ relatives had/have a PES contract,  
                   2a) I heard about PES from friends/ other people who know about PES,  
                   2b) I noticed that friends/ other people had/ have a PES contract,                    
kkkkkkkk k3a) I heard about PES from neighbours who know about PES,  
                   3b) I noticed that neighbours had/ have a PES contract,  
                     4) I noticed that there exists a property with PES close-by, 
                     5) I had contact with intermediaries,   
                     6) I participated in an informational meeting about PES,   
                     7) I heard about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper,   
       
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                      8) I had contact with Finafifo/ Minaet, 
 
...I felt more motivated than before to undertake actions to conserve the 
environment. 
 [Has she has checked a box with the number 4 or 5?                 
 Yes  →  continue with 4d              
 No   →  continue with block 5] 
 
d. Can you explain a bit why you felt more motivated than before to undertake actions to conserve the 
environment? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
5. Perceptions over deforestation ban (Not) reasonable 
Let us think now of a person that you know who has a Finca/ property with forest. 
Do you think that it is reasonable that, even though it is his private property, the 
Forest Law says that it is not permitted to cut trees there or do you think that 
normally the owner should have the right to change the land use as he desires to?  
 
    Reasonable 
    Undecided 
    Not reasonable 
        
6. Perceptions over a better enforcement of the Forest Law Degree of  (dis)agreement 
1) The contact with persons of my family/ relatives who know about PES 
2) The contact with friends/ other people who know about PES                                           
3) The contact with neighbours who know about PES 
4) The existence of a property with PES close-by 
5) The contact I had with intermediaries 
6) The participation in an informational meeting about PES 
7) The hearing about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper  
8) The contact I had with Finafifo/ Minaet 
 
... led me to think that the government is now more capable than before to enforce 
the Forest Law. 
       
 
7. Perceptions over the importance of the Forest Law       Yes              No 
Do you also think that the Forest Law is now of greater importance compared to 
what you have thought about it earlier? 
                         
 
b. What do you generally think about the Forest Law? _______________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Justice with reference to the people who receive PES Degree of  (dis)agreement 
a. I think that it is fair that a person in my neighbourhood receives PES for forest 
protection, even though it’s already generally forbidden by the Forest Law to cut 
down trees or change the land use in a forest standing on private property.  
       
[Has she has checked a box with the number 4 or 5?                 
 Yes  →  continue with 8b. After 8b   →  continue with block 9 
 No   →  continue with block 8c] 
 
b. Why do you think that it is fair? ______________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
c. Why do you think that it is unfair? _____________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
d. You said that it is unfair. Can you also explain if there resulted any new perceptions/ feelings/ changes in 
views out of this with reference to the receivers of these payments?  __________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
e. Apart from effects in perceptions, did you notice a change in the relationship that you have with these 
persons?      No                  Yes   →   Please explain 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Perceptions over the importance of forest protection Degree of  (dis)agreement 
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 a. Due to…     1) contact with persons of my family/ relatives who know about PES, 
                        2) contact with friends/ other people who know about PES, 
                        3) contact with neighbours who know about PES,  
                        4) the existence of a property with PES close-by, 
                        5) contact I had with intermediaries, 
                        6) my participation in an informational meeting about PES,   
                        7) hearing about PES in the Radio/ TV/ Newspaper,   
                        8) contact I had with Fonafifo/ Minaet,   
 
...I now regard deforestation and forest destruction/ degradation as a bigger 
problem that what I have thought before.   
 
 
       
10. Motivation to do something for the environment  Number between 1 and 10 
If you had to describe your motivation to undertake actions in favour of the environment, such as recycle, save 
water or electricity etc., with a number ranging from 1 to 10 where 1 means that you don’t care at all and 
never think about how to do something for the environment and 10 means that you are super-motivated and 
always think about a way how to improve it, with which number would you describe yourself? ______(number) 
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 C.  Socio-economic information 
19 Gender?       [fill out without asking] 
 Masculine 
 Feminine 
 
20 In which year were you born? ____________________  
 
21 What is your marital status? ______________________ 
 
22 Since when do you live here in this house?   Since:  _____________ (year) 
 
23 a. What is the total size of your property? (all Fincas that you have)____________ (ha) 
         b. How many hectares of your property are covered with forests? _____________(ha) 
        c. Would you be eligible to apply for PES?               
            Yes          
            No         
            I don't know 
 
24 How many people live in your household (including yourself)? __________________ (number) 
 
25 What is your highest completed education level?  
 Completed primary 
 Completed secondary 
 Completed technician 
 Completed university 
 
26 What is your principal occupation?  __________________________________ 
 
27 Could you indicate in the following list the total consumption* per month in your home 
including all expenses of all persons living in the house? 
*Consumption includes all expenses that are not for the farm, for example food, clothing, school expenses 
(school, high school, university), expenses for the car, electrodomestics, reparations, medicines, doctor, medical 
insurances, gifts for friends or family, energy, telephone, water etc.. 
   Less than 25 000 colones       25 001 – 50 000 colones 
   50 001 – 100 000 colones        100 001 – 200 000 colones 
   200 001 – 300 000 colones       300 001 – 400 000 colones 
   400 001 – 500 000 colones       500 001 – 750 000 colones 
   750 001 – 1 000 000 colones       More than 1 000 000 colones 
 
 
 
      Are you interested in the results of this study? Please indicate your e-mail address in  
      order to send you the conclusion of the investigation: _________________________ 
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